Section 3
|
Provides for dismissal of suit barred by limitation—
Article 44— Suit to challenge deed of transfer to be instituted within 3
years of attaining majority—
Suit challenging deed of transfer made during minority shall have to be
instituted within 3 (three) years of attaining majority or within 12 years
of execution and registration of the deed. Suit instituted beyond the
period of limitation is liable to be dismissed. Lal Miah (Md.) Vs. Md.
Anwar Hossain @ Ami 14 MLR (2009) (AD) 24.
|
Lal Miah (Md.) Vs. Md. Anwar Hossain @ Ami |
14 MLR (AD) 24 |
Sections 4, 9-18 and 22
|
The provisions contained in sections 4, 9-18 and 22 of the Limitation Act
are applicable in determining the period of limitation prescribed by any
special law for filing any suit, appeal or application where such special
law does not expressly exclude the applicability of the provisions of these
sections of the Limitation Act. The remaining provisions of the Limitation
Act shall not apply in any proceeding under any special law.
The Appellate Division held that the the appellant preferred an appeal
against the judgment of the Election Tribunal before the court of District
Judge- which was a wrong forum. Subsequently the District Judge returned
the memo of appeal on 06.01.2010 and thereafter on the very next day the
appellant filed the same before the Election Appellate Tribunal- the right
forum. There is no allegation that the appellant was not bonafide in filing
and prosecuting with the appeal in the court of District Judge which had no
jurisdiction. So, in the circumstances the time during which the appellant
was prosecuting with the appeal before the court of District Judge shall be
excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed by the special
law i.e. the Local Government (Upazilla Parishad) Ordinance, 2008 for
filing the appeal against the judgment of the Election Tribunal as per
section 14 of the Limitation Act- the application of which has not been
excluded by this special law. Evidently, the High Court Division was not
correct in coming to the finding that the Local Government (Upazilla
Parishad) Ordinance, 2008 and the Local Government (Upazilla Parishad)
Rules, 2008 being special laws and the period of limitation prescribed
under section 13(4) of the Ordinance and Rules 65(3) being different from
that prescribed in the Limitation Act, any proceeding thereunder is
excluded from the operation of section 29(2) read with section 14 or from
any other provisions of the Limitation Act, and therefore, the benefit of
section 14 or any other provisions of Limitation Act is not available in
computing the period of limitation in filing any election tribunal case or
election appeal there-from and thus in holding that the election appeal
filed before the Election Appellate Tribunal was barred by limitation.
Appellate Division makes it clear again that the provisions contained in
sections 4, 9-18 and 22 of the Limitation Act are applicable in determining
the period of limitation prescribed by any special law for filing any suit,
appeal or application where such special law does not expressly exclude the
applicability of the provisions of these sections of the Limitation Act.
The remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply in any
proceeding under any special law.
Abdul Wahab Sheik -Vs- Md. Kamal Hossain Md. Kalam Hossain and others.
(Civil) 11 ALR (AD) 100-104
|
Abdul Wahab Sheik -Vs- Md. Kamal Hossain Md. Kalam Hossain and others |
11 ALR (AD) 100 |
Sections 4 to 25
|
The Limitation Act, 1908
Sections 4 to 25
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925
Article III Rule 6 of the Schedule/Rules
Filing the suit for loss or damage to goods– The period of limitation for
filing any suit for loss or damage to goods that occurred in the course of
carriage, will be one year from the date of delivery of the goods. The
well-established principle of law based on this section is that the
defendant’s failure to plead the bar of limitation as a defence will not
save the suit from being barred by limitation unless any of the provisions
mentioned in sections 4 to 25 are applicable.
Hence, we find that the filing of the suit in Singapore on 05.05.2001
beyond the period of one year from the date when the goods were delivered,
or at the latest from 05.03.2000 when the joint survey report was
published, was barred by limitation. Even if the defendants do not plead
the bar of limitation, the court cannot ignore the provisions of section 3
of the Limitation Act in the absence of the provisions of sections 4 to 25
of the said Act. ...Eximpo Trading Limited =VS= M.V. Banglar Kakoli,
(Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 575]
....View Full Judgment
|
Eximpo Trading Limited =VS= M.V. Banglar Kakoli |
9 LM (AD) 575 |
Sections 5 and 29
|
In an enactment if the procedure for filing the case and limitation is
provided, the provision is taken to be a special law and the court’s
discretionary power to extend the period of limitation is excluded in view
of section 29 of the Limitation Act. In other words, it may be said that
special law is a law which deals with any special law contrary to the
general law and in such law the court’s power to exercise its discretion
to extend the period of limitation under section 5 of the Limitation Act
has been excluded. In such a case, the court is left with no discretion
even it finds injustice to a party to extend the period of limitation. A
special law is a law dealing with a particular subject enacted for the
special cases in the special circumstances as distinguished from the
general law which applies generally on the question of limitation though
the Limitation Act is a general law.
Md. Motaleb Hossain: -Vs.- Abdul Haque Limon and another: (Criminal) 11 ALR
(AD) 105-110
|
Md. Motaleb Hossain: -Vs.- Abdul Haque Limon and another |
11 ALR (AD) 105 |
Section 5
|
More than one year and nine months was consumed to start a part file and
the leave petition was filed out of time by 1340 days. Such gross
negligence and inordinate delay on the part of Solicitor Wing should not be
condoned otherwise the officers of the Solicitor Wing will be encouraged to
be more irresponsible and negligent in their official duties.
Government of Bangladesh & ors vs Alauddin & ors 6 BLC (AD) 101.
|
Government of Bangladesh & ors vs Alauddin & ors |
6 BLC (AD) 101 |
Section 5
|
There has been a delay of 542 days in filing the revisional application by
the appellant. In the background of the provision of law the suit filed by
the respondents and decreed by the Courts below was being totally
noh-entertainable by the civil Court, the High Court Division was required
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to correct the gross error
committed by the Courts below. The High Court Division was not correct in
refusing to condone the delay and consequent thereupon in not entertaining
the revisional application.
Director of Housing and Settlement vs Abdul Majid Howlader and ors 9 BLC
(AD) 51.
....View Full Judgment
|
Director of Housing and Settlement vs Abdul Majid Howlader and ors |
9 BLC (AD) 51 |
Section 5, 29(2) and Article 156
|
Trade Mark Act, 2009;
Section 2(12), 100
Trade Mark Rules, 2015
Rule 10, 14, 15 and 50(1)
Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) Rules, 1973
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh;
Article 107(1)
Code of Civil Procedure
Order XLI Rule 1, Order XLIII Rule 2
Limitation Act, 1908 (1st Schedule)
Section 5, 29(2) and Article 156
Since Bangladesh Supreme Court (High Court Division) Rules, 1973 does not
prescribe any time limit for preferring appeal before the High Court
Division against the order passed by the Registrar under the Act, 2009 as
such, the time frame as prescribed in Rule 50(1) of the Rules of 2015 is
applicable. ...Kazi Md. Kamrul Islam Vs. Registrar, Dep. of PDTM & ors,
(Civil), 18 SCOB [2023] HCD 1
....View Full Judgment
|
Kazi Md. Kamrul Islam Vs. Registrar, Dep. of PDTM & ors |
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 1 |
Section 5, 29(2) and Article 156
|
Limitation Act, 1908
Section 5, 29(2) and Article 156 of the 1st Schedule
Trade Mark Act, 2009
Section 100(2)
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 cannot be applied for condoning delay
in preferring appeal under Section 100(2) of the Trade Mark Act, 2009:
It is the established principles of law that under special law when time
period has been prescribed for preferring appeal Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1908 cannot be applied unless incorporated by the
Legislature in express terms. Trade Mark Act, 2009 being a special law and
having prescribed specific period for preferring appeal before the High
Court Division as such, in the absence of incorporation of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1908 it shall have no manner of application for condoning
delay in preferring appeal under Section 100(2) of the Act, 2009. ...Kazi
Md. Kamrul Islam Vs. Registrar, Dep. of PDTM & ors, (Civil), 18 SCOB [2023]
HCD 1
....View Full Judgment
|
.Kazi Md. Kamrul Islam Vs. Registrar, Dep. of PDTM & ors |
18 SCOB [2023] HCD 1 |
Section 5
|
Limitation Act, 1908
Section 5
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Order XLVII Rule 1
Having gone through the application for condonation of delay filed by the
Government along with that civil petition it appears that the application
does not contain any specific explanation as required under section 5 of
the Limitation Act which prescribes that every days delay has to be
explained properly up to the satisfaction of the Court concerned. In that
circumstances the order dated 14.12.2017 has been passed dismissing the
civil petition for leave to appeal and Appellate Division does not find any
error apparent on the face of it discovered by the review petition which is
liable to be dismissed. .....Ministry of Law, Bangladesh =VS= Md. Touhidul
Islam, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 228]
....View Full Judgment
|
Ministry of Law, Bangladesh =VS= Md. Touhidul Islam |
15 LM (AD) 228 |
Section 5
|
The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 104
The Limitation Act, 1908
Section 5
It is simply a fault of the engaged Counsels of the appellant. It is an
established principle of administration of justice that parties should not
suffer for the laches and negligence of their engaged Advocates– It is
found that the cost amount was paid as directed within stipulated time,
however, the present appellant failed to produce before the High Court
Division the documents manifesting payment of sum. It is simply a fault of
the engaged Counsels of the appellant. It is an established principle of
administration of justice that parties should not suffer for the laches and
negligence of their engaged Advocates. Appellate Division decides to
condone the delay of 11 days and consider the Civil Petition for Leave to
Appeal at least for doing complete justice in exercise of its power under
Article 104 of the Constitution. The appeal is allowed without any order as
to cost. The earlier judgment of this Division is reviewed. The impugned
judgments and orders of the High Court Division dated 06-07-2003 and
22-08-2004 treating the Rule is discharged and refusing its recalled the
said order respectively are hereby set aside. The High Court Division is
directed to hear the motion on merit. .....Deputy Commissioner, Gazipur
=VS= Md. Idris Ali, (Civil), 2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 56]
....View Full Judgment
|
Deputy Commissioner, Gazipur =VS= Md. Idris Ali |
13 LM (AD) 56 |
Section 5
|
The delay caused in filing the revisional application by the Government was
due to the exhaustion of the official formalities which was beyond its
control and it was not an inordinate one, so it should have been condoned:
The facts and circumstances clearly indicate that the different offices of
the Government are so connected that one cannot work without co-operation
and assistance from the other. In the instant case, it appears that the
office of the Deputy Commissioner, Netrokona, initiated the proposal to
file a revisional application before the High Court Division but it could
not do so without obtaining the necessary papers and the opinion of the
Government pleader and concerned authority. However, it appears that the
record was sent to the office of the Solicitor and thereafter, the record
was sent to the office of the learned Attorney General and then an
Assistant Attorney General was entrusted to take all necessary steps
regarding filing of the same in the High Court Division under section
115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In these circumstances, the reasons
for delay of 403 days in filing the revisional application as stated in the
application under section 5 of the Limitation Act by the
defendantpetitioners cannot be disregarded and discarded simply because the
individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would
pursue the application for condonation of delay since he is a person
legally injured. Whereas, the state being impersonal machinery has to work
through different offices or servants and from one table to another table
in different offices. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case it
appears that the delay caused in filing the revisional application was due
to the exhaustion of the official formalities and as such, the same is
beyond the control of the defendant petitioners and moreover, the aforesaid
delay of 403 days is not an inordinate one and as such, if the same is not
condoned the defendant leave petitioners shall be led to irreparable loss
and injury. ...Govt. of Bangladesh & ors Vs. Md. Abdul Jalil & ors,
(Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] AD 74
....View Full Judgment
|
Govt. of Bangladesh & ors Vs. Md. Abdul Jalil & ors |
17 SCOB [2023] AD 74 |
Sections 5, 14 and article 182
|
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Sections 47, 48(2)(a)
Limitation Act, 1908
Sections 5, 14 and article 182
Condonation of delay– The Executing Court in rejecting such applications
opined that the decree holder filed the decree execution Case No.4 of 1990
which was dismissed on 06/06/1992 for want of steps. On 13/11/2000, 2nd
decree execution case being Case No.05 of 2000 was filed, which was
admittedly delayed by 8 years and 4 months. The decree holder took the
pretext to condone the delay in an application under section 48(2)(a) of
the Code. The Executing Court found that decree holder had filed another
suit being other Suit No.35 of 1992 and proceeded well ahead without any
hindrance for the same time. Furthermore, some criminal cases were not at
the period of limitation but later like G.R. Case No.32 of 1998, non G.R.
Case No.33 of 1998 and C.R. Case were out of period of limitation, however,
execution case was dismissed on 06/06/1992, hence, the Court disbelieved
the aforementioned pretexts to allow the aforementioned applications.
.....Moslehuddin Ahmed =VS= Abdul Gafur, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 188]
....View Full Judgment
|
Moslehuddin Ahmed =VS= Abdul Gafur |
12 LM (AD) 188 |
Section 5
|
The Limitation Act
Section 5
The Code of Civil Procedure
Section 115 (1)
Delay condone–– The application under section 5 of the Limitation Act,
it appears that the petitioners have properly explained the reasons for
which they could not prefer the instant revisional application before the
High Court Division in time. And as such, Appellate Division is of the view
that there is no latches or negligence on the part of the petitioners and
they have been able to explain the cause of delay in filing revisional
application which in this Division’s view, fulfills the requirement as
spelled out under section 5 of the Limitation Act upto the satisfaction of
the Court and as such, we are inclined to condone the delay. ––The
impugned judgment and order of the High Court Division is set aside. The
delay of 403 days in filing the revisional application before the High
Court Division is condoned. The High Court Division is directed to hear the
substantive revisional application under section 115 (1) of the Code as In
Re motion in accordance with law. .....Deputy Commissioner, Netrokona =VS=
Md. Abdul Jalil, (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 196]
....View Full Judgment
|
Deputy Commissioner, Netrokona =VS= Md. Abdul Jalil |
14 LM (AD) 196 |
Section 5
|
Condonation of delay– Government in various stages Appellate Division
takes sympathetic and lenient view and allow consideration of delay of
Government cases in many cases– Appellate Division is of the view that
the alleged negligence and latches on the part of the government petitioner
in filing of the civil rule by delay of 310 days overcoming all the hurdles
of red taping and procedural intricacies seem to be not willful. Moreover,
taking into account the government’s pledge that they would be more and
more careful in future in this regard and seeking for mercy of the Hon'ble
Court, we are inclined to give the government another chance to place their
case for merit consideration. The Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal is
disposed of. Impugned order of the High Court Division is set aside. The
delay of 310 days in filing the revisional application is hereby condoned.
The High Court Division is directed to hear the motion. .....Deputy
Commissioner, Khulna =VS= Khan Abdus Salam, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD)
323]
....View Full Judgment
|
Deputy Commissioner, Khulna =VS= Khan Abdus Salam |
12 LM (AD) 323 |
Section 5
|
Condone the delay of 1477 days– No separate standards to determine the
cause laid by the Government vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to
prove strict standards of "sufficient cause"– There is no gainsaying that
the Government decisions are taken by officers/ agencies proverbially at a
slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table
and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay,
intentional or otherwise, is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural
red tape on the process of their making decision is a common feature.
Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the
revisional applications brought by the Government are lost for such default
no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis
suffers is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should,
therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach
rather than the technical detection of "sufficient cause" for explaining
every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of
the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and
require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The
Court should decide the matters on merit unless the case is hopelessly
without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the
Government vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict
standards of "sufficient cause". Considering the legal principles, the
inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 1477 days deserves condonation.
Therefore, the judgment and order of the High Court Division refusing to
condone the delay is set-aside. The High Court Division is directed to hear
the revisional application as a motion. .....Mymensingh Forest Division,
Bangladesh =VS= Abdur Sobhan, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 327]
....View Full Judgment
|
Mymensingh Forest Division, Bangladesh =VS= Abdur Sobhan |
12 LM (AD) 327 |
Section 5
|
Satisfactory explanation of delay is the pre-requisite for condoning the
delay in filing appeal.
Additional Deputy Commissioner, (Rev.) Narayangonj Vs. Dr. Mir Abdul Hakim
being dead his heirs Mir Abu Shahid and others 2 MLR (AD) (1997) 231.
|
Additional Deputy Commissioner, (Rev.) Narayangonj Vs. Dr. Mir Abdul Hakim being dead his heirs Mir Abu Shahid and others |
2 MLR (AD) 231 |
Section 5
|
Condonation of delay
Government stands on equal footing with ordinary litigants—Inordinate
delay caused by gross negligence on the part of Government Law
officers—Not condoned.
The petition for leave to appeal filed after 1340 days with a prayer for
condonation of delay by the Government of Bangladesh Government stands on
the same footing with ordinary litigants. It cannot deserve unlimited
latitude in matters of condonation of delay. Though in many cases of the
Government, delay is condoned upon sympathetic considerations as the file
of the Government moves through different stages and time-consuming
procedures. But an inordinate delay of 1340 days arising out of the gross
negligence of Government officials cannot be condoned. Appropriate action
should be taken against the delinquent officers for their laches and
negligence, causing losses to the Government.
It is really surprising to know that more than one year and nine months
were consumed to start a part-file and to file the leave petition. This is
a gross negligence on the part of the Solicitor Wing, which cannot be
condoned.
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Works and
others Vs Mr. Alauddin, 21 BLD (AD) 35.
|
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Works and others Vs Mr. Alauddin, |
21 BLD (AD) 35 |
Section 5
|
If an appeal (like the instant appeal) is dismissed on ground of
limitation, conflicting decision is likely in the other appeal when decided
on merit.
Md. Suruzzamal Vs. Bangladesh and another, 13 BLD (AD) 125.
|
Md. Suruzzamal Vs. Bangladesh and another, |
13 BLD (AD) 125 |
Section 5
|
For admitting a time- barred appeal. the Court first of all is to be
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in
time- the appellant has to make out a case of sufficient cause by filing an
application for condonation of delay.
The practice of admitting a time-barred appeal ‘ subject to objections at
the hearing is not surely a sound one and must be discouraged except, in
marginal cases. When the delay is long the court must make the exercise
under section 5 of the Imitation Act before admitting the appeal with
notice to the respondent.
Mointazuddin and another Vs. Yakub Ali, 13 BLD (AD) 219.
|
Mointazuddin and another Vs. Yakub Ali, |
13 BLD (AD) 219 |
Section 5
|
Petition is barred by limitation of 195 days grounds taken for condonation
are that the relevant Ministry asked legal opinion for filing a leave
petition and also to get a certified copy of the High Court Division order,
that the file was sent to the Attorney General and then to the Additional
Attorney General for opinion, that thereafter, it was sent to the solicitor
who was pleased to appoint an ‘Advocate-on-Record, that the solicitors
office asked the Ministry of Home Affairs for supplying necessary documents
and papers, that thereafter necessary fund was sought for etc, — there is
no good ground for its condonation—petition dismissed. [Para-2]
The Principal Secretary Vs. Mohammad Abdul Baten 2 BLT (AD)-90
|
The Principal Secretary Vs. Mohammad Abdul Baten |
2 BLT (AD) 90 |
Section 5 r/w Article-157
|
If an appeal against an order of acquittal is filed by the Government
either before the High Court Division or the Court of Session beyond the
period as provides in Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908, Then in such
a case an application seeking condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act is very much entertainable if the Court is satisfied
with the explanation offered as to how delay occurred, then is quite
competent to condone the delay.
Dr. M. A. Mazed & Ors Vs. Bangladesh & Ors 12 BLT (AD)-154
|
Dr. M. A. Mazed & Ors Vs. Bangladesh & Ors |
12 BLT (AD) 154 |
Section 5
|
Delay of 996 days condoned– Government machinery runs through several
hands and the delay in such circumstances cannot altogether be avoided–
While hearing the Rule on condonation of delay, the High Court Division
should have considered that the State machinery moves or functions through
so many agencies. When the machinery is run by so many hands, it is not
also possible for such machinery to come before the Court within the
quickest possible time. Although the Court is generally reluctant to
consider the question of delay in favour of the Government, yet in the
context of thing it should not be ignored that the Government machinery
runs through several hands and the delay in such circumstances cannot
altogether be avoided. Instead of considering this aspect of the case, the
High Court Division discharged the Rule on condonation of delay.
This civil appeal is allowed without any order as to costs and the impugned
judgment delivered by the High Court Division is set aside. Delay of 996
days in preferring the revisional application is hereby condonded. A Single
Bench of the High Court Division having Rule issuing power is directed to
hear the revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to consider the question of issuance of the Rule. ...ADC (Rev)
=VS= Most. Monowara Khatun, (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 38]
....View Full Judgment
|
ADC (Rev) =VS= Most. Monowara Khatun |
11 LM (AD) 38 |
Section 5
|
ধারা ৫ সহজ সরল পাঠ এটি কাঁচের
মত স্পষ্ট যে, কোন আপীল বা রায়
পুনর্বিচার বা পুনরীক্ষণের
দরখাস্ত বা আপীল করার অনুমতি
প্রার্থনার দরখাস্ত বা অন্য
কোন দরখাস্ত, যার উপর এই ধারা
বর্তমান কার্যকর অন্য কোন
আইনের দ্বারা বা অধীন
প্রযোজ্য করা হয়, তাঁর
নির্দিষ্ট তামাদির মেয়াদ
উত্তীর্ণ হওয়ার পর গৃহীত হতে
পারে, যদি আপীলকারী বা
দরখাস্তকারী এই মর্মে
আদালতকে সন্তুষ্ট করতে পারে
যে, নির্ধারিত মেয়াদের মধ্যে
আপীল দায়ের বা দরখাস্তটি
দাখিল না করার যথেষ্ট কারণ
ছিল। অর্থাৎ কোন আপীল দায়ের,
রায় পুনর্বিচার দায়ের,
পুননিরিক্ষণের দরখাস্ত
দায়ের আপীল করার অনুমতি
প্রার্থনায় এবং অন্য কোন
দরখাস্ত দায়ের বর্তমান
কার্যকর কোন আইন দ্বারা বা
কোন আইনের অধীন তামাদি আইনের
৫ ধারার বিধান প্রযোজ্য করা
হল তামাদির নির্দিষ্ট মেয়াদ
উত্তীর্ণ হওয়ার পরেও আদালতের
সন্তুষ্টি সাপেক্ষে আপীল
দায়ের বা দরখাস্ত গৃহীত হতে
পারে। ...বিগ বস কর্পোরেশন
লিমিটেড বনাম আর্মি
ওয়েলফেয়ার ট্রাস্ট Big Boss Corporation
Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57
....View Full Judgment
|
Big Boss Corporation Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust |
17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57 |
Section 5, 29(2)
|
সালিশ আইন, ২০০১ এর ধারা ৪২ ও
তামাদি আইনের ৫, ২৯(২) ধারাঃ
ধারা ৪২ সহজ পাঠে এটি কাঁচের
মত স্পষ্ট যে, সালিশী রোয়েদাদ
প্রাপ্তির ৬০ (ষাট) দিনের
মধ্যে সংক্ষুব্ধ পক্ষকে
বাংলাদেশ অনুষ্ঠিত
আন্তর্জাতিক বাণিজ্যিক
সালিশী রোয়েদাদ বাতিলের
ক্ষেত্রে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ এবং
আন্তর্জাতিক বাণিজ্যিক
সালিশ প্রদত্ত রোয়েদাদ
ব্যতীত সালিশী আইন, ২০০১ এর
অধীন প্রদত্ত সালিশী রোয়েদাদ
বাতিলের ক্ষেত্রে জেলা জজ
আদালতে আবেদন দাখিল করতে
হবে। যেহেতু সালিশী আইন, ২০০১
এর ৪২ ধারায় দরখাস্ত দায়ের ৬০
(ষাট) দিন সময় প্রদত্ত হয়েছে
সেহেতু তামাদী আইনের ২৯(২)
ধারার বিধান মোতাবেক তামাদি
আইনের ৫ ধারা প্রযোজ্য নয়।
ফলে সালিশী আইন, ২০০১ এর ৪২
ধারায় বর্ণিত ৬০ (ষাট) দিন
অতিবাহিত হওয়ার পর রোয়েদাদ
বাতিলের দরখাস্ত আইন দ্বারা
বারিত। ...বিগ বস কর্পোরেশন
লিমিটেড বনাম আর্মি
ওয়েলফেয়ার ট্রাস্ট Big Boss Corporation
Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57
....View Full Judgment
|
Big Boss Corporation Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust |
17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57 |
Section 5
|
Condonation of delay
Government stands on equal footing with ordinary litigants—Inordinate
delay caused by gross negligence on the part of Government Law
officers—Not condoned.
The petition for leave to appeal filed after 1340 days with a prayer for
condonation of delay by the Government of Bangladesh Government stands on
the same footing with ordinary litigants. It cannot deserve unlimited
latitude in matters of condonation of delay. Though in many cases of the
Government, delay is condoned upon sympathetic considerations as the file
of the Government moves through different stages and time-consuming
procedures. But an inordinate delay of 1340 days arising out of the gross
negligence of Government officials cannot be condoned. Appropriate action
should be taken against the delinquent officers for their laches and
negligence, causing losses to the Government.
It is really surprising to know that more than one year and nine months
were consumed to start a part-file and to file the leave petition. This is
a gross negligence on the part of the Solicitor Wing, which cannot be
condoned.
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Works and
others Vs Mr. Alauddin, 21 BLD (AD) 35.
|
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Works and others Vs Mr. Alauddin, |
21 BLD (AD) 35 |
Section 5
|
If an appeal (like the instant appeal) is dismissed on ground of
limitation, conflicting decision is likely in the other appeal when decided
on merit.
Md. Suruzzamal Vs. Bangladesh and another, 13 BLD (AD) 125.
|
Md. Suruzzamal Vs. Bangladesh and another, |
13 BLD (AD) 125 |
Section 5
|
For admitting a time- barred appeal. the Court first of all is to be
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in
time- the appellant has to make out a case of sufficient cause by filing an
application for condonation of delay.
The practice of admitting a time-barred appeal ‘ subject to objections at
the hearing is not surely a sound one and must be discouraged except, in
marginal cases. When the delay is long the court must make the exercise
under section 5 of the Imitation Act before admitting the appeal with
notice to the respondent.
Mointazuddin and another Vs. Yakub Ali, 13 BLD (AD) 219.
|
Mointazuddin and another Vs. Yakub Ali, |
13 BLD (AD) 219 |
Section 5
|
In the absence of any sufficient cause shown for condonation of delay of an
inordinate delay of 1780 days in preferring the criminal appeal by the
petitioner the High Court Division rightly rejected the petition under
section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Abul Hossain vs State 1 BLC (AD) 40.
|
Abul Hossain vs State |
1 BLC (AD) 40 |
Section 5
|
Condonation of delay is the discretion of the Court—
To condone delay is the discretion of the Court. When the High Court
Division in exercise of its discretion condoned the delay of 201 days upon
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as explained, the
apex court found nothing wrong in it warranting interference therewith.
Abul Kalam Azad Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Deputy
Commissioner, Dinajpnr and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 42.
|
Abul Kalam Azad Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Dinajpnr and others |
11 MLR (AD) 42 |
Section 5
|
Condonation of delay— Government and Private litigant stand on equal
footing— Even then Government deserves some leniency—
Law is well settled that both the private and Government litigant stand on
equal footing. Government cannot claim any special privilege in respect of
limitation. Delay of every day shall be explained. Since the Government has
to take decision through different stages and obtain opinion from different
departments it takes more times. When cause of delay is satisfactorily
explained, delay can be condoned.
Sonar Bangla Service Station Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by
the Secretary, Ministry of Works and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 394.
|
Sonar Bangla Service Station Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Works and others |
11 MLR (AD) 394 |
Section 5
|
Applicable to an application seeking setting aside abatement— But filing
separate application u/s 5 for condonation of delay when the court is
satisfied on the materials on record may be waived in exceptional
circumstance—
Order 22 rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for
substitution of legal heirs of deceased plaintiff/appellant or defendant/
respondent, as the case may be, where the right to sue survives after
setting aside abatement. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has been
made applicable to such case. In certain exceptional circumstances the apex
court held that necessity of filing separate application u/s 5 of the
Limitation Act may be waived where the court is satisfied on the basis of
the materials on record to secure the ends of justice and set aside the
abatement and allow substitution based on the principles that the right of
a party cannot be defeated by mere technicalities. Hazi Habibur Rahman Vs.
Aiub Ali Sawdagar being dead his heirs Most Kamrun Nahar and others 12 MLR
(2007) (AD) 14.
|
Hazi Habibur Rahman Vs. Aiub Ali Sawdagar being dead his heirs Most Kamrun Nahar and others |
12 MLR (AD) 14 |
Section 5
|
Condonation of delay is not applicable to appeal under the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1980—
The Administrative Appellate Tribunal is debarred from entertaining any
appeal which is not filed within the period of limitation as contemplated
under section 6 (2A) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. As such the
Administrative Appellate Tribunal rejected the memorandum of appeal as
being one time barred. Since the condonation of delay is not applicable the
apex court held the order of rejection perfectly justified. 'Bangladesh
represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs and others Vs. Md.
Waziullah 13 MLR (2008) (AD) 161.
|
Bangladesh represented by the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs and others Vs. Md. Waziullah |
13 MLR (AD) 161 |
Sections 6, 28 and Article 144
|
Partition Suit—Minor ousted from possession—His title not extinguished
till the lapse of three years after attainment of majority, even though 12
years passed after dispossession—
Suit for partition filed after one year of attainment of majority—
Suit competent without a prayer for declaration of title—Only ad valorem
court-fee is to be paid.
Sanjib Kurnar Bose and another Vs. Sved Shainsuddin & anr, BLD (AD) 311
|
Sanjib Kurnar Bose and another Vs. Sved Shainsuddin & anr, |
1 BLD (AD) 311 |
Section 12(2)
|
The Limitation Act provides filing of appeal or any application challenging
any decree or order, whatsoever, of the court upon obtaining the certified
copy of the same and section 12(2) of the Limitation Act provides that the
time consumed in obtaining such copy shall be excluded. In the instant
case, it appears that neither there is any statement as to delay or there
is any prayer for condonation of delay nor there is any such finding by the
court of appeal below. As such it can be safely construed that the
application was filed within time. So there was no bar in allowing the
application. As such Rule 19 is very much applicable in the present case.
Hence we hold that the High Court Division committed error of law in not
taking the above facts into consideration and as such came an erroneous
finding that the re-admission was made without complying with the provision
of law. .....Bangladesh =VS= Abdul Barek Bepari, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM
(AD) 93]
....View Full Judgment
|
Bangladesh =VS= Abdul Barek Bepari |
3 LM (AD) 93 |
Section 13
|
Computation of Limitation—Limitation in a suit for specific performance
of contract when no date is fixed for the performance — Meaning of the
word ‘absent’ in the context of defendant’s non-availability in the
country — No time having being fixed for the performance of the contract,
time will begin to run when the plaintiff has notice that performance is
refused — the defendant having refused to file application for permission
for registration of the document and having admittedly left for India in
1964, the suit filed in 1969 was prima facie barred by limitation — But
when the law allows the period of absence of the defendant from Bangladesh
to be excluded for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation,
the plaintiff should not be denied such computation by putting some
artificial meaning to the word ‘absent’ merely because the period of
his absence may be too long in a particular case.
Bangladesh, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Pabna and others Vs.
Md. Abdus Sobhan Talukder and another 9 BLD (AD) 173
|
Bangladesh, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Pabna and others Vs. Md. Abdus Sobhan Talukder and another |
9 BLD (AD) 173 |
Section 14
|
However, the respondent can still avail the statutory forum of appeal under
section 42 of the VAT Act taking recourse of section 14 of the Limitation
Act. Since we already held that the writ petition is not maintainable as
such refrained from going into merit of the case. …Commissioner, Customs,
Excise and VAT Com. & ors. Vs. Perfect Tobacco Co. Ltd, (Civil), 16 SCOB
[2022] AD 84
....View Full Judgment
|
Commissioner, Customs, Excise and VAT Com. & ors. Vs. Perfect Tobacco Co. Ltd |
16 SCOB [2022] AD 84 |
Section 14(4)
|
The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 117 r/w
The Limitation Act 1908
Section 14(4)
In Civil Appeal No. 159 of 2010, Government of Bangladesh vs Sontosh Kumar
Saha and others that the Administrative Tribunal set up to exercise the
powers under Article 117 of the Constitution shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide the terms and conditions of service of the public
servants and that no judicial review of the actions of the authority will
be available to them, except in a case where the vires of law is challenged
in which cases only. Civil court can also pass or make interim orders,
subject to fulfillment of certain terms and conditions.
Writ petitioners can seek reliefs before the Administrative Tribunal, we
make it clear that if the writ petitioners desire to redress their
grievances before the Administrative Tribunal since they had been
prosecuting their grievances in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh for a long
time, the Administrative Tribunal shall entertain their petitions, if any,
are filed on condoning the delay under section 14 of the Limitation Act. We
also waive the statutory bar applicable to an applicant for filing a
departmental appeal before the appellate authority, since they have already
moved the High Court Division, the said period of limitation has already
expired. We want to make it clear that the proviso to sub section (4) shall
not stand in the way in making the applications and the Administrative
Tribunal shall admit the petitions as if the applicants have preferred
appeals under proviso to sub section (4). We further direct the
Administrative Tribunal to dispose of the petitions, if any is filed, on
priority basis not later than 6 (six) months from the date of receipt of
the order. ...Ministry of Education, Dhaka =VS= GMM Mizanur Rahman Bhuiyan,
[6 LM (AD) 32]
....View Full Judgment
|
Ministry of Education, Dhaka =VS= GMM Mizanur Rahman Bhuiyan |
6 LM (AD) 32 |
Section 14
|
The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1980 does not make any provision for
application of section 14 of the Limitation Act in proceedings before the
Administrative Tribunal.
Md. Abdus Sukkur Vs Chairman, National Board of Revenue and others, 17 BLD
(AD) 43.
|
Md. Abdus Sukkur Vs Chairman, National Board of Revenue and others, |
17 BLD (AD) 43 |
Section 14
|
Administrative Tribunal Act being a special law if provision of section 14
of the Limitation Act applies. If the time for disposal of the writ
petition can be excluded in competition of the period of limitation of six
months, from the date or order of termination.
Section 29 of the Act says that the provision in section 4, sections-9- 18
and section 22 shall apply to a case under a special or local law only in
so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by
such special or local law.
Bangladesh Bank & Ors Vs. Mohammad Abdul Mannan 2BLT (AD)-101
|
Bangladesh Bank & Ors Vs. Mohammad Abdul Mannan |
2 BLT (AD) 101 |
Section 14 and Section-29(2)
|
read with Administrative Tribunals Act, 1980 Second Proviso to
Sub-Section-(2) of Section-4
It is clear from the wording of the second proviso to sub-section (2) of
Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act that the legislative
intendment behind this provision is to exclude the proceedings governed by
the Administrative Tribunals Act from the operation of the benefit
conferred by subsection (2) of section 29. The petitioner cannot,
therefore, the benefit of Section- 14 of the Limitation Act while computing
the period of limitation in filing his application before the
Administrative Tribunal.
Abul Bashar Vs. Investment Corporation of Bangladesh & Ors. 9BLT (AD)-21
|
Abul Bashar Vs. Investment Corporation of Bangladesh & Ors. |
9 BLT (AD) 21 |
Sections 14 and 29
|
Exclusion of time in computing time of limitation to file a case —
Whether exclusion prescribed under section 14 of the Limitation Act is
applicable in a case of special law — If a person in good faith
prosecutes his legal proceedings in a wrong forum he should be entitled to
exclude this period in computing the period of limitation under special
law, such as the Wakf Ordinance. In the instant case it cannot be said that
the respondent started her proceeding in good faith and consequently she is
not entitled to the benefit of section 14 — Wakfs Ordinance, 1962 (I of
1962), Ss. 32 and 33; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), s. 115; Or
XLVII R. 7(2)
Syed Amir Hossain Vs. Mrs. Nadera Rahman, 5 BLD (AD) 317
|
Syed Amir Hossain Vs. Mrs. Nadera Rahman, |
5 BLD (AD) 317 |
Section 14
|
The Value Added Tax Act (VAT Act)
Section 42(1)(Ka) and sec. 42(2)(Ka)
The Limitation Act, 1908
Section 14
Our Apex Court in the case of TaeHung Packaging (BD) Limited and others Vs.
Bangladesh and others, reported in 18 BLC (AD) (2013) 144, held: “The
consistent views of this Division are that if any alternative remedy is
available, the judicial review by the High Court Division in writ
jurisdiction is not available with the exception that where the vires of a
statutory provision is challenged or where the alternative remedy is not
efficacious exercise of such power may be justified.” In the case of
Champalal Binani Vs. the Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal & others,
reported in AIR 1970(SC)645, the Indian Supreme Court observed that:
“Where the aggrieved party has an alternative remedy the High Court would
be slow to entertain a petition challenging an order of a taxing authority
which is exfacie with jurisdiction. A petition for a writ of certiorari may
lie to the High Court, where the order is on the face of it erroneous or
raises question of jurisdiction or of infringement of fundamental rights of
the petition.”
The respondent can still avail the statutory forum of appeal under section
42 of the VAT Act taking recourse of section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Since we are already held that the writ petition is not maintainable as
such refrained from going into merit of the case. Judgment and order dated
05.05.2016 passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition No.1649 of
2012 is set aside. .....Customs, Excise and VAT Commissionerate =VS= M/S.
Perfect Tobacco Company Ltd. , (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 271]
....View Full Judgment
|
Customs, Excise and VAT Commissionerate =VS= M/S. Perfect Tobacco Company Ltd. |
12 LM (AD) 271 |
Section 15
|
Limitation Act, 1908
Section 15 And
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Order IX rule 13
Pendency of a case for setting aside an ex-parte decree cannot extend the
period of limitation for filing of execution case:
Application for execution of a final decree or order is to be made within 3
(three) years from the date mentioned in 2nd Column of Article 182 of the
Limitation Act subject to some exceptions as detailed in the 3rd Column
read with provisions of section 15 of the Act inasmuch as Article 182 makes
no provision for fresh limitation from a final order passed on an
application under Order IX rule 13 of the Code. In other words if no stay
order or injunction is passed staying the operation of the decree or order
under section 15 or no situation arises as per the 3rd Column of Article
182 the decree or order would keep open for execution and time would run
from the date of final decree or order. A bare reading of Article 182 of
the limitation Act also suggests that an application under order IX rule 13
of the code does not come within the meaning of applications mentioned in
clause 5 of column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act to save
limitation. Accordingly, pendency of a case under Order IX rule 13 of the
Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside an ex-parte decree cannot extend
the period of limitation for filing execution case. ...Md. Mohitur Rohman
Chy & ors Vs. Md. Abdul Kuddus Miah & ors, (Civil), 9 SCOB [2017] HCD 163
....View Full Judgment
|
Md. Mohitur Rohman Chy & ors Vs. Md. Abdul Kuddus Miah & ors |
9 SCOB [2017] HCD 163 |
Section 18
|
The appellate court has rightly held that the limitation period will be
counted from the date of knowledge, which is as per provisions of section
18 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appellate court has accurately found
that the suit is not barred by limitation, because the limitation period
shall be counted from the date of knowledge of this impugned Nadabinama
deed obtained by practicing fraud upon the executants and that the
plaintiffs have derived knowledge about the contents of the disputed deed
on the date of obtaining certified copy on 20.05.1998. …Abedun Nessa Vs.
Jaher Sheikh and others, (Civil), 16 SCOB [2022] HCD 37
....View Full Judgment
|
Abedun Nessa Vs. Jaher Sheikh and others |
16 SCOB [2022] HCD 37 |
Section 18
|
Limitation of compensation for wrongful cancellation of the dealership
licence Delay was caused in filing the suit as the partners of the firm
were scared due to the prevailing lawlessness in the country — When there
is fraud there is no question of limitation and it will run from the date
when fraud was detected — Appellant has succeeded in establishing that
there has been suppression of truth, absence of prior notice before
cancellation, non-compliance with the terms of the agreement and malafide
on the part of respondent No. I which entitled the appellant to the decree
sought for.
M/s. Hajee Mohammad Au and sons Vs. Burma Eastern Limited and others, 6BLD
(AD)146
|
M/s. Hajee Mohammad Au and sons Vs. Burma Eastern Limited and others, |
6 BLD (AD) 146 |
Section 22( 1)
|
Plea of limitation—When not available
When the petitioner on his own volition added himself as a defendant in the
suit 3 years after its institution, it does not lie in his mouth to say
that the suit is barred against him under Section 22(1) of the Limitation
Act.
Mohammad Gazi Miah Vs. Syed Abdur Rouf and others, 15 BLD (AD) 54.
|
Mohammad Gazi Miah Vs. Syed Abdur Rouf and others, |
15 BLD (AD) 54 |
Section 23
|
The Easements Act, 1882
Section 15 r/w
Limitation Act, 1908
Section 23
One should bring a suit within 2(two) years of interruption of his
enjoyment (distinct from actual user) of easement right when the cause of
action arises– The Appellate Division observed that the High Court
Division took the view that since the suit was not filed within two years
from 1990, i.e. when the wall was erected by the defendants, the suit is
barred. The Appellate Division is of view the finding of the High Court
Division is quite erroneous. The requirement of the law is that in
establishing the right of easement it has to be shown that the right was
openly enjoyed as an easement, and as of right, without interruption for 20
years and the period of 20 years shall be taken to be a period ending with
the interruption of the enjoyment of the easement right when the cause of
action arises and the suit is to be instituted within 2 years from the date
when the cause of action arises. .....Shamsul Huq Molla =VS= Shunil
Chandra Biswas, [1 LM (AD) 373]
....View Full Judgment
|
Shamsul Huq Molla =VS= Shunil Chandra Biswas |
1 LM (AD) 373 |
Section 28
|
Acquisition of title by adverse possession—
The plaintiffs were never recognised as cosharers of the suit land and on
the contrary the defendant had been in the exclusive possession since the
time of C.S operation and by continuous possession adversely to the
interest of the plaintiff, the defendants have already acquired good and
indefeasible title to the suit land and the right title and interest of the
plaintiff in the suit land has been extinguished by ouster and adverse
possession for more than a period of 12 years. Dalimon Nessa Bewa and
others Vs. Md. Hashmat Ali 13 MLR (2008) (AD) 329.
|
Dalimon Nessa Bewa and others Vs. Md. Hashmat Ali |
13 MLR (AD) 329 |
Section 28
|
Acquisition of title by adverse possession for more than twelve years—
The plaintiff-respondent, who embraced Islam, had been in uninterrupted
possession of the suit land for more than twelve years and acquired
indefeasible title thereto. The suit land was formerly part of their family
debater property wherefrom the idol was removed and the property lost its
debater character. The High Court Division set aside the judgment and
decree of the court of appeal and restored those of the trial court which
the apex court upheld. Hari Thakur Deb Bigraha (Sri Sri) and others Vs Md.
Abdul Hannan and others 13 MLR (2008) (AD) 353.
|
Hari Thakur Deb Bigraha (Sri Sri) and others Vs Md. Abdul Hannan and others |
13 MLR (AD) 353 |
Section 28
|
Possession of a cosharer in joint property does not constitute adverse
possession against other cosharers—
Amicable arrangement between cosharers is not a partition by metes and
bounds—
In a joint property possession of one cosharer is possession of other
cosharers. Such possession never becomes adverse against the other
cosharers. Amicable arrangement among cosharers is not a partition by metes
and bounds. Probir Kumar Rakshit Vs. Abdus Sabur and others 14 MLR (2009)
(AD) 10.
|
Probir Kumar Rakshit Vs. Abdus Sabur and others |
14 MLR (AD) 10 |
Section 28
|
Acquisition of title by adverse possession—
When the plaintiff has succeeded in proving his continuous possession in
the suit property adversely against all others for more than 12 years
before the institution of the suit, his title to the suit property has been
held to have been perfected by adverse possession against the defendants.
Kalimuddin (Mir) being dead his heirs Ayesha Khatun @ Chamatkar Bibi and
others Vs. Mohammad Dukhi Mondal and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 151.
|
Kalimuddin (Mir) being dead his heirs Ayesha Khatun @ Chamatkar Bibi and others Vs. Mohammad Dukhi Mondal and others |
11 MLR (AD) 151 |
Section 28
|
Suit for recovery of possession of suit land must be instituted within 12
years of dispossession—
The law is well settled that for recovery of possession of the suit land
must be instituted within 12 years of dispossession. When the plaintiff
fails to prove the date of dispossession and the institution of the suit
within 12 years of dispossession, he is not entitled to get the decree.
Delwar Hossain Akter (Md.) and another Vs. Md. Nazrul Islam Khan and others
11 MLR (2006) (AD) 380.
|
Delwar Hossain Akter (Md.) and another Vs. Md. Nazrul Islam Khan and others |
11 MLR (AD) 380 |
Section 28
|
Acquisition of title by adverse possession—
Suit for declaration of title on the basis of fictitious title deeds as
well as by adverse possession is not maintainable. In a suit for
declaration of title by adverse possession the plaintiff must establish
that from certain particular point of time he has been continuously
possessing the suit land for over a period of twelve years in assertion of
his hostile title denying the title of the real owner openly to the
knowledge of all. Sheikh Farid (Md.) and others Vs. Abdul Wadud Sikder and
others 12 MLR (2007) (AD) 201.
|
Sheikh Farid (Md.) and others Vs. Abdul Wadud Sikder and others |
12 MLR (AD) 201 |
Section 28 r/w Article 142
|
Limitation for filing a suit for recovery of kash possession of immovable
property is 12 years starting from the date of dispossession–– Both the
trial Court and the High Court Division correctly arrived at a finding that
when the result of the earlier Title Suit No.100 of 1974 reached its
finality by dismissing the Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.113 of
1985 on 18.03.1986 by this Division, the terminus a quo to claim possession
from the defendant began and the plaintiff ought to have file the suit for
recovery of khas possession within 12 years from the said date or disposal
of the said civil petition for leave to appeal i.e. on 18.03.1986. Since
the suit was filed on 16.03.1998, the suit is within 12 years from the date
of terminus a quo.
In a case reported in 12 CWN 326, it has been held by the Privy Council
that the plaintiffs are entitled to deduction of the period between the
20th April, 1903, where in the previous suit he obtained a decree in their
favour and the 22nd February, 1904, the date of the reversal of that decree
by the appellate court, their right of action having been in suspension.
––Admittedly, if the period during which the plaintiffs were litigating
for their rights is deducted, their present suit is in time. ––Under
the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above
Appellate Division does not find any logic to interfere with the findings
of the High Court Division. .....Jasmeen Ershad =VS= Shahar Banoo Mohsin
Asgar, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 254]
....View Full Judgment
|
Jasmeen Ershad =VS= Shahar Banoo Mohsin Asgar |
15 LM (AD) 254 |
Section 28
|
Section 28 of the Limitation Act has no application to persons who are in
possession and who have had no occasion to sue for recovery of possession.
Md. Abdul Ban Muktear Vs. Md.Nurul Islam & Ors 12 BLT (AD)126
|
Md. Abdul Ban Muktear Vs. Md.Nurul Islam & Ors |
12 BLT (AD) 126 |
Section 28
|
Limitation Act, 1908
Section 28
Specific Relief Act, 1877
Section 42
Adverse possession– It is found that the defendants have been in
possession of the disputed land for more than 12 years as of right and by
asserting hostile title against the plaintiffs of their predecessor and
there was a complete outer and thus, the right, title and interest of the
plaintiffs if any which they alleged had acquired in the properties had
been lost by adverse possession.
Appellate Division disapproves the finding of the appellate Court below to
the effect that the defendants failed to prove their title in the suit
land. But it revealed that if there is any loophole in the title of the
defendants, the same has been covered by their long run possession so also
by acquisition of statutory title by way of adverse possession.
The plaintiff-respondents hopelessly failed to discharge the onus (as has
been ascertained by us) and as such, the suit of the plaintiff-respondent
fails. Appellate Division finds that there is illegality or infirmity in
the impugned judgment, which in our view calls for interference. The
judgment and order of the High Court Division is set aside and there by the
judgment passed by the trail Court is hereby restored. ...Abdul Hamid
Gazi(Md.) =VS= A Samad, (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 444]
....View Full Judgment
|
Abdul Hamid Gazi(Md.) =VS= A Samad |
11 LM (AD) 444 |
Section 28 and Article 144
|
Adverse possession — It implies that The person against whom adverse
possession is exercised is a person who is entitled to demand possession at
the moment adverse pos-session begins — A person who bases his title on
adverse possession must show that his pos- session was hostile to the real
owner and amounted to a denial of his title — As there is no evidence to
show that the plaintiff ever claimed any title by adverse possession
against the real owner with whose permission he entered into the suit
property, he is not en- titled to any relief on the basis of adverse pos-
session.
Abdul Kader and others Vs. A.K Noor and others, 5 BLD (AD) 33
|
Abdul Kader and others Vs. A.K Noor and others, |
5 BLD (AD) 33 |
Section 28 and Article 144
|
Adverse possession — Claim of adverse possession by Tenant — There is
no adverse possession where the relationship is that of landlord and tenant
— When the tenant continues to stay on the land after the termination of
the lease but does so on the terms of the lease and on payment of rent his
possession cannot be adverse to the landlord.
Narendra Basu Roy and another Vs. Municipal Committee, Mymensingh, 6 BLD
(AD) 297
|
Narendra Basu Roy and another Vs. Municipal Committee, Mymensingh, |
6 BLD (AD) 297 |
Section 29
|
Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966
Rule 29 of the first schedule
Read with section 29 of the Limitation Act:
The High Court Division committed an error of law in holding that the date
on which carriage stopped was the date on which the carrier defendants
admitted its failure to deliver its goods finally and offered payment of
compensation in lieu of the goods. The time for limitation began to run
from the expiry of 7 days after the date on which the goods ought to have
arrived, that is, on 22.01.1999. Since the suit was filed on 24.05.2001
apparently the same was barred by limitation in view of special limitation
provided in Rule 29 of the first schedule of the Carriage by Air
(International Convention) Act, 1966 read with section 29 of the Limitation
Act. …Biman Bangladesh Airlines & ors Vs. Al Rojoni Enterprise, (Civil),
9 SCOB [2017] AD 66
....View Full Judgment
|
Biman Bangladesh Airlines & ors Vs. Al Rojoni Enterprise |
9 SCOB [2017] AD 66 |
Section 29
|
The Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966
Rule 29(first schedule) r/w
The Limitation Act
Section 29
The High Court Division committed an error of law in holding that the date
on which carriage stopped was the date on which the carrier defendants
admitted its failure to deliver its goods finally and offered payment of
compensation in lieu of the goods. The time for limitation began to run
from the expiry of 7 days after the date on which the goods ought to have
arrived, that is, on 22.01.1999. Since the suit was filed on 24.05.2001
apparently the same was barred by limitation in view of special limitation
provided in Rule 29 of the first schedule of the Carriage by Air
(International Convention) Act, 1966 read with section 29 of the Limitation
Act. .....Biman Bangladesh Airlines =VS= Al Rojoni Enterprise, [4 LM (AD)
95]
....View Full Judgment
|
Biman Bangladesh Airlines =VS= Al Rojoni Enterprise |
4 LM (AD) 95 |
Section 29(2)
|
When a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation for filing,
suit, appeal or application different from the period prescribed by the
First Schedule of the said Act, the Proviso contained in Section 4,
Sections 9-18 and Section 22 will apply.
Md. Ishaque and others Vs. The Government of Bangladesh, 14 BLD (AD) 39.
|
Md. Ishaque and others Vs. The Government of Bangladesh, |
14 BLD (AD) 39 |
Section 29
|
State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 148 r/w
The Limitation Act, 1908
Section 29
The main ground on which the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner
(Revenue), Dhaka was challenged was that the limitation for filing an
appeal under section 147 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950(the
Act, 1950), as provided in section 148 thereof was 30 days, but the appeal
was filed beyond 30 days with an application for condonation of delay.
Therefore, the order passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue)
admitting the appeal condoning the delay was without jurisdiction. From the
impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court Division
accepted the said contention of the writ-petitioner and made the Rule Nisi
absolute. We find nothing wrong with the view taken by the High Court
Division inasmuch as limitation provided in the Act, 1950 was a special
limitation. .....A.T.M. Nasiruddin =VS= Shirin Ahmed Chy., [3 LM (AD) 45]
....View Full Judgment
|
A.T.M. Nasiruddin =VS= Shirin Ahmed Chy. |
3 LM (AD) 45 |
Section 29
|
বিশেষ আইন ভিন্নতর তামাদির
মেয়াদের বিধান সুনির্দিষ্ট
থাকলে তামাদি আইনের ধারা ২৯(২)
মোতাবেক তামাদি আইনের ধারা ৫
প্রযোজ্য হবে নাঃ
কোন বিশেষ আইন কোন মামলা, আপীল
বা দরখাস্ত দাখিলের জন্য
তামাদি আইন, ১৯০৮ এর প্রথম
তফসিল বর্ণিত নির্ধারিত
মেয়াদ অপেক্ষা ভিন্নতর
তামাদির মেয়াদের বিধান
থাকলে, অর্থাৎ তামাদি আইনের
প্রথম তফসিল মামলা, আপীল বা
দরখাস্ত দাখিলে যে মেয়াদ বা
সময় দেওয়া সে মেয়াদ ও সময়ের
পরিবর্তে ভিন্নতর তামাদির
মেয়াদ বা সময় দেওয়া থাকলে
তামাদি আইনের ২৯(২)(ক) মোতাবেক
বিশেষ আইনের যে পরিমান
সরাসরি বহির্ভূত না হবে সে
পরিমান তামাদি আইনের ৪ ধারা,
তামাদি আইনের ৯ থেকে ১৮ এবং ২২
ধারার বিধান সমূহ প্রযোজ্য
হবে এবং ২৯(২)(খ) মোতাবেক
তামাদি আইনের ২৯(২)(ক) ধারার
বিধান ব্যতীত তামাদি আইনের
অবশিষ্ট বিধান সমূহ প্রযোজ্য
হবে না। অর্থাৎ বিশেষ আইন
ভিন্নতর তামাদির মেয়াদের
বিধান সুনির্দিষ্ট থাকলে
তামাদি আইনের ধারা ২৯(২)
মোতাবেক তামাদি আইনের ধারা ৫
প্রযোজ্য হবে না ...বিগ বস
কর্পোরেশন লিমিটেড বনাম
আর্মি ওয়েলফেয়ার ট্রাস্ট Big Boss
Corporation Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57
....View Full Judgment
|
Big Boss Corporation Limited Vs. Army Welfare Trust |
17 SCOB [2023] HCD 57 |
Barred by limitation–
|
Barred by limitation–
It is crystal clear that the plaintiffs miserably failed to prove their
title to the suit land. Admittedly, the plaintiffs filed Title Suit No.63
of 1954 for declaration of title in respect of the suit land which was
dismissed. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed Title Appeal No.64 of 1957
before the learned District Judge, Sylhet, which was also dismissed.
Therefore, it appears that instant Title Suit No.112 of 1972 filed by the
plaintiffs is hopelessly barred by limitation. .....Israil Kha & others
=VS= Syed Anwar Hossain & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 277]
....View Full Judgment
|
Israil Kha & others =VS= Syed Anwar Hossain & others |
1 LM (AD) 277 |