Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138
CrPC
Section 200
An abuse of the process of law— The respondent filed the complaint bearing Criminal Case No. 648 of 2016 before JMFC, Kalwan, alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act on 15th December 2016 in relation to dishonoured Cheque No.010722. The JMFC issued the process on 2nd March 2017. Challenging the issuance of process, the appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition No. 2316 of 2017 before the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 18th December 2023. The High Court found no infirmities in the order of the JMFC issuing process and held that the contentions raised by the appellant could only be decided at trial.
While filing a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint. Accordingly, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The complaint bearing S.C. No. 648 of 2016 pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class at Kalwan and the order of cognizance dated 2nd March 2017 are hereby quashed and set aside. .....Rekha Sharad Ushir =VS= Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari, (Criminal), 2025(2) [19 LM (SC) 27] ....View Full Judgment

The Prevention of Corruption Act
Section 7 and
Cr.P.C
Sections 227/239
High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction– It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence.
Having considered the reasoning given by the High Court and the grounds which are weighed with the High Court while discharging the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239 Cr.P.C. While discharging the accused. The High Court materially erred in negating the exercise of considering the transcript in detail and in considering whether on the basis of the material on record the accused is likely to be convicted for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act or not. As observed hereinabove, the High Court was required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not. At the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. At this stage, it is to be noted that even as per Section 7 of the PC Act, even an attempt constitutes an offence. Therefore, the High Court has erred and/or exceeded in virtually holding a mini trial at the stage of discharge application.
The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court discharging the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is unsustainable in law and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly hereby quashed and set aside and the order passed by the learned Special Judge framing charge against the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is hereby restored. Now the case is to be tried against the accused by the competent court for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, in accordance with law and its own merits. ...State of Rajasthan =VS= Ashok Kumar Kashyap, [10 LM (SC) 15] ....View Full Judgment

Criminal complaint is an abuse of the process of Court and is required to be quashed–
The material on record is absolutely clear that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant No.1. The complainant has merely alleged that the funds came from his bank account but beyond such allegations no material has been placed on record at any stage. The stand taken by the appellants in their application under Section 245(2) CrPC is quite clear that the shares can be sold in the market and the proceeds can be divided between Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2. If Respondent No.2 is insisting on having complete ownership in respect of the concerned shares, the matter must first be established before a competent forum. We have considered the material on record through the steps indicated in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (supra) and are convinced that the instant case calls for interference under Section 482 CrPC. Further, from the facts that Appellant No.1 had disowned Respondent No.2 and had filed civil proceedings seeking appropriate orders against them, we are also convinced that the present criminal complaint is nothing but an attempt to wreck vengeance against the father, brother and the brother in law of the complainant. The instant criminal complaint is an abuse of the process of Court and is required to be quashed. Allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed by the Courts below and allow the application for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC in complaint No.3804 of 2009 on the file of third Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad. ...Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal =VS= State of Uttar Pradesh, (Criminal), 2019 (1) [6 LM (SC) 135] ....View Full Judgment

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138
Cr.P.C.
Section 255(2), 255(3)
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
Section 278
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
This Court is of the view that if the Accused is willing to pay in accordance with the aforesaid guidelines, the Court may suggest to the parties to go for compounding. If for any reason, the financial institutions/complainant asks for payment other than the cheque amount or settlement of entire loan or other outstanding dues, then the Magistrate may suggest to the Accused to plead guilty and exercise the power under Section 255(2) and/or 255(3) of the Cr.P.C. or 278 of the BNSS, 2023 and/or give the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the Accused. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court dated 16th April, 2009 is set aside and the judgment as well as the orders of Trial Court and Sessions Court are restored with a direction to the Respondent No.1-Accused to pay Rs.7,50,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Fifty Thousand) in 15 (fifteen) equated monthly instalment of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) each. The High Courts and District Courts shall implement the aforesaid guidelines not later than 01st November, 2025. .....Sanjabij Tari =VS= Kishore S. Borcar, (Criminal), 2025(2) [19 LM (SC) 34] ....View Full Judgment

The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 302 r/w
The Code of Criminal Procedure of India
Section 354(3)
Death Sentence: Indian Context–
Since the eclipse of the British suzerainty in 1947, Indian law and practice on death sentence went through periodic evolution.
While Section 302 of the substantive law, i.e., the Penal Code has remained static in allowing discretion in imposing either death sentence or life imprisonment, the abjective law, i.e., the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) made all the differences.
Uptil 1955, death sentence was the rule while life imprisonment stood as exception, because the British made Cr.P.C. of 1898, required the Court concerned to assign reason when it opted not to pass death sentence.
During the period between 1955 and April 1974, the amended Cr.P.C. removed the requirement of assigning reason in either case, leaving it to the Court’s discretion, and the judicial view was that death sentence remained the Rule while life term, an exception.
In 1973, Indian Parliament resolved to deface the made in UK Cr.P.C. and instead go for a home baked one. Under the new Cr.P.C. (of 1973) regime a Court in passing a death sentence is obliged to assign “special reason” (Section 354(3).
Indian Supreme Court maintains that the implication of the new regime is that life imprisonment is now the rule and death sentence exception (Abraham-v-State of MP, AIR 1976 S.C. 2196).
Indian Parliament, however, found no reason to abolish death penalty, and tacitly lent support to the view, Lord Macaulay’s team expressed, when they inserted Section 302 in the draft Penal Code in 1860, which was in following terms;
“First among the punishment provided for offences by this case stands death. No argument that has been brought to our notice has satisfied us that it would be desirable wholly to dispense with this punishment. But we are convinced that it ought to be very sparingly inflicted; and we propose to employ it only in cases where either murder or the highest offence against the state has been committed”.
Indian Supreme Court also rejected the contention more than once that death sentence is ultravires the Constitution (in Jagmohan-v-State, AIR 1973 S.C. 947, before 1973 Cr.P.C. and in Bachan Singh-v-State of Punjab, AIR 1980 S.C. 898, Alauddin Miah-v-State of Bihar, AIR 1989 S.C. 1456, Swami Sharddananda (2)-v-State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 S.C.C. 767, (post 1973 Cr.P.c.)
In interpreting Section 354(3) of the new Cr.P.C. Indian Supreme Court ordained in Bachan Singh-v-State of Punjab (1980) 2 S.C.C. 684 that the new Cr.P.C. means that death sentence can only be imposed in “rarest of the rare cases”.
Until 01.04.1974 the law as regards sentencing a person found guilty of murder, was no different from ours. v In propounding the “rarest of rare” theory a Constitution Bench of the Indian Supreme Court, rejecting however the plea that the law allowing death sentence was repugnant to constitutional mandate, expressed in Bachan Singh – V-State of Punjab (1980 2 SCC 684) that legislative policy in Section 354(3) of the 1973 Code is that for a person convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence, an exception, and mitigating circumstances must be given due consideration. The Supreme Court also ordained that a balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be struck.
“Rarest of rare” theory came up for Supreme Court’s holistic scrutiny shortly after that Court innovated this principle in Bachan Singh in 1980. It was the hall mark case of Manchi Singh-V-State of Punjab (1983 3 SCC 470). In elaborating this theory the Supreme Court surmoned that for practical application the “rarest of rare” principle must be read and understood in the background of the five categories of murder cases enumerated in it, and thus finally standardised and classified the cases, from which two Constitution Benches, (in Jagmohan and Bachi Singh) resolutely refrained from in the past.
In quick succession Machhi Singh-V-State of Punjab came up before the Indian Supreme Court with an inundation of onerous task of penological dissection on sentencing in murder cases. Unlike Bachan Singh, vires of death sentencing provision was not challenged, it was a normal appeal case.
In Manchi Singh, affirming capital punishment, the Supreme Court put itself in the position of the community and observed that though the community revered and protected life because the very humanistic edifice is constructed on the foundation of reverence for life principle, it may yet withdraw the protection and demand death penalty (page 487-89, para 32-37), keeping, nevertheless, in mind, the “rarest of rare matrix propounded in Bachan Singh. The Apex Court observed,
“32. It may do so in rarest of rare cases when its collective conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the Judicial Power Centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The community may entertain such a sentiment when the crime is viewed from the platform of the motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime, or the anti social or abhorrent nature of the crime, such as, for instance: 1. Manner of commission of murder.
33. When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diobolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to arose intense and extreme indignation of the community. For instance,
i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with the end in view to roast him alive in the house,
ii) when the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of torture or cruelty in order to bring about his or her death, iii) when the body of the victim is cut into pieces or his body is dismembered in a fiendish manner.
11. Motive for commission of murder
34. when the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness. For instance when (a) a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of money or reward, (b) a cold blooded murder is committed with a deliberate design in order to inherit property or to gain control over property of a ward or a person under the control of the murderer or vis-a-avis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or position of trust, or (c) a murder is committed in the course of betrayal of the motherland.
111. Anti Social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime.
35. (a) when murder of a member of a schedule cast or minority community etc is committed not for personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath. For instance when such a crime is committed in order to terrorise such persons and frighten them into fleeing from a place or in order to deprive them of, or make them surrender lands or benefits conferred on them with a view to reverse past injustices and in order to restore the social balance.
(b) In cases of “bride burning” and what are known as “dowry deaths” or when murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of infatuation. IV) Magnitute of Crime.
36. when the crime is enormouse in proportion. For instance when multiple murders, say all or almost all the members of a family or large number of persons of a particular caste, community or locality are committed. V. Personality of victim of murder;
37. when the victim of murder is (a) an innocent child who could not have, as has not provided even an excuse, much less, a provocation for murder (b) a helpless woman or a person rendered helpless by old age or infirmity (c) when the victim is a person vis-à-vis whom the murderer is in a position of domination or trust (d) when the victim is a public figure generally loved and respected by the community for the services rendered by him and the murder is committed for political or similar reasons other than personal reasons”.
It will emerge from the following discussions that the number of “rarest of rare’ case have by no means remained in shallow captivity. The list is quite a flared one. (Paras:1010-1022); .....Allama Delwar Hossain Sayedee =VS= Government of Bangladesh, (Criminal), 2017 (1)-[2 LM (AD) 76] ....View Full Judgment

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Sections 138, 143(A), 145(2)
The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Section 357
The remedy for failure to pay interim compensation as directed by the court is thus provided for by the Legislature–– The right to cross-examine the respondent was denied to the Appellant, the decisions rendered by the courts below suffer from an inherent infirmity and illegality. Therefore, Supreme Court have no hesitation in allowing this appeal and setting aside the decisions of all three courts with further direction that Complaint Case No. 244 of 2019 shall stand restored to the file of the Trial Court. The Trial Court is directed to permit the Appellant to cross-examine the Respondent and then take the proceedings to a logical conclusion. With these observations the appeal is allowed.–– It is also directed that 20% of the cheque amount namely Rs.1,40,000/- must be deposited by the Appellant as interim compensation. .....Noor Mohammed =VS= Khurram Pasha, (Criminal), 2022(2) [13 LM (SC) 1] ....View Full Judgment

The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138
CrPC
Section 391
The appellant preferred an appeal before the Principal Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar and during pendency thereof, he filed an application under Section 391 CrPC for taking additional evidence at appellate stage and seeking a direction to obtain the opinion of the handwriting expert after comparing the admitted signature of the accused appellant and the signature as appearing on the disputed cheque. Another prayer made in the said application was that the concerned officer from the Post Office should be summoned so as to prove the defence theory that the notice under Section 138 of NI Act was never received by the accused appellant. The appellant had sought for comparison of the signature as appearing on the cheque through the handwriting expert by filing an application before the trial Court which rejected the same vide order dated 13th June, 2019. The said order was never challenged and had thus attained finality. So far as the allegation of the accused appellant that he did not receive the notice under Section 138 of the NI Act is concerned, it would be for the appellate Court while deciding the appeal to examine such issue based on the evidence available on record and thus, there was no requirement for the appellate Court to have exercised power under Section 391 CrPC for summoning the official from the Post Office and had rightly rejected the application under Section 391 CrPC. .....Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod =VS= State of Gujarat, (Criminal), 2024(2) [17 LM (SC) 1] ....View Full Judgment

Bail–
In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chatterjee and Another [3 (2010) 14 SCC 496], it was held that:
(i) Whether there was a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of accusations;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of a conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if granted bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of repetition of the offence;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.
There is no doubt that liberty is important, even that of a person charged with crime but it is important for the courts to recognise the potential threat to the life and liberty of victims/witnesses, if such accused is released on bail. Allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to the accused. ...Sudha Singh =VS= The State of Uttar Pradesh, (Criminal), 2021(1) [10 LM (SC) 23] ....View Full Judgment

Bail– There is no doubt that the grant or denial of bail is entirely the discretion of the judge considering a case but even so, the exercise of judicial discretion has been circumscribed by a large number of decisions rendered by this Court and by every High Court in the country. Yet, occasionally there is a necessity to introspect whether denying bail to an accused person is the right thing to do on the facts and in the circumstances of a case. We are concerned, is that during the entire period of investigations which appear to have been spread over seven months, the appellant was not arrested by the investigating officer. Even when the appellant apprehended that he might be arrested after the charge sheet was filed against him, he was not arrested for a considerable period of time. When he approached the Allahabad High Court for quashing the FIR lodged against him, he was granted two months time to appear before the trial judge. All these facts are an indication that there was no apprehension that the appellant would abscond or would hamper the trial in any manner. That being the case, the trial judge, as well as the High Court ought to have judiciously exercised discretion and granted bail to the appellant. It is nobody’s case that the appellant is a shady character and there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant had earlier been involved in any unacceptable activity, let alone any alleged illegal activity. The appellant is granted bail on conditions that may be reasonably fixed by the trial judge. .....Dataram Singh = VS= State of Uttar Pradesh, (Criminal), 2018 (1) [4 LM (SC) 110] ....View Full Judgment

The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Sections 420 and 109 r/w
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 482
No criminal proceeding against lawyers, doctors, architects and some special skills– Quashing the criminal proceeding– The High Court while quashing the criminal proceedings in respect of the respondent herein has gone into the allegations in the charge sheet and the materials placed for his scrutiny and arrived at a conclusion that the same does not disclose any criminal offence committed by him. It also concluded that there is no material to show that the respondent herein joined hands with A-1 to A-3 for giving false opinion. In the absence of direct material, he cannot be implicated as one of the conspirators of the offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 109 of IPC. In the banking sector in particular, rendering of legal opinion for granting of loans has become an important component of an advocate’s work. In the law of negligence, professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects and others are included in the category of persons professing some special skills. A lawyer does not tell his client that he shall win the case in all circumstances. Likewise a physician would not assure the patient of full recovery in every case. A surgeon cannot and does not guarantee that the result of surgery would invariably be beneficial, much less to the extent of 100% for the person operated on. It is beyond doubt that a lawyer owes an “unremitting loyalty” to the interests of the client and it is the lawyer’s responsibility to act in a manner that would best advance the interest of the client. Merely because his opinion may not be acceptable, he cannot be mulcted with the criminal prosecution, particularly, in the absence of tangible evidence that he associated with other conspirators. At the most, he may be liable for gross negligence or professional misconduct if it is established by acceptable evidence and cannot be charged for the offence under Sections 420 and 109 of IPC along with other conspirators without proper and acceptable link between them. Supreme Court is satisfied that there is no prima facie case for proceeding in respect of the charges alleged insofar as respondent herein is concerned. This Court agrees with the conclusion of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings and reject the stand taken by the CBI. .....Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Hyderabad =VS= K. Narayana Rao, (Criminal), 2022(1) [12 LM (SC) 19] ....View Full Judgment

Code of Criminal Procedure [India]
Section 482
Indian Penal Code
Sections 307, 323, 427, 447 and 506(2) r/w sec. 34
Quash proceeding– The High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters–– The High Court rightly refused to quash the criminal complaint, observing that it can exercise power under Section 482 of the CrPC only in rare cases. The power to quash the proceedings is generally exercised when there is no material to proceed against the Petitioners even if the allegations in the complaint are prima facie accepted as true. The High Court in effect found, and rightly, that the allegations in the complaint coupled with the statements recorded by the learned Magistrate had the necessary ingredients of offences under Sections 307, 323, 427, 447 and 506(2) read with Section 34 of the IPC. Supreme Court agrees with the High Court that this is not a fit case to quash the criminal proceedings for the reasons discussed above. …Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu =VS= State of Andhra Pradesh, (Criminall), 2021(2) [11 LM (SC) 26] ....View Full Judgment

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138 r/w Section 141
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 482
Non-executive directors cannot be held liable under section 138 NI Act unless specific evidence proves their active involvement— Perusal of the record and submissions of the parties, it is evident that the Appellant was neither a signatory to the dishonoured cheques nor was he actively involved in the financial decision-making of the company. Moreover, he resigned from the post of independent non-executive director on 03.05.2017, duly notified through Form DIR-11 and DIR-12 to the Registrar of Companies. The complaints do not contain any specific averments detailing how the Appellant was responsible for the dishonoured cheques.
The legal precedents cited above, including Pooja Ravinder (supra), clearly hold that non-executive directors cannot be held liable under section 138 NI Act unless specific evidence proves their active involvement. The Impugned Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2019 of the High Court is set aside, and the criminal proceedings against the Appellant in Complaint Nos. 66/SS, 645/SS, 697/SS, 1595/SS (all) of 2017 pending against the present Applicant before the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate 28th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai are hereby quashed. .....Kamalkishor Shrigopal Taparia =VS= India Ener-Gen, (Criminal), 2025(2) [19 LM (SC) 64] ....View Full Judgment

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138 r/w Section 141
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 482
Appellant(s) attended board meetings does not suffice to impose financial liability on the Appellant(s), as such attendance does not automatically translate into control over financial operations— It is evident that the Appellant(s) neither issued nor signed the dishonoured cheques, nor had any role in their execution. There is no material on record to suggest that they were responsible for the issuance of the cheques in question. Their involvement in the company’s affairs was purely non-executive, confined to governance oversight, and did not extend to financial decision making or operational management.
The complaint lacks specific averments that establish a direct nexus between the Appellant(s) and the financial transactions in question or demonstrate their involvement in the company’s financial affairs. Additionally, the CGR(s) and ROC records unequivocally confirm their non-executive status, underscoring their limited role in governance without any executive decision-making authority. The mere fact that Appellant(s) attended board meetings does not suffice to impose financial liability on the Appellant(s), as such attendance does not automatically translate into control over financial operations. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment and Order dated 28.11.2023 of the High Court is set aside, and the criminal proceedings against the Appellant(s) in Complaint No(s). 15858 and 15857 of 2017 pending before the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,New Delhi are hereby quashed. The appeals are allowed. .....K. S. Mehta =VS= M/S Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt., (Criminal), 2025(2) [19 LM (SC) 69] ....View Full Judgment

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Section 482
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
Section 17
When the notice was issued to the appellant, he was not in charge of the corporate debtor— The appellant did not have the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by the respondent by way of the notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 NI Act. When the notice was issued to the appellant, he was not in charge of the corporate debtor as he was suspended from his position as the director of the corporate debtor as soon as IRP was appointed on 25.07.2018. Therefore, the powers vested with the board of directors were to be exercised by the IRP in accordance with the provisions of IBC. All the bank accounts of the corporate debtor were operating under the instructions of the IRP, hence, it was not possible for the appellant to repay the amount in light of section 17 of the IBC. Additionally, Supreme Court has been informed on behalf of the appellant that, after the imposition of the moratorium, the IRP had made a public announcement inviting the claims from the creditors of the Corporate Debtor and the respondent has filed a claim with the IRP.
Supreme Court is of the considered view that the High Court ought to have quashed the case against the appellant by exercising its power under section 482 of the CrPC. Therefore, this Court allow this appeal by setting aside the impugned order dated 21.12.2021 and quash the summoning order dated 07.09.2018. Further, this Court hereby quash the complaint case no.15580/2018, pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Chandigarh, filed by the respondent against the appellant. .....Vishnoo Mittal =VS= M/S Shakti Trading Company, (Criminal), 2025(2) [19 LM (SC) 75] ....View Full Judgment

Dowry Prohibition Act 1961
Section-6 r/w
Cr.P.C
Section 482
Quashment– In the absence of specific allegations of entrustment of the dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6, in our view, continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed. .....Bobbili Ramakrishna Raju =VS= State of Andhra Pradesh, [1 LM (SC) 610] ....View Full Judgment

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138
CrPC
Section 482
Commission of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act–– The High Court quashed the summoning order issued by the Trial Court–– The classification of the underlying debt or liability as being barred by limitation is a question that must be decided based on the evidence adduced by the parties. We agree with aforesaid opinion. Undoubtedly, the question regarding the time barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. The appeal is allowed, and the Impugned Order is set aside. The proceedings emanating from the Underlying Complaint i.e., CC No. 6437 of 2017 is restored to the file of the Trial Court. .....Atamjit Singh =VS= State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. , (Criminal), 2024(1) [16 LM (SC) 1] ....View Full Judgment

The Electricity Act
Section 135 r/w
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 482
Quash– The filing of FIR after passing of the award by the Lok Adalat was wholly unjust and illegal and the same was not permissible being against the terms of the award and also for want of any subsisting cause of action arising out of demand. It is, therefore, not legally sustainable–– Settlement of the case and receiving the payment, the BSES filed FIR No.548/15 against the appellant on 21.03.2015 under Section 135 of the Electricity Act in P.S. Malviya Nagar, South Delhi in relation to the same demand. ––The appellant felt aggrieved by the registration of FIR against him and filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) in the High Court challenging its registration as being bad in law. ––The High Court, by impugned order, dismissed the petition, which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by way special leave by the appellant in this Court. ––In our opinion, the effect of passing of an award was that dispute in relation to the demand raised by the BSES was settled amicably between the parties leaving no dispute surviving. The original demand was for Rs.97,786/whereas the dispute was settled at Rs.83,120/in full and final satisfaction of the claim made by the BSES against the appellant. ––The filing of FIR after passing of the award by the Lok Adalat was wholly unjust and illegal and the same was not permissible being against the terms of the award and also for want of any subsisting cause of action arising out of demand. It is, therefore, not legally sustainable. ––The appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. As a consequence, the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code by the appellant is allowed and FIR No. 548/2015 registered in PS Malviya Nagar, South Delhi against the appellant is hereby quashed. .....Saleem Ahmed =VS= State, (Criminal), 2023(1) [14 LM (SC) 8] ....View Full Judgment

Quashing the complaint–
In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Limited and Ors v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another6 this Court referred to State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.7 and summarized and illustrated the category of cases in which power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code could be exercised. This court observed and held:-
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." [6 2005 (1) SCC 122; 7 (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335]
The High Court clearly erred in law in dismissing the complaint, which certainly disclosed an offence prima facie. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that it was not for the High Court to enter the factual arena and adjudicate the merits of the allegations. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order of the High Court quashing the complaint is set aside. The first respondent shall proceed with further investigation in accordance with law. ...V. Ravi Kumar =VS= State, Tamil Nadu, (Criminal), 2019 (1) [6 LM (SC) 126] ....View Full Judgment