Mandatory injunction is granted at the interim stage–
The granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:-
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.” This judgment also makes it clear that when a mandatory injunction is granted at the interim stage much more than a mere prima facie case has to be made out. None of the aforesaid statutory provisions or judgments have either been adverted to or heeded by the impugned judgment.
Set aside the impugned judgment and restore the judgment of the Courts below.
The suit filed is a Section 6 suit which is a summary proceeding in itself, the trial Court should endeavour to dispose of the Suit itself within a period of six months from today. ...Tek Singh =VS= Shashi Verma, (Civil), 2019 (1) [6 LM (SC) 7] ....View Full Judgment

Specific performance of contract against the defendants in relation to the suit land–
By judgment/decree dated 29.08.1980, the Trial Court dismissed the suit insofar as it pertained to grant of relief of specific performance of contract was concerned but decreed the suit by granting money decree for Rs.7000/- in plaintiff's favour. In this way, the suit was partly decreed and partly dismissed. The plaintiff-Gurbachan Kaur alone filed the first appeal in the Court of District Judge. So far as the defendants are concerned, they did not file any appeal against the money decree suffered by them. By judgment/decree date 06.11.1984, the first Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Felt aggrieved, the plaintiff- Gurbachan Kaur carried the matter further and filed Second Appeal before the High Court. The appeal was admitted for final hearing on substantial questions of law framed by the High Court. Gurnam Singh(respondent-defendant No.4) also died on 19.04.2002. Legal representatives on record to enable them to prosecute the lis involved in the appeal. On 18.05.2010, the High Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the judgment/decree of the two Courts below and decreed the plaintiff's suit for specific performance of the contract against the defendants in relation to the suit land. It is against this judgment of the High Court, the legal representatives of defendant No.2(Late Joginder Singh) and defendant No.4(Late Gurnam Singh) filed the present appeal by way of special leave petition and sought permission to question its legality and correctness. It is a settled principle of law that the decree passed by a Court for or against a dead person is a “nullity”. In our view, the objection, therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment/decree. .....Gurnam Singh =VS= Gurbachan Kaur, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (SC) 17] ....View Full Judgment

The Specific Relief Act, 1963
Section 16(c) r/w
The Limitation Act, 1963
Article 54
Specific performance of agreement of sale– The High Court has wrongly observed that the plaintiff has not produced any evidence to prove that he demanded the performance of sale after the execution of the agreement of sale. The filing of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale is governed by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, read with Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The plaintiff has specifically averred in his plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract under the agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993. It was also specifically stated that the plaintiff had been demanding that the first defendant receive the balance consideration of Rs. 58,800/and execute a regular registered sale deed at his cost, but the first defendant had been avoiding the specific performance of the agreement of sale. In light of this, in our considered opinion, all the formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff for getting a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled. Moreover, there cannot be any proof of oral demand. Be that as it may, we are satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance consideration to the first defendant and was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In view of reasons, the impugned judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court stands restored. The appeals are allowed accordingly. .....Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy =VS= Baddam Pratapa Reddy, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (SC) 28] ....View Full Judgment

Without paying rent and actual possession of the property on the date of the suit, he is not entitled for the decree for permanent injunction–
In a suit filed under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, possession on the date of suit is a must for grant of permanent injunction. When the first respondent-plaintiff has failed to prove that he was in actual possession of the property on the date of the suit, he is not entitled for the decree for permanent injunction. In our considered view, the First Appellate Court and the High Court fell in error by presuming that the first respondent-plaintiff was in possession by merely relying upon the prior suit filed by the appellant-defendant for possession and Purshis Ex.-41. The impugned order of the High Court affirming the findings of the First Appellate Court is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. The impugned judgment dated 23.06.2016 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.6873/2016 is set aside and this appeal is allowed. ...Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande =VS= Balkrishna Rambharose, (Civil), 2019 (1) [6 LM (SC) 1] ....View Full Judgment