Provides for dismissal of suit barred by limitation—
Article 44— Suit to challenge deed of transfer to be instituted within 3 years of attaining majority—
Suit challenging deed of transfer made during minority shall have to be instituted within 3 (three) years of attaining majority or within 12 years of execution and registration of the deed. Suit instituted beyond the period of limitation is liable to be dismissed. Lal Miah (Md.) Vs. Md. Anwar Hossain @ Ami 14 MLR (2009) (AD) 24.

The provisions contained in sections 4, 9-18 and 22 of the Limitation Act are applicable in determining the period of limitation prescribed by any special law for filing any suit, appeal or application where such special law does not expressly exclude the applicability of the provisions of these sections of the Limitation Act. The remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply in any proceeding under any special law.
The Appellate Division held that the the appellant preferred an appeal against the judgment of the Election Tribunal before the court of District Judge- which was a wrong forum. Subsequently the District Judge returned the memo of appeal on 06.01.2010 and thereafter on the very next day the appellant filed the same before the Election Appellate Tribunal- the right forum. There is no allegation that the appellant was not bonafide in filing and prosecuting with the appeal in the court of District Judge which had no jurisdiction. So, in the circumstances the time during which the appellant was prosecuting with the appeal before the court of District Judge shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed by the special law i.e. the Local Government (Upazilla Parishad) Ordinance, 2008 for filing the appeal against the judgment of the Election Tribunal as per section 14 of the Limitation Act- the application of which has not been excluded by this special law. Evidently, the High Court Division was not correct in coming to the finding that the Local Government (Upazilla Parishad) Ordinance, 2008 and the Local Government (Upazilla Parishad) Rules, 2008 being special laws and the period of limitation prescribed under section 13(4) of the Ordinance and Rules 65(3) being different from that prescribed in the Limitation Act, any proceeding thereunder is excluded from the operation of section 29(2) read with section 14 or from any other provisions of the Limitation Act, and therefore, the benefit of section 14 or any other provisions of Limitation Act is not available in computing the period of limitation in filing any election tribunal case or election appeal there-from and thus in holding that the election appeal filed before the Election Appellate Tribunal was barred by limitation. Appellate Division makes it clear again that the provisions contained in sections 4, 9-18 and 22 of the Limitation Act are applicable in determining the period of limitation prescribed by any special law for filing any suit, appeal or application where such special law does not expressly exclude the applicability of the provisions of these sections of the Limitation Act. The remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply in any proceeding under any special law.
Abdul Wahab Sheik -Vs- Md. Kamal Hossain Md. Kalam Hossain and others. (Civil) 11 ALR (AD) 100-104

The Limitation Act, 1908
Sections 4 to 25
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925
Article III Rule 6 of the Schedule/Rules
Filing the suit for loss or damage to goods– The period of limitation for filing any suit for loss or damage to goods that occurred in the course of carriage, will be one year from the date of delivery of the goods. The well-established principle of law based on this section is that the defendant’s failure to plead the bar of limitation as a defence will not save the suit from being barred by limitation unless any of the provisions mentioned in sections 4 to 25 are applicable.
Hence, we find that the filing of the suit in Singapore on 05.05.2001 beyond the period of one year from the date when the goods were delivered, or at the latest from 05.03.2000 when the joint survey report was published, was barred by limitation. Even if the defendants do not plead the bar of limitation, the court cannot ignore the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act in the absence of the provisions of sections 4 to 25 of the said Act. ...Eximpo Trading Limited =VS= M.V. Banglar Kakoli, (Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 575] ....View Full Judgment

In an enactment if the procedure for filing the case and limitation is provided, the provision is taken to be a special law and the court’s discretionary power to extend the period of limitation is excluded in view of section 29 of the Limitation Act. In other words, it may be said that special law is a law which deals with any special law contrary to the general law and in such law the court’s power to exercise its discretion to extend the period of limitation under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been excluded. In such a case, the court is left with no discretion even it finds injustice to a party to extend the period of limitation. A special law is a law dealing with a particular subject enacted for the special cases in the special circumstances as distinguished from the general law which applies generally on the question of limitation though the Limitation Act is a general law.
Md. Motaleb Hossain: -Vs.- Abdul Haque Limon and another: (Criminal) 11 ALR (AD) 105-110

More than one year and nine months was consumed to start a part file and the leave petition was filed out of time by 1340 days. Such gross negligence and inordinate delay on the part of Solicitor Wing should not be condoned otherwise the officers of the Solicitor Wing will be encouraged to be more irresponsible and negligent in their official duties. Government of Bangladesh & ors vs Alauddin & ors 6 BLC (AD) 101.

There has been a delay of 542 days in filing the revisional application by the appellant. In the background of the provision of law the suit filed by the respondents and decreed by the Courts below was being totally noh-entertainable by the civil Court, the High Court Division was required to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to correct the gross error committed by the Courts below. The High Court Division was not correct in refusing to condone the delay and consequent thereupon in not entertaining the revisional application. Director of Housing and Settlement vs Abdul Majid Howlader and ors 9 BLC (AD) 51. ....View Full Judgment

Trade Mark Act, 2009; Section 2(12), 100
Trade Mark Rules, 2015 Rule 10, 14, 15 and 50(1)
Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) Rules, 1973
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh; Article 107(1)
Code of Civil Procedure Order XLI Rule 1, Order XLIII Rule 2
Limitation Act, 1908 (1st Schedule) Section 5, 29(2) and Article 156
Since Bangladesh Supreme Court (High Court Division) Rules, 1973 does not prescribe any time limit for preferring appeal before the High Court Division against the order passed by the Registrar under the Act, 2009 as such, the time frame as prescribed in Rule 50(1) of the Rules of 2015 is applicable. ...Kazi Md. Kamrul Islam Vs. Registrar, Dep. of PDTM & ors, (Civil), 18 SCOB [2023] HCD 1 ....View Full Judgment

Limitation Act, 1908 Section 5, 29(2) and Article 156 of the 1st Schedule
Trade Mark Act, 2009 Section 100(2)
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 cannot be applied for condoning delay in preferring appeal under Section 100(2) of the Trade Mark Act, 2009: It is the established principles of law that under special law when time period has been prescribed for preferring appeal Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 cannot be applied unless incorporated by the Legislature in express terms. Trade Mark Act, 2009 being a special law and having prescribed specific period for preferring appeal before the High Court Division as such, in the absence of incorporation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 it shall have no manner of application for condoning delay in preferring appeal under Section 100(2) of the Act, 2009. ...Kazi Md. Kamrul Islam Vs. Registrar, Dep. of PDTM & ors, (Civil), 18 SCOB [2023] HCD 1 ....View Full Judgment

Limitation Act, 1908
Section 5
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Order XLVII Rule 1
Having gone through the application for condonation of delay filed by the Government along with that civil petition it appears that the application does not contain any specific explanation as required under section 5 of the Limitation Act which prescribes that every days delay has to be explained properly up to the satisfaction of the Court concerned. In that circumstances the order dated 14.12.2017 has been passed dismissing the civil petition for leave to appeal and Appellate Division does not find any error apparent on the face of it discovered by the review petition which is liable to be dismissed. .....Ministry of Law, Bangladesh =VS= Md. Touhidul Islam, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 228] ....View Full Judgment

The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 104
The Limitation Act, 1908
Section 5
It is simply a fault of the engaged Counsels of the appellant. It is an established principle of administration of justice that parties should not suffer for the laches and negligence of their engaged Advocates– It is found that the cost amount was paid as directed within stipulated time, however, the present appellant failed to produce before the High Court Division the documents manifesting payment of sum. It is simply a fault of the engaged Counsels of the appellant. It is an established principle of administration of justice that parties should not suffer for the laches and negligence of their engaged Advocates. Appellate Division decides to condone the delay of 11 days and consider the Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal at least for doing complete justice in exercise of its power under Article 104 of the Constitution. The appeal is allowed without any order as to cost. The earlier judgment of this Division is reviewed. The impugned judgments and orders of the High Court Division dated 06-07-2003 and 22-08-2004 treating the Rule is discharged and refusing its recalled the said order respectively are hereby set aside. The High Court Division is directed to hear the motion on merit. .....Deputy Commissioner, Gazipur =VS= Md. Idris Ali, (Civil), 2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 56] ....View Full Judgment

The delay caused in filing the revisional application by the Government was due to the exhaustion of the official formalities which was beyond its control and it was not an inordinate one, so it should have been condoned:
The facts and circumstances clearly indicate that the different offices of the Government are so connected that one cannot work without co-operation and assistance from the other. In the instant case, it appears that the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Netrokona, initiated the proposal to file a revisional application before the High Court Division but it could not do so without obtaining the necessary papers and the opinion of the Government pleader and concerned authority. However, it appears that the record was sent to the office of the Solicitor and thereafter, the record was sent to the office of the learned Attorney General and then an Assistant Attorney General was entrusted to take all necessary steps regarding filing of the same in the High Court Division under section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In these circumstances, the reasons for delay of 403 days in filing the revisional application as stated in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act by the defendantpetitioners cannot be disregarded and discarded simply because the individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the application for condonation of delay since he is a person legally injured. Whereas, the state being impersonal machinery has to work through different offices or servants and from one table to another table in different offices. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case it appears that the delay caused in filing the revisional application was due to the exhaustion of the official formalities and as such, the same is beyond the control of the defendant petitioners and moreover, the aforesaid delay of 403 days is not an inordinate one and as such, if the same is not condoned the defendant leave petitioners shall be led to irreparable loss and injury. ...Govt. of Bangladesh & ors Vs. Md. Abdul Jalil & ors, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] AD 74 ....View Full Judgment

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Sections 47, 48(2)(a)
Limitation Act, 1908
Sections 5, 14 and article 182
Condonation of delay– The Executing Court in rejecting such applications opined that the decree holder filed the decree execution Case No.4 of 1990 which was dismissed on 06/06/1992 for want of steps. On 13/11/2000, 2nd decree execution case being Case No.05 of 2000 was filed, which was admittedly delayed by 8 years and 4 months. The decree holder took the pretext to condone the delay in an application under section 48(2)(a) of the Code. The Executing Court found that decree holder had filed another suit being other Suit No.35 of 1992 and proceeded well ahead without any hindrance for the same time. Furthermore, some criminal cases were not at the period of limitation but later like G.R. Case No.32 of 1998, non G.R. Case No.33 of 1998 and C.R. Case were out of period of limitation, however, execution case was dismissed on 06/06/1992, hence, the Court disbelieved the aforementioned pretexts to allow the aforementioned applications. .....Moslehuddin Ahmed =VS= Abdul Gafur, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 188] ....View Full Judgment

The Limitation Act
Section 5
The Code of Civil Procedure
Section 115 (1)
Delay condone–– The application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, it appears that the petitioners have properly explained the reasons for which they could not prefer the instant revisional application before the High Court Division in time. And as such, Appellate Division is of the view that there is no latches or negligence on the part of the petitioners and they have been able to explain the cause of delay in filing revisional application which in this Division’s view, fulfills the requirement as spelled out under section 5 of the Limitation Act upto the satisfaction of the Court and as such, we are inclined to condone the delay. ––The impugned judgment and order of the High Court Division is set aside. The delay of 403 days in filing the revisional application before the High Court Division is condoned. The High Court Division is directed to hear the substantive revisional application under section 115 (1) of the Code as In Re motion in accordance with law. .....Deputy Commissioner, Netrokona =VS= Md. Abdul Jalil, (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 196] ....View Full Judgment

Condonation of delay– Government in various stages Appellate Division takes sympathetic and lenient view and allow consideration of delay of Government cases in many cases– Appellate Division is of the view that the alleged negligence and latches on the part of the government petitioner in filing of the civil rule by delay of 310 days overcoming all the hurdles of red taping and procedural intricacies seem to be not willful. Moreover, taking into account the government’s pledge that they would be more and more careful in future in this regard and seeking for mercy of the Hon'ble Court, we are inclined to give the government another chance to place their case for merit consideration. The Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal is disposed of. Impugned order of the High Court Division is set aside. The delay of 310 days in filing the revisional application is hereby condoned. The High Court Division is directed to hear the motion. .....Deputy Commissioner, Khulna =VS= Khan Abdus Salam, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 323] ....View Full Judgment

Condone the delay of 1477 days– No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the Government vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of "sufficient cause"– There is no gainsaying that the Government decisions are taken by officers/ agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay, intentional or otherwise, is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape on the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the revisional applications brought by the Government are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of "sufficient cause" for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merit unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the Government vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of "sufficient cause". Considering the legal principles, the inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 1477 days deserves condonation. Therefore, the judgment and order of the High Court Division refusing to condone the delay is set-aside. The High Court Division is directed to hear the revisional application as a motion. .....Mymensingh Forest Division, Bangladesh =VS= Abdur Sobhan, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 327] ....View Full Judgment

Satisfactory explanation of delay is the pre-requisite for condoning the delay in filing appeal. Additional Deputy Commissioner, (Rev.) Narayangonj Vs. Dr. Mir Abdul Hakim being dead his heirs Mir Abu Shahid and others 2 MLR (AD) (1997) 231.

Condonation of delay
Government stands on equal footing with ordinary litigants—Inordinate delay caused by gross negligence on the part of Government Law officers—Not condoned.
The petition for leave to appeal filed after 1340 days with a prayer for condonation of delay by the Government of Bangladesh Government stands on the same footing with ordinary litigants. It cannot deserve unlimited latitude in matters of condonation of delay. Though in many cases of the Government, delay is condoned upon sympathetic considerations as the file of the Government moves through different stages and time-consuming procedures. But an inordinate delay of 1340 days arising out of the gross negligence of Government officials cannot be condoned. Appropriate action should be taken against the delinquent officers for their laches and negligence, causing losses to the Government.
It is really surprising to know that more than one year and nine months were consumed to start a part-file and to file the leave petition. This is a gross negligence on the part of the Solicitor Wing, which cannot be condoned.
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Works and others Vs Mr. Alauddin, 21 BLD (AD) 35.

If an appeal (like the instant appeal) is dismissed on ground of limitation, conflicting decision is likely in the other appeal when decided on merit. Md. Suruzzamal Vs. Bangladesh and another, 13 BLD (AD) 125.

For admitting a time- barred appeal. the Court first of all is to be satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time- the appellant has to make out a case of sufficient cause by filing an application for condonation of delay.
The practice of admitting a time-barred appeal ‘ subject to objections at the hearing is not surely a sound one and must be discouraged except, in marginal cases. When the delay is long the court must make the exercise under section 5 of the Imitation Act before admitting the appeal with notice to the respondent. Mointazuddin and another Vs. Yakub Ali, 13 BLD (AD) 219.

Petition is barred by limitation of 195 days grounds taken for condonation are that the relevant Ministry asked legal opinion for filing a leave petition and also to get a certified copy of the High Court Division order, that the file was sent to the Attorney General and then to the Additional Attorney General for opinion, that thereafter, it was sent to the solicitor who was pleased to appoint an ‘Advocate-on-Record, that the solicitors office asked the Ministry of Home Affairs for supplying necessary documents and papers, that thereafter necessary fund was sought for etc, — there is no good ground for its condonation—petition dismissed. [Para-2] The Principal Secretary Vs. Mohammad Abdul Baten 2 BLT (AD)-90

If an appeal against an order of acquittal is filed by the Government either before the High Court Division or the Court of Session beyond the period as provides in Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908, Then in such a case an application seeking condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is very much entertainable if the Court is satisfied with the explanation offered as to how delay occurred, then is quite competent to condone the delay. Dr. M. A. Mazed & Ors Vs. Bangladesh & Ors 12 BLT (AD)-154

Delay of 996 days condoned– Government machinery runs through several hands and the delay in such circumstances cannot altogether be avoided– While hearing the Rule on condonation of delay, the High Court Division should have considered that the State machinery moves or functions through so many agencies. When the machinery is run by so many hands, it is not also possible for such machinery to come before the Court within the quickest possible time. Although the Court is generally reluctant to consider the question of delay in favour of the Government, yet in the context of thing it should not be ignored that the Government machinery runs through several hands and the delay in such circumstances cannot altogether be avoided. Instead of considering this aspect of the case, the High Court Division discharged the Rule on condonation of delay.
This civil appeal is allowed without any order as to costs and the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court Division is set aside. Delay of 996 days in preferring the revisional application is hereby condonded. A Single Bench of the High Court Division having Rule issuing power is directed to hear the revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to consider the question of issuance of the Rule. ...ADC (Rev) =VS= Most. Monowara Khatun, (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 38] ....View Full Judgment

ধারা ৫ সহজ সরল পাঠ এটি কাঁচের মত স্পষ্ট যে, কোন আপীল বা রায় পুনর্বিচার বা পুনরীক্ষণের দরখাস্ত বা আপীল করার অনুমতি প্রার্থনার দরখাস্ত বা অন্য কোন দরখাস্ত, যার উপর এই ধারা বর্তমান কার্যকর অন্য কোন আইনের দ্বারা বা অধীন প্রযোজ্য করা হয়, তাঁর নির্দিষ্ট তামাদির মেয়াদ উত্তীর্ণ হওয়ার পর গৃহীত হতে পারে, যদি আপীলকারী বা দরখাস্তকারী এই মর্মে আদালতকে সন্তুষ্ট করতে পারে যে, নির্ধারিত মেয়াদের মধ্যে আপীল দায়ের বা দরখাস্তটি দাখিল না করার যথেষ্ট কারণ ছিল। অর্থাৎ কোন আপীল দায়ের, রায় পুনর্বিচার দায়ের, পুননিরিক্ষণের দরখাস্ত দায়ের আপীল করার অনুমতি প্রার্থনায় এবং অন্য কোন দরখাস্ত দায়ের বর্তমান কার্যকর কোন আইন দ্বারা বা কোন আইনের অধীন তামাদি আইনের ৫ ধারার বিধান প্রযোজ্য করা হল তামাদির নির্দিষ্ট মেয়াদ উত্তীর্ণ হওয়ার পরেও আদালতের সন্তুষ্টি সাপেক্ষে আপীল দায়ের বা দরখাস্ত গৃহীত হতে পারে। ...বিগ বস কর্পোরেশন লিমিটেড বনাম আর্মি ওয়েলফেয়ার ট্রাস্ট Big Boss Corporation Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57 ....View Full Judgment

সালিশ আইন, ২০০১ এর ধারা ৪২ ও তামাদি আইনের ৫, ২৯(২) ধারাঃ
ধারা ৪২ সহজ পাঠে এটি কাঁচের মত স্পষ্ট যে, সালিশী রোয়েদাদ প্রাপ্তির ৬০ (ষাট) দিনের মধ্যে সংক্ষুব্ধ পক্ষকে বাংলাদেশ অনুষ্ঠিত আন্তর্জাতিক বাণিজ্যিক সালিশী রোয়েদাদ বাতিলের ক্ষেত্রে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ এবং আন্তর্জাতিক বাণিজ্যিক সালিশ প্রদত্ত রোয়েদাদ ব্যতীত সালিশী আইন, ২০০১ এর অধীন প্রদত্ত সালিশী রোয়েদাদ বাতিলের ক্ষেত্রে জেলা জজ আদালতে আবেদন দাখিল করতে হবে। যেহেতু সালিশী আইন, ২০০১ এর ৪২ ধারায় দরখাস্ত দায়ের ৬০ (ষাট) দিন সময় প্রদত্ত হয়েছে সেহেতু তামাদী আইনের ২৯(২) ধারার বিধান মোতাবেক তামাদি আইনের ৫ ধারা প্রযোজ্য নয়। ফলে সালিশী আইন, ২০০১ এর ৪২ ধারায় বর্ণিত ৬০ (ষাট) দিন অতিবাহিত হওয়ার পর রোয়েদাদ বাতিলের দরখাস্ত আইন দ্বারা বারিত। ...বিগ বস কর্পোরেশন লিমিটেড বনাম আর্মি ওয়েলফেয়ার ট্রাস্ট Big Boss Corporation Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57 ....View Full Judgment

Condonation of delay
Government stands on equal footing with ordinary litigants—Inordinate delay caused by gross negligence on the part of Government Law officers—Not condoned.
The petition for leave to appeal filed after 1340 days with a prayer for condonation of delay by the Government of Bangladesh Government stands on the same footing with ordinary litigants. It cannot deserve unlimited latitude in matters of condonation of delay. Though in many cases of the Government, delay is condoned upon sympathetic considerations as the file of the Government moves through different stages and time-consuming procedures. But an inordinate delay of 1340 days arising out of the gross negligence of Government officials cannot be condoned. Appropriate action should be taken against the delinquent officers for their laches and negligence, causing losses to the Government.
It is really surprising to know that more than one year and nine months were consumed to start a part-file and to file the leave petition. This is a gross negligence on the part of the Solicitor Wing, which cannot be condoned.
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Works and others Vs Mr. Alauddin, 21 BLD (AD) 35.

If an appeal (like the instant appeal) is dismissed on ground of limitation, conflicting decision is likely in the other appeal when decided on merit. Md. Suruzzamal Vs. Bangladesh and another, 13 BLD (AD) 125.

For admitting a time- barred appeal. the Court first of all is to be satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time- the appellant has to make out a case of sufficient cause by filing an application for condonation of delay.
The practice of admitting a time-barred appeal ‘ subject to objections at the hearing is not surely a sound one and must be discouraged except, in marginal cases. When the delay is long the court must make the exercise under section 5 of the Imitation Act before admitting the appeal with notice to the respondent. Mointazuddin and another Vs. Yakub Ali, 13 BLD (AD) 219.

In the absence of any sufficient cause shown for condonation of delay of an inordinate delay of 1780 days in preferring the criminal appeal by the petitioner the High Court Division rightly rejected the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Abul Hossain vs State 1 BLC (AD) 40.

Condonation of delay is the discretion of the Court—
To condone delay is the discretion of the Court. When the High Court Division in exercise of its discretion condoned the delay of 201 days upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as explained, the apex court found nothing wrong in it warranting interference therewith. Abul Kalam Azad Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Dinajpnr and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 42.

Condonation of delay— Government and Private litigant stand on equal footing— Even then Government deserves some leniency—
Law is well settled that both the private and Government litigant stand on equal footing. Government cannot claim any special privilege in respect of limitation. Delay of every day shall be explained. Since the Government has to take decision through different stages and obtain opinion from different departments it takes more times. When cause of delay is satisfactorily explained, delay can be condoned. Sonar Bangla Service Station Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Works and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 394.

Applicable to an application seeking setting aside abatement— But filing separate application u/s 5 for condonation of delay when the court is satisfied on the materials on record may be waived in exceptional circumstance—
Order 22 rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for substitution of legal heirs of deceased plaintiff/appellant or defendant/ respondent, as the case may be, where the right to sue survives after setting aside abatement. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has been made applicable to such case. In certain exceptional circumstances the apex court held that necessity of filing separate application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act may be waived where the court is satisfied on the basis of the materials on record to secure the ends of justice and set aside the abatement and allow substitution based on the principles that the right of a party cannot be defeated by mere technicalities. Hazi Habibur Rahman Vs. Aiub Ali Sawdagar being dead his heirs Most Kamrun Nahar and others 12 MLR (2007) (AD) 14.

Condonation of delay is not applicable to appeal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1980—
The Administrative Appellate Tribunal is debarred from entertaining any appeal which is not filed within the period of limitation as contemplated under section 6 (2A) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. As such the Administrative Appellate Tribunal rejected the memorandum of appeal as being one time barred. Since the condonation of delay is not applicable the apex court held the order of rejection perfectly justified. 'Bangladesh represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs and others Vs. Md. Waziullah 13 MLR (2008) (AD) 161.

Partition Suit—Minor ousted from possession—His title not extinguished till the lapse of three years after attainment of majority, even though 12 years passed after dispossession—
Suit for partition filed after one year of attainment of majority—
Suit competent without a prayer for declaration of title—Only ad valorem court-fee is to be paid. Sanjib Kurnar Bose and another Vs. Sved Shainsuddin & anr, BLD (AD) 311

The Limitation Act provides filing of appeal or any application challenging any decree or order, whatsoever, of the court upon obtaining the certified copy of the same and section 12(2) of the Limitation Act provides that the time consumed in obtaining such copy shall be excluded. In the instant case, it appears that neither there is any statement as to delay or there is any prayer for condonation of delay nor there is any such finding by the court of appeal below. As such it can be safely construed that the application was filed within time. So there was no bar in allowing the application. As such Rule 19 is very much applicable in the present case. Hence we hold that the High Court Division committed error of law in not taking the above facts into consideration and as such came an erroneous finding that the re-admission was made without complying with the provision of law. .....Bangladesh =VS= Abdul Barek Bepari, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 93] ....View Full Judgment

Computation of Limitation—Limitation in a suit for specific performance of contract when no date is fixed for the performance — Meaning of the word ‘absent’ in the context of defendant’s non-availability in the country — No time having being fixed for the performance of the contract, time will begin to run when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused — the defendant having refused to file application for permission for registration of the document and having admittedly left for India in 1964, the suit filed in 1969 was prima facie barred by limitation — But when the law allows the period of absence of the defendant from Bangladesh to be excluded for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation, the plaintiff should not be denied such computation by putting some artificial meaning to the word ‘absent’ merely because the period of his absence may be too long in a particular case. Bangladesh, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Pabna and others Vs. Md. Abdus Sobhan Talukder and another 9 BLD (AD) 173

However, the respondent can still avail the statutory forum of appeal under section 42 of the VAT Act taking recourse of section 14 of the Limitation Act. Since we already held that the writ petition is not maintainable as such refrained from going into merit of the case. …Commissioner, Customs, Excise and VAT Com. & ors. Vs. Perfect Tobacco Co. Ltd, (Civil), 16 SCOB [2022] AD 84 ....View Full Judgment

The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 117 r/w
The Limitation Act 1908
Section 14(4)
In Civil Appeal No. 159 of 2010, Government of Bangladesh vs Sontosh Kumar Saha and others that the Administrative Tribunal set up to exercise the powers under Article 117 of the Constitution shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the terms and conditions of service of the public servants and that no judicial review of the actions of the authority will be available to them, except in a case where the vires of law is challenged in which cases only. Civil court can also pass or make interim orders, subject to fulfillment of certain terms and conditions.
Writ petitioners can seek reliefs before the Administrative Tribunal, we make it clear that if the writ petitioners desire to redress their grievances before the Administrative Tribunal since they had been prosecuting their grievances in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh for a long time, the Administrative Tribunal shall entertain their petitions, if any, are filed on condoning the delay under section 14 of the Limitation Act. We also waive the statutory bar applicable to an applicant for filing a departmental appeal before the appellate authority, since they have already moved the High Court Division, the said period of limitation has already expired. We want to make it clear that the proviso to sub section (4) shall not stand in the way in making the applications and the Administrative Tribunal shall admit the petitions as if the applicants have preferred appeals under proviso to sub section (4). We further direct the Administrative Tribunal to dispose of the petitions, if any is filed, on priority basis not later than 6 (six) months from the date of receipt of the order. ...Ministry of Education, Dhaka =VS= GMM Mizanur Rahman Bhuiyan, [6 LM (AD) 32] ....View Full Judgment

The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1980 does not make any provision for application of section 14 of the Limitation Act in proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal. Md. Abdus Sukkur Vs Chairman, National Board of Revenue and others, 17 BLD (AD) 43.

Administrative Tribunal Act being a special law if provision of section 14 of the Limitation Act applies. If the time for disposal of the writ petition can be excluded in competition of the period of limitation of six months, from the date or order of termination.
Section 29 of the Act says that the provision in section 4, sections-9- 18 and section 22 shall apply to a case under a special or local law only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Bangladesh Bank & Ors Vs. Mohammad Abdul Mannan 2BLT (AD)-101

read with Administrative Tribunals Act, 1980 Second Proviso to Sub-Section-(2) of Section-4
It is clear from the wording of the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act that the legislative intendment behind this provision is to exclude the proceedings governed by the Administrative Tribunals Act from the operation of the benefit conferred by subsection (2) of section 29. The petitioner cannot, therefore, the benefit of Section- 14 of the Limitation Act while computing the period of limitation in filing his application before the Administrative Tribunal. Abul Bashar Vs. Investment Corporation of Bangladesh & Ors. 9BLT (AD)-21

Exclusion of time in computing time of limitation to file a case — Whether exclusion prescribed under section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable in a case of special law — If a person in good faith prosecutes his legal proceedings in a wrong forum he should be entitled to exclude this period in computing the period of limitation under special law, such as the Wakf Ordinance. In the instant case it cannot be said that the respondent started her proceeding in good faith and consequently she is not entitled to the benefit of section 14 — Wakfs Ordinance, 1962 (I of 1962), Ss. 32 and 33; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), s. 115; Or XLVII R. 7(2) Syed Amir Hossain Vs. Mrs. Nadera Rahman, 5 BLD (AD) 317

The Value Added Tax Act (VAT Act)
Section 42(1)(Ka) and sec. 42(2)(Ka)
The Limitation Act, 1908
Section 14
Our Apex Court in the case of TaeHung Packaging (BD) Limited and others Vs. Bangladesh and others, reported in 18 BLC (AD) (2013) 144, held: “The consistent views of this Division are that if any alternative remedy is available, the judicial review by the High Court Division in writ jurisdiction is not available with the exception that where the vires of a statutory provision is challenged or where the alternative remedy is not efficacious exercise of such power may be justified.” In the case of Champalal Binani Vs. the Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal & others, reported in AIR 1970(SC)645, the Indian Supreme Court observed that: “Where the aggrieved party has an alternative remedy the High Court would be slow to entertain a petition challenging an order of a taxing authority which is exfacie with jurisdiction. A petition for a writ of certiorari may lie to the High Court, where the order is on the face of it erroneous or raises question of jurisdiction or of infringement of fundamental rights of the petition.”
The respondent can still avail the statutory forum of appeal under section 42 of the VAT Act taking recourse of section 14 of the Limitation Act. Since we are already held that the writ petition is not maintainable as such refrained from going into merit of the case. Judgment and order dated 05.05.2016 passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition No.1649 of 2012 is set aside. .....Customs, Excise and VAT Commissionerate =VS= M/S. Perfect Tobacco Company Ltd. , (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 271] ....View Full Judgment

Limitation Act, 1908
Section 15 And
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Order IX rule 13
Pendency of a case for setting aside an ex-parte decree cannot extend the period of limitation for filing of execution case:
Application for execution of a final decree or order is to be made within 3 (three) years from the date mentioned in 2nd Column of Article 182 of the Limitation Act subject to some exceptions as detailed in the 3rd Column read with provisions of section 15 of the Act inasmuch as Article 182 makes no provision for fresh limitation from a final order passed on an application under Order IX rule 13 of the Code. In other words if no stay order or injunction is passed staying the operation of the decree or order under section 15 or no situation arises as per the 3rd Column of Article 182 the decree or order would keep open for execution and time would run from the date of final decree or order. A bare reading of Article 182 of the limitation Act also suggests that an application under order IX rule 13 of the code does not come within the meaning of applications mentioned in clause 5 of column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act to save limitation. Accordingly, pendency of a case under Order IX rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside an ex-parte decree cannot extend the period of limitation for filing execution case. ...Md. Mohitur Rohman Chy & ors Vs. Md. Abdul Kuddus Miah & ors, (Civil), 9 SCOB [2017] HCD 163 ....View Full Judgment

The appellate court has rightly held that the limitation period will be counted from the date of knowledge, which is as per provisions of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appellate court has accurately found that the suit is not barred by limitation, because the limitation period shall be counted from the date of knowledge of this impugned Nadabinama deed obtained by practicing fraud upon the executants and that the plaintiffs have derived knowledge about the contents of the disputed deed on the date of obtaining certified copy on 20.05.1998. …Abedun Nessa Vs. Jaher Sheikh and others, (Civil), 16 SCOB [2022] HCD 37 ....View Full Judgment

Limitation of compensation for wrongful cancellation of the dealership licence Delay was caused in filing the suit as the partners of the firm were scared due to the prevailing lawlessness in the country — When there is fraud there is no question of limitation and it will run from the date when fraud was detected — Appellant has succeeded in establishing that there has been suppression of truth, absence of prior notice before cancellation, non-compliance with the terms of the agreement and malafide on the part of respondent No. I which entitled the appellant to the decree sought for. M/s. Hajee Mohammad Au and sons Vs. Burma Eastern Limited and others, 6BLD (AD)146

Plea of limitation—When not available
When the petitioner on his own volition added himself as a defendant in the suit 3 years after its institution, it does not lie in his mouth to say that the suit is barred against him under Section 22(1) of the Limitation Act. Mohammad Gazi Miah Vs. Syed Abdur Rouf and others, 15 BLD (AD) 54.

The Easements Act, 1882
Section 15 r/w
Limitation Act, 1908
Section 23
One should bring a suit within 2(two) years of interruption of his enjoyment (distinct from actual user) of easement right when the cause of action arises– The Appellate Division observed that the High Court Division took the view that since the suit was not filed within two years from 1990, i.e. when the wall was erected by the defendants, the suit is barred. The Appellate Division is of view the finding of the High Court Division is quite erroneous. The requirement of the law is that in establishing the right of easement it has to be shown that the right was openly enjoyed as an easement, and as of right, without interruption for 20 years and the period of 20 years shall be taken to be a period ending with the interruption of the enjoyment of the easement right when the cause of action arises and the suit is to be instituted within 2 years from the date when the cause of action arises. .....Shamsul Huq Molla =VS= Shunil Chandra Biswas, [1 LM (AD) 373] ....View Full Judgment

Acquisition of title by adverse possession—
The plaintiffs were never recognised as cosharers of the suit land and on the contrary the defendant had been in the exclusive possession since the time of C.S operation and by continuous possession adversely to the interest of the plaintiff, the defendants have already acquired good and indefeasible title to the suit land and the right title and interest of the plaintiff in the suit land has been extinguished by ouster and adverse possession for more than a period of 12 years. Dalimon Nessa Bewa and others Vs. Md. Hashmat Ali 13 MLR (2008) (AD) 329.

Acquisition of title by adverse possession for more than twelve years—
The plaintiff-respondent, who embraced Islam, had been in uninterrupted possession of the suit land for more than twelve years and acquired indefeasible title thereto. The suit land was formerly part of their family debater property wherefrom the idol was removed and the property lost its debater character. The High Court Division set aside the judgment and decree of the court of appeal and restored those of the trial court which the apex court upheld. Hari Thakur Deb Bigraha (Sri Sri) and others Vs Md. Abdul Hannan and others 13 MLR (2008) (AD) 353.

Possession of a cosharer in joint property does not constitute adverse possession against other cosharers—
Amicable arrangement between cosharers is not a partition by metes and bounds—
In a joint property possession of one cosharer is possession of other cosharers. Such possession never becomes adverse against the other cosharers. Amicable arrangement among cosharers is not a partition by metes and bounds. Probir Kumar Rakshit Vs. Abdus Sabur and others 14 MLR (2009) (AD) 10.

Acquisition of title by adverse possession—
When the plaintiff has succeeded in proving his continuous possession in the suit property adversely against all others for more than 12 years before the institution of the suit, his title to the suit property has been held to have been perfected by adverse possession against the defendants. Kalimuddin (Mir) being dead his heirs Ayesha Khatun @ Chamatkar Bibi and others Vs. Mohammad Dukhi Mondal and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 151.

Suit for recovery of possession of suit land must be instituted within 12 years of dispossession—
The law is well settled that for recovery of possession of the suit land must be instituted within 12 years of dispossession. When the plaintiff fails to prove the date of dispossession and the institution of the suit within 12 years of dispossession, he is not entitled to get the decree. Delwar Hossain Akter (Md.) and another Vs. Md. Nazrul Islam Khan and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 380.

Acquisition of title by adverse possession—
Suit for declaration of title on the basis of fictitious title deeds as well as by adverse possession is not maintainable. In a suit for declaration of title by adverse possession the plaintiff must establish that from certain particular point of time he has been continuously possessing the suit land for over a period of twelve years in assertion of his hostile title denying the title of the real owner openly to the knowledge of all. Sheikh Farid (Md.) and others Vs. Abdul Wadud Sikder and others 12 MLR (2007) (AD) 201.

Limitation for filing a suit for recovery of kash possession of immovable property is 12 years starting from the date of dispossession–– Both the trial Court and the High Court Division correctly arrived at a finding that when the result of the earlier Title Suit No.100 of 1974 reached its finality by dismissing the Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.113 of 1985 on 18.03.1986 by this Division, the terminus a quo to claim possession from the defendant began and the plaintiff ought to have file the suit for recovery of khas possession within 12 years from the said date or disposal of the said civil petition for leave to appeal i.e. on 18.03.1986. Since the suit was filed on 16.03.1998, the suit is within 12 years from the date of terminus a quo.
In a case reported in 12 CWN 326, it has been held by the Privy Council that the plaintiffs are entitled to deduction of the period between the 20th April, 1903, where in the previous suit he obtained a decree in their favour and the 22nd February, 1904, the date of the reversal of that decree by the appellate court, their right of action having been in suspension. ––Admittedly, if the period during which the plaintiffs were litigating for their rights is deducted, their present suit is in time. ––Under the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above Appellate Division does not find any logic to interfere with the findings of the High Court Division. .....Jasmeen Ershad =VS= Shahar Banoo Mohsin Asgar, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 254] ....View Full Judgment

Section 28 of the Limitation Act has no application to persons who are in possession and who have had no occasion to sue for recovery of possession. Md. Abdul Ban Muktear Vs. Md.Nurul Islam & Ors 12 BLT (AD)126

Limitation Act, 1908
Section 28
Specific Relief Act, 1877
Section 42
Adverse possession– It is found that the defendants have been in possession of the disputed land for more than 12 years as of right and by asserting hostile title against the plaintiffs of their predecessor and there was a complete outer and thus, the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs if any which they alleged had acquired in the properties had been lost by adverse possession.
Appellate Division disapproves the finding of the appellate Court below to the effect that the defendants failed to prove their title in the suit land. But it revealed that if there is any loophole in the title of the defendants, the same has been covered by their long run possession so also by acquisition of statutory title by way of adverse possession.
The plaintiff-respondents hopelessly failed to discharge the onus (as has been ascertained by us) and as such, the suit of the plaintiff-respondent fails. Appellate Division finds that there is illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment, which in our view calls for interference. The judgment and order of the High Court Division is set aside and there by the judgment passed by the trail Court is hereby restored. ...Abdul Hamid Gazi(Md.) =VS= A Samad, (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 444] ....View Full Judgment

Adverse possession — It implies that The person against whom adverse possession is exercised is a person who is entitled to demand possession at the moment adverse pos-session begins — A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show that his pos- session was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title — As there is no evidence to show that the plaintiff ever claimed any title by adverse possession against the real owner with whose permission he entered into the suit property, he is not en- titled to any relief on the basis of adverse pos- session. Abdul Kader and others Vs. A.K Noor and others, 5 BLD (AD) 33

Adverse possession — Claim of adverse possession by Tenant — There is no adverse possession where the relationship is that of landlord and tenant — When the tenant continues to stay on the land after the termination of the lease but does so on the terms of the lease and on payment of rent his possession cannot be adverse to the landlord. Narendra Basu Roy and another Vs. Municipal Committee, Mymensingh, 6 BLD (AD) 297

Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966
Rule 29 of the first schedule
Read with section 29 of the Limitation Act:
The High Court Division committed an error of law in holding that the date on which carriage stopped was the date on which the carrier defendants admitted its failure to deliver its goods finally and offered payment of compensation in lieu of the goods. The time for limitation began to run from the expiry of 7 days after the date on which the goods ought to have arrived, that is, on 22.01.1999. Since the suit was filed on 24.05.2001 apparently the same was barred by limitation in view of special limitation provided in Rule 29 of the first schedule of the Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 read with section 29 of the Limitation Act. …Biman Bangladesh Airlines & ors Vs. Al Rojoni Enterprise, (Civil), 9 SCOB [2017] AD 66 ....View Full Judgment

The Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966
Rule 29(first schedule) r/w
The Limitation Act
Section 29
The High Court Division committed an error of law in holding that the date on which carriage stopped was the date on which the carrier defendants admitted its failure to deliver its goods finally and offered payment of compensation in lieu of the goods. The time for limitation began to run from the expiry of 7 days after the date on which the goods ought to have arrived, that is, on 22.01.1999. Since the suit was filed on 24.05.2001 apparently the same was barred by limitation in view of special limitation provided in Rule 29 of the first schedule of the Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 read with section 29 of the Limitation Act. .....Biman Bangladesh Airlines =VS= Al Rojoni Enterprise, [4 LM (AD) 95] ....View Full Judgment

When a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation for filing, suit, appeal or application different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule of the said Act, the Proviso contained in Section 4, Sections 9-18 and Section 22 will apply. Md. Ishaque and others Vs. The Government of Bangladesh, 14 BLD (AD) 39.

State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 148 r/w
The Limitation Act, 1908
Section 29
The main ground on which the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Dhaka was challenged was that the limitation for filing an appeal under section 147 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950(the Act, 1950), as provided in section 148 thereof was 30 days, but the appeal was filed beyond 30 days with an application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the order passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) admitting the appeal condoning the delay was without jurisdiction. From the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court Division accepted the said contention of the writ-petitioner and made the Rule Nisi absolute. We find nothing wrong with the view taken by the High Court Division inasmuch as limitation provided in the Act, 1950 was a special limitation. .....A.T.M. Nasiruddin =VS= Shirin Ahmed Chy., [3 LM (AD) 45] ....View Full Judgment

বিশেষ আইন ভিন্নতর তামাদির মেয়াদের বিধান সুনির্দিষ্ট থাকলে তামাদি আইনের ধারা ২৯(২) মোতাবেক তামাদি আইনের ধারা ৫ প্রযোজ্য হবে নাঃ কোন বিশেষ আইন কোন মামলা, আপীল বা দরখাস্ত দাখিলের জন্য তামাদি আইন, ১৯০৮ এর প্রথম তফসিল বর্ণিত নির্ধারিত মেয়াদ অপেক্ষা ভিন্নতর তামাদির মেয়াদের বিধান থাকলে, অর্থাৎ তামাদি আইনের প্রথম তফসিল মামলা, আপীল বা দরখাস্ত দাখিলে যে মেয়াদ বা সময় দেওয়া সে মেয়াদ ও সময়ের পরিবর্তে ভিন্নতর তামাদির মেয়াদ বা সময় দেওয়া থাকলে তামাদি আইনের ২৯(২)(ক) মোতাবেক বিশেষ আইনের যে পরিমান সরাসরি বহির্ভূত না হবে সে পরিমান তামাদি আইনের ৪ ধারা, তামাদি আইনের ৯ থেকে ১৮ এবং ২২ ধারার বিধান সমূহ প্রযোজ্য হবে এবং ২৯(২)(খ) মোতাবেক তামাদি আইনের ২৯(২)(ক) ধারার বিধান ব্যতীত তামাদি আইনের অবশিষ্ট বিধান সমূহ প্রযোজ্য হবে না। অর্থাৎ বিশেষ আইন ভিন্নতর তামাদির মেয়াদের বিধান সুনির্দিষ্ট থাকলে তামাদি আইনের ধারা ২৯(২) মোতাবেক তামাদি আইনের ধারা ৫ প্রযোজ্য হবে না ...বিগ বস কর্পোরেশন লিমিটেড বনাম আর্মি ওয়েলফেয়ার ট্রাস্ট Big Boss Corporation Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57 ....View Full Judgment

Barred by limitation–
It is crystal clear that the plaintiffs miserably failed to prove their title to the suit land. Admittedly, the plaintiffs filed Title Suit No.63 of 1954 for declaration of title in respect of the suit land which was dismissed. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed Title Appeal No.64 of 1957 before the learned District Judge, Sylhet, which was also dismissed. Therefore, it appears that instant Title Suit No.112 of 1972 filed by the plaintiffs is hopelessly barred by limitation. .....Israil Kha & others =VS= Syed Anwar Hossain & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 277] ....View Full Judgment