Limitation Act, 1908
Article 5
Penal Code, 1860
Sections 385/386/323
Delay condoned–– From the materials on record it is clear that he was abroad from 2000 for which he could not appear before the Court. It also appears that after his return in 2015 when he came to know about the conviction and sentence he surrendered before the court on the earliest opportunity. This aspect should have been considered by the High Court Division in exercising its discretionary power of condonation of delay as refusal to condone the delay under such circumstances would prevent substantial justice. ––The delay of 4,543 days in filing of the criminal appeal before the High Court Division is condoned upon setting aside the impugned judgment and order and the High Court Division is directed to register the criminal appeal and dispose of the same on merit in accordance with law. .....Tipu =VS= State, (Criminal), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 308] ....View Full Judgment

The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 42(1) r/w article 31
The Limitation Act
Article 10 (First Schedule)
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 96
Hadis r/w Quran
Pre-emption–– From the judgment of the trial Court, it appears that it decreed the suits on the findings, inter alia, that the plaintiffs proved that they were the owners of ‘B’ scheduled land which is contiguous to the suit land and therefore, they were entitled to file the suit for pre-emption as Shafi-I-Jar; that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they had a path way on the suit land for engress and outgress from ‘B’ scheduled land; that the suits were filed well within the period of limitation; that the plaintiffs proved their case of Talab-I Mowasibat and Talab-I-Ishad. ––Appellate Division can easily and definitely say that the saying of the great Prophet (saw) is Hadis. ––The source of pre-emption as Shafi-I-Jar, i.e. vicinage from Hadis: (I) Narrated by Ibn Abbas that the Prophet (saw) said, “Whoever has land and wants to sell it, let him offer it to his neighbour (Ibn Majah).” (II) Narrated by Abu Rafi “That the Prophet (saw) said, “The neighbour has more right to property that is near (Sahih Al Bukhari and Sahih Al Muslim).” (III) Narrated by Sharid Bin Suwaid that “I said, O Messenger of Allah, (what do you think of) land owned by only one person but this land has neighbours?” He said: “The neighbour has more right to property that is near” (Sahih Al Bukhari). (IV) Narrated by Samarah that the Prophet of Allah (PBUH) said, “The neighbour of the house has a greatest right to pre-empt the house” (Jamai of Tirmizi).
In the instant case, the agreement for sale vide Ext-‘A’ was executed on 16.08.1995 and part payment was made on that date and physical possession of the suit property was also handed over to the vendee on receipt of full consideration, the sale deed was executed and presented for registration on 07.03.1996 whereas, the suit was filed on 30.06.1997, i.e. much beyond the period of limitation of 1 (one) year as provided in article 10 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. But the trial Court totally ignored the above factual and legal aspects of the case and thus erred in law in holding that the suits were not barred by limitation. ––Appellate Division finds that the High Court Division was totally wrong in declaring the right of pre-emption under the Muhammedan Law on the ground of vicinage both agricultural and town property void being discriminatory and violative of article 42(1) read with article 31 of the Constitution. .....Jamuna Knitting and Dying Ltd. =VS= Messer’s Y. K. Co. Textile Ltd, (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 139] ....View Full Judgment

It is Article 95 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act which governs a suit to set aside a decree obtained by fraud or for other relief on the ground of fraud. It provides 3 years from the time when fraud comes known to the party wronged. Govt. of Bangladesh Vs. Ramananda Sarker. 9BLT (AD)-30

Limitation — Suit for declaration that auction sale was fraudulent, void and not binding — Period of limitation in such a suit When a plaintiff brings a suit it must be governed by some provisions of the Limitation Act — Whether such a suit is to be brought within three years from the date when the fraud became known to the party wronged The trial Court found that the plaintiff did not bring the suit within three years from the date of knowledge of the sale — The Subordinate Judge held that since the sale was void abilities there could not be any question of limitation — the suit, however, being, as it is, and the facts as found there can be no escape from the bar of limitation even though the auction sale was said to have been tainted with fraud and thus void. Syed Ahmed and others Vs. Abdul Mokarram and others, 7BLD (AD) 166

The payment of compen­sation should reflect the benefit that the recipient would obtain by investing that sum of money had it been paid in due time. There is a general right of performance within a reasonable time. Approximately twenty years have elapsed from 1992 when there was no further impediment in the way of completing the sale. On the basis that money put into long term investment would, more or less, double in five years the seller is entitled to receive taka two crores by way of compen­sation. Mahua Khair vs Amena Begum All Ispahani 17 BLC (AD) 139

Sale deeds, Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, Baina dated, Time from which the period of limitation begins, Novation of contract, Performance of a contract;
Time consumed in the so called arbitration proceedings or waiting for subsequent refusal are of no assistance to the plaintiff.
Specific performance is a relief which the Court will not grant, unless in cases where the parties seeking it come promptly, and as soon as the nature of the case will admit. The rights of equity are rights which are given to litigants who are vigilant and not to those who sleep. ...Md. Badaruddin Vs. Md. Shahidullah Miah, (Civil), 14 SCOB [2020] HCD 86 ....View Full Judgment

Limitation and genuineness of the agreement– In a case for specific performance of contract where the written agreement for sale is not registered, the oral evidence of witnesses with regard to execution of the agreement, payment of consideration money, offer of remainder of consideration money, if any, and the refusal to execute and register the deed of sale assumes primary importance. In the instant case the oral evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim is all the more important because the defendants deny the deed of agreement altogether.
The plaintiff’s case is that the bainanama was executed on 04.11.1985. The deed of sale was to be registered within three years. We note that the stipulation in the deed of agreement is that if the defendant fails to register the deed of sale within three years, then the plaintiff had the option to file a suit in Court on depositing the balance consideration money and could thus get the property registered through Court. The plaintiff, therefore, could have filed the suit any time after 04.11.1988, but did not do so. Sending a legal notice to the defendants in 2001 will not save the suit from being barred by limitation unless the plaintiff can prove that he offered the balance consideration money and asked for execution and registration of the deed within the period stipulated in the agreement for sale and the suit was filed within statutory limitation thereafter. Hence, the suit filed in 2001 is barred by limitation. ...Aminul Islam(Md.) alias Md. Amin =VS= Md. Ataur Rahman, (Civil), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 148] ....View Full Judgment

Limitation Act, 1908
Article 113 (first schedule)
Specific Relief Act, 1877
Section 22
Specific performance of contract is an equitable and discretionary relief to be given by the competent Court exercising the same judiciously–– The story of agreement for sale advanced by the plaintiff creates suspicion–– Trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 28.05.2005, decreed the suit. Then the defendants preferred Title Appeal No.304 of 2005 in the Court of District Judge, Dhaka, which was heard by the Additional District Judge, 6th Court, who after hearing the parties allowed the appeal reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit in part. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff filed Civil Revision No.1725 of 2007 in the High Court Division and obtained Rule, which was made absolute.
From the evidence quoted above it is apparent that there are some inconsistencies regarding the claim of the plaintiff, that is, in respect of talk of sale, settlement of consideration, execution of “bainanama”, payment of premium to the Government by the plaintiff, offer made by the plaintiff to the defendants on the basis of alleged agreement to get the sale deed executed and registered upon payment of rest consideration and as to the delivery of possession of the suit land. All those inconsistencies created a doubt about the genuineness of the alleged agreement for sale and transaction.
The pleading and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and the other materials on record raised a doubt about the talk of sale, payment of consideration, execution of bainanama, delivery of the possession of the disputed property and making construction in the suit land. Without taking any permission and even without making any prayer to the Government to get permission to transfer the suit land, the story of agreement for sale advanced by the plaintiff creates suspicion. Appellate Division is of the view that the instant case was not fit case for exercising discretion for enforcement of contract and the plaintiff was not entitled to get any relief, the High Court Division has committed an error of law in not exercising its discretion judiciously and, thereby, erroneously made the Rule absolute. .....Mosammat Asma Khatun =VS= Md. Abdul Karim, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 440] ....View Full Judgment

Specific performance of contract– From the Article 113 of the Limitation Act, it is clear that when date is fixed it means there is a definite date fixed for doing particular Act. Even in the second part the stress is on ‘when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused’. In a suit for specific performance, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the existence of a concluded contract between the parties and that the plaintiff is ready and willing at all material dates to perform its part of the contract. The plaintiff has failed to prove the same. From the date of deed of agreement, exhibit-‘A’, and the date of refusal as stipulated in the averments of the plaint it is evident that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. .....Delwar Hossain Majhi @Dulal Majhi =VS= Al-haj Mokhlesur Rahman Bepari,(Civil),2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 172] ....View Full Judgment

Article 113 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is the proper provision which governs a suit for specific performance of a contract. Under this article the period of limitation is three years from the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. It is nobody’s case that any date was fixed for performance. [Para-7] A. D. C. Wested Property) Vs. Md. Serajul Islam & Ors. 6 BLT (AD)-132

Article 113 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is the proper provision which governs a suit for specific performance of a contract. Under this article the period of limitation is three years from the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. It is nobody’s case that any date was fixed for performance, A.D. C. (Vested Properly) Vs. Md. Serajul Islam & Ors. 6BLT (AD)-132

The suit is instituted within 03 years from the date of refusal and hence the suit is not barred by limitation. ...Abdus Sattar(Md.) =VS= Nazrul Islam(Md.) , (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 457] ....View Full Judgment

Limitation — Limitation in a suit for specific performance of contract — When it will start — Whether limitation will run from the expiry of the period mentioned in the notice by the plaintiff to the defendant to perform the contract after obtaining necessary permission for execution and registration of the sale deed or from the expiry of the Ordinance putting embargo on execution and registration of the sale deed with permission — Upon true construction of the relevant clause of the agreement it would appear that the plaintiff could ask for the deed amicably or through Court both after the expiry of the Ordinance, and during the continuance of the Ordinance upon fulfilling conditions therefor — Finding as to limitation that the suit was filed within three years from the expiry of the Ordinance is justified — Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964(1 of 1964), S.4. Rustam Dhali and others Vs. Sekander Dhali and others, 7 BLD(AD151

Adverse possession must be notorious open and hostile and within the knowledge of the land owner .
The Appellate Division found that the High Court Division came to a finding that a period of 12 years must have elapsed to acquire right on the basis of adverse possession and such possession must be notorious open and hostile and within the knowledge of the land owner and that the petitioners miserably failed to prove so, and as such Appellate Division dismissed both the petitions.
Md. Motiar Rahman Khan being dead his heirs: (1). Md. Rabiul Anam and others. -Vs.- Md. Abdul Aziz Khan and others. (Civil) 8 ALR (AD) 191-193

The plaintiff prayed for declaration of title stating that his cause for seeking such relief arose on 27-10-1969. The suit was filed on 3-9-1976. The relief so sought was barred in view of the provision of Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The other relief, that is relief b(l) was also barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. Abu Naser Md Wahidun Nabi vs Balai Roy 10 BLC (AD) 58.

According to paragraph No. 7 of the plaint, cause of action arose on 14.07.2002 after having knowledge from the sub-registry office. But on perusal of the records it appears that the certified copies of exhibit-2 and 2(ka) were obtained on 17.07.1995. The certified copies of exhibit-2(Ga) and exhibit-2(Gha) were obtained after filing of the suit on 05.07.2003 and 03.07.2003 respectively. Thus it can be held that the cause of action of the suit is definitely false and the suit is barred by law of limitation. The beneficiaries of exhibit-2(Gha) dated 19.12.1982 being defendant Nos. 4-5 are the sons of plaintiff No. 3 Sahaton and the husband of plaintiff No. 2 Rahaton was the identifier to exhibit-Gha dated 15.09.1994. So it raises serious doubt on the story of cause of action and as such it is held that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. ...Sirajul Haque Howlader and ors Vs. Zulekha Begum & ors, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 199 ....View Full Judgment

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Order 41 Rule 31
The Limitation Act, 1908
Article 120
For rectification of a document, declaration of title and confirmation of possession in the suit land– On appreciation and sifting of evidences adduced in the trial court disbelieved the defendant’s version of cases regarding their title and possession over the suit and Appellate Division observed that appellate court without discarding the findings based on strong evidences reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence, the same as well as the later affirmation thereof, of the High Court Division are not tenable in the eye of law. Appellate Division’s considered view is that the High Court Division as well as the Court of appeal below made an error of laws and facts setting aside the judgment and order of the trial Court on the basis of erroneous findings, thus the same cannot be sustainable in law. These Civil Appeals are allowed without any order as to cost. The judgment and order of the High Court Division as well as judgment and decree of the Appellate Court are set aside and judgment and decree of the learned Assistant Judge is hereby restored. .....Mortuz Ali Karar(Md.) =VS= Khatiza Banu, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 110] ....View Full Judgment

The Limitation Act does not specifically provide for any particular period of limitation in filing suits by a Muslim for arrears of maintenance although Articles 128 and 129 of the first schedule provide for a period of 12 years each by a Hindu for arrears of maintenance and for a declaration Of his right to maintenance and the time for which period begins to run is when the arrears are payable. No such corresponding provisions exist in respect of suit filed by a Muslim for a corresponding relief. Residuary Article 120, providing for a period of limitation of 6 years from the time when the right to sue accrues in respect of a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first schedule, will be applicable to a suit for maintenance under ordinance of 1985. [Para-23] Jamila Khatoon Vs. Rustom Ali 4 BLT (AD)-97

Limitation — Question of limitation in a suit seeking declaration that the proceedings under section 92 of the S.A.T.Act was void — Since no notice was issued by the Revenue Officer under sub-section 3 of section 92 of the S,A.T.Act inviting any objection against the taking over of the holding as abandoned’ holding, the period of limitation prescribed in that section will not be applicable — The suit attracts the general provisions of the Limitation Act under Article 120 of the Limitation Act — State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 (XXVIII of 1951), S.92 (4). Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Sailesh Chandra Bhattacharya, 4 BLD (AD) 295

Limitation—Bar of—Limitation commenced to run from the date when the cause of action first accrued — Since the plaintiff did not file the suit within six years from the date when the impugned notification was issued. the suit is clearly barred by limitation. M/s. Jute Trading Corporation Ltd. Vs. Khana Rani Githa and others, 5BLD (AD)218

The High Court Division also held that since the transactions are vitiated by fraud, the suit would be governed by Article 134 of the Limitation Act and the starting point of limitation would be 12 years from the date when the transfer became known to the present plaintiff. Parveen Sultana vs Sahera Khatun 12 BLC (AD) 175.

Adverse possession—In the instant case in their pleading the Mahaluxmi bank did not raise the plea of their acquiring title by adverse possession and so no issue was framed regarding acquiring of title of the bank in the suit land by their adverse possession. However, since the defendant No. 1 asserted that they acquired title also by adverse possession, issue No. 6 was framed regarding the acquiring of title by the defendant No. 1 on the basis of adverse possession. Even if the bank proves possession over period of 12 years, they will not succeed if the title remained with the defendant No. 1. Ruhul Amin vs Official Liquidator, Mahaluxmi Bank Ltd U BLC (AD) 1

It appears that the right of adverse possession cannot stand since the defendant claims that he took settlement of the land from his landlord but on his failure to prove his such claim he cannot raise the alternative plea. Jamira Khatun vs Fazlul Karim 15 BLC (AD) 236.

The suit is governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act and as such there has been miscarriage of justice. The High Court Division it appears exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below specially the appellate Court which is final Court of fact when there was no misreading and non-reading of the material evidence on record and mis-construction of the documents. There is also legal infirmity in the judgments of the Courts below. We are of the view that the High Court Division was not justified in making the Rule absolute and the same accordingly requires interference by us. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs. .....Sufia Begum =VS= Md. Tariqul Alam, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 428] ....View Full Judgment

Limitation for filing a suit for recovery of kash possession of immovable property is 12 years starting from the date of dispossession–– Both the trial Court and the High Court Division correctly arrived at a finding that when the result of the earlier Title Suit No.100 of 1974 reached its finality by dismissing the Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.113 of 1985 on 18.03.1986 by this Division, the terminus a quo to claim possession from the defendant began and the plaintiff ought to have file the suit for recovery of khas possession within 12 years from the said date or disposal of the said civil petition for leave to appeal i.e. on 18.03.1986. Since the suit was filed on 16.03.1998, the suit is within 12 years from the date of terminus a quo.
In a case reported in 12 CWN 326, it has been held by the Privy Council that the plaintiffs are entitled to deduction of the period between the 20th April, 1903, where in the previous suit he obtained a decree in their favour and the 22nd February, 1904, the date of the reversal of that decree by the appellate court, their right of action having been in suspension. ––Admittedly, if the period during which the plaintiffs were litigating for their rights is deducted, their present suit is in time. ––Under the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above Appellate Division does not find any logic to interfere with the findings of the High Court Division. .....Jasmeen Ershad =VS= Shahar Banoo Mohsin Asgar, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 254] ....View Full Judgment

The Specific Relief Act
Section 42 r/w
The Code of Civil Procedure
Order VI, Rule 17 r/w
The Limitation Act
Article 142
Amendment of Plain– It is now settled that as to the question of limitation there are two ways in which the same may arise . “First, whether the claim to be included was barred on the date of the institution of the suit. Secondly, whether the claim is barred on the date of the prayer for amendment. On the first case, the prayer for amendment can not be allowed as it is barred on the date of institution of the suit and on the second case, the prayer can be allowed.” The suit was instituted on 7th March, 1964 and though the amendment of the plaint was made on 19th April, 1977, as soon as the prayer for amendment was allowed, the said amendment related back to the date of institution of the suit, as if those statements in the amendment petition were made in the original plaint. In that view of the matter, the learned Counsel is absolutely wrong in his contention that the amendment is barred by limitation. Article 142 of the Limitation Act applies when a plaintiff set up a case of possession followed by dispossession. In such a case the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years from the date of the institution of the suit. …Monowara Begum(Most.) =VS= Malanch Bibi, [8 LM (AD) 102] ....View Full Judgment

Specific Relief Act, 1877
Sections- 8, 9 r/w
Limitation Act, 1908
Article 142, 149 (Schedule-1)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 115
Declaration of the title and recovery of khas possession–– The trial Court as well as the Appellate Court arrived at concurrent finding that the plaintiffs have been able to prove their title and possession followed by dispossession from the suit land. It appears that the findings of the trial court as well as the Appellate Court are based on the proper appreciation of evidence on record both oral and documentary. It is well settled position in law that under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent findings of the Courts below by taking a different view of the evidence. The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the Courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction [Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan-Vs-Tuffail Mohammed, AIR 1991 SC 455]. The civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of probability. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given [Vishnu Dutt Sharma-V-Daya Sapra 13 SCC (2009) page 729]. In view of the facts, circumstances and proposition of law discussed above, we are of the view that the preponderance of probability regarding title and possession (before dispossession) of the plaintiffs to the suit land is clearly in favour of the plaintiffs and, there fore, the High Court Division made serious error of law in making the rule absolute which occasioned failure of justice. .....Proddut Kumar Das =VS= A Rashid Howlader, (Civil), 2024(1) [16 LM (AD) 472] ....View Full Judgment

Onus to prove possession - followed by dispossession — Where neither the High Court Division nor the lower appellate Court found paintiff out of possession in the suit land be- fore institution of the suit the question of discharging such onus by the plaintiff is not relevant. Akhtar Hossain Shariff and others Vs. Munshi Akkas Hossain and others, 3BLD (AD) 334

In the instant case it is apparent that plaintiffs claim of redemption did not become barred by limitation during the period as mentioned in Article 4 of the Order. The plaintiffs' right to file suit seeking redemption became timebarred on 26-12-1988. In that state of the matter the contention of the learned Advocate of the plaintiff-petitioners that plaintiffs' suit was not barred by limitation since he would get one year more from 26-12-1988 and thus the period for filing the suit seeking redemption was to expire in December, 1989 but the suit having been filed on 27th September, 1989 the same was not barred by limitation legally not well founded and sustainable. The High Court Division was not in error in holding that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation. Guljan Bibi vs Md Fazlu Miah 12 BLC (AD) 18.

It is a cardinal principle of law that the plaintiff has to prove his case independent of the weakness or defects of defendant's case. Even if a foreign judgment is-admissible in evidence, it does not improve the plaintiff's case as he has hopelessly failed to prove the alleged agreement for exchange with Ghosh brothers and the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation as he had been out of possession for long 20 years from 1949 to 1969. Moksed Ali Mondal vs Abdus Samad Modal 9 BLC (AD) 220.

The High Court Division upon correct assessment of the materials on record held that the plaintiff has been able to prove his continuous, uninterrupted and hostile possession in the suit land for over 12 years and accordingly, held that good and infeasible title by adverse possession has accrued in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly, made the Rule absolute. Hari Thakur Deb Bigraha vs Md Abdul Hannan 13 BLC (AD) 38.

It appears from the record that there is no sufficient pleading in support of plaintiff's claim of adverse possession in the suit land and there is also no legal evidence as well in support of plaintiff's claim. To enable a plaintiff to acquire title by adverse possession, his possessions must be of actual, open, notorious and hostile character as to amount to ouster of exclusion of the real owner. The plaintiff has utterly failed to prove his title in the suit lands. PW 1 stated that he got decree in Title Suit No.62 of 1997. The decree was executable but admit­tedly he failed to execute the decree and thus, the decree was rendered infructuous after expiry of three years of the date of passing the decree. Moreso, no right or title is conferred on the plaintiff on the strength of the said decree the suit land having been declared enemy property any other decree except that the suit land is not an enemy property was of no avail. Md Ali Bepary vs Garupranjan Chakraborty 14 BLC (AD) 97

Adverse possession — Question of giving the benefit of adverse possession in favour of the plaintiff when the plea of adverse possession can be taken by the defendant in a suit — The plaintiffs claim is against the real owner on the basis of a bainapatra and they were possessing the land for more than the statutory period adversely against him and have perfected their title by such possession against him and not against the defendnats — Plaintiffs have not derived title against the defendant by adverse possession but against the real owner — The defendant cannot plead point of limitation as the defendant was not in physical possession — Though the plaintiffs could not prove their bainapatra their physical possession had tilted in their favour against the true owner and the suit was therefore rightly decreed. — Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877), S. 42.Md Ashraf Au and another Vs. Fatique Chandra Saha and others, 3 BLD (AD) 315

Adverse possession Tenant’s right to claim adverse possession — Plaintiff and her husband were tenants of the suit premises since 1947 and after 1953 they paid rent to the Evacuee Management Committee and thereafter to the Custodian of Enemy Property Her possession is therefore legal possession which can be termed as juridical possession — When the Custodian, Enemy Property released the property on the ground that the same is not enemy property he could not direct her to release the property to a particular individual whose title is denied by the owner. As against such person who claims to be part- owner of the property, plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession is valid in law. Mst. Aftabunnessa Vs. Md. Shamsul Huq Talukder, 4BLD (AD) 273

Adverse possession against co-sharer — Sole possession is not exclusive or adverse possession — Possession of a co-owner becomes adverse to other co-owners from the moment when there is an ouster and exclusion
— A thin veneer of adverse possession or semblance of it viewed from a dsitance would not be sufficient for the defendants to succeed without discharging their heavy onus —They have to do prove that their possession was so open and hostile to the knowledge of all that the plaintiff must have known to the notorious fact that the plea of adverse possession is being raised up — Mere non-payment of rent and even non-sharing of profit would not justify a case of adverse possession — Nothing emerged from the facts of the case which ought to have put the plaintiffs on their guard and no signs were apparent to put the plaintiffs on the notice of adverse possession. Hazera Begum and others Vs. Roushan Ara Begum and others, 7BLD(AD)38

Limitation for redemption suit is 60 years—
P.O. No. 12 of 1972—
Article 4— Does not apply to cases which did not become barred during the period from 1st March 1971 to 1st March 1972—
Except where the claim or right to initiate legal proceedings becomes barred during the period from 1st March 1971 to 1st March 1972, such claim or right to initiate legal proceedings are not saved under article 4 of P.O. No. 12 of 1972. The instant redemption suit not falling within the said category the period as aforesaid can not be excluded from the computation of the limitation. Guljan Bibi (Most) and others Vs. Md. Fazlu Miah and others 12 MLR (2007) (AD) 112.

60 years limitation for the mortgagor to bring a suit to recover possession from the mortgagee when the right so accrued.
The Appellate Division held’s that the present suit for redemption was filed under the above quoted provision of law. The limitation for such suit is 60 years as per Article 148 of the Limitation Act. This suit, therefor, is well within the statutory period of limitation. .....Khanje Ali Sikder =VS= Hazi Mozaharuddin & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 51] ....View Full Judgment

The suit for redemption of mortgage was not maintainable in law– The plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit land, rather it is defendant Nos.14-20 who are in possession of the suit land. Therefore, the suit for redemption of mortgage was not maintainable in law. The trial Court on misconception and misreading of the case as well as the provision of article 148 of the Limitation Act held that the suit was maintainable. The crucial fact to be decided in the suit was whether the mortgagor returned back the money to the mortgagee within 5(five) years as stipulated in the deed of reconveyance or not, but the plaintiffs failed to prove the said fact and thus after the expiry of the said period of 5(five) years the transaction became a past closed one. But the trial Court and the High Court Division failed to consider the said fact. We find merit in the appeal and accordingly, the same is allowed. ...Golzar Hossain =VS= Abdul Kadir, (Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 74] ....View Full Judgment

The plaintiff filed a suit for redemption of mortgage and both the courts below found that a suit for redemption of mortgage is maintainable and the same having been filed within 60 years from the accrual of the cause of action the suit was not barred by limitation. The learned Single Judge wrongly held that the suit for redemption is barred by limitation. A reference to Article 148 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that the limitation of filing such a suit is 60 years and as such the learned single Judge wrongly held that the suit was barred by limitation. Asmat Ali Vs. Abdur Rafique Mridha & Ors. 9BLT(AD)-12

Usufructuary mortgage — Limitation for redemption — Period for which mortgage can be entered into is not to be confused with the period of limitation for redemption. The maximum period for which a usufructuary mortgage can be entered into was fifteen years under section 95 of the State-Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. But by Ordinance No. XXI of 1961 section 95 was amended and thereby the maximum period of usufructuary mortgage was reduced to seven years. Unless earlier redeemed by repayment of the consideration a mortgagor acquires the right to redemption on the expiry of the maximum period of seven years, and if the mortgagee does not voluntarily restore possession of the land to the mortgagors, the latter may file a suit within a period of 60 years from the date of accrual of his right of redemption. Moulvi Abu Bakkar Vs. Nazir Ahmed, 2 BLD (AD) 151

In a suit for declaration of title by way of adverse possession the plaintiffs claim that they have been possessing the suit land for 86/87 years by constructing houses thereon and the Court of appeal below which is the final court of fact found on consideration of both oral and documentary evidence the right, title and possession of the plaintiffs in the suit land and the High Court Division also found that there was no error occasioning failure of justice in the impugned judgment for which no interference is called for. Government of Bangladesh represented by DC, Rajshahi vs Zahura Bewa and others 10 BLC (AD) 150.

The limitation for filing an appeal before the District Judge is 30 days from the date of the Decree. Momtazuddin and another Vs. Yakub All, 13 BLD (AD) 219.

Partition decree — Execution — Limitation runs from the date when the hnal decree is engrossed on stamped paper and signed by the Judge. A decree, before it is prepared, drawn and sighed according to law, cannot be put into execution. The decree cannot be drown except on a requisite stamped paper, but as there is no law compelling a person interested in the decree to supply for the stamp paper within a particular period of time nor any provision to cancel or set aside the decree or dismiss the suit on this ground, the drawing of the decree may be delayed beyond the period of limitation for its execution. In such circumstances limitation will start from the date the decree is drawn and signed or it becomes executable. Aminullah Bhuiyan and others Vs. Abdul Hafiz and others, 1 BLD(AD)210.

Applicability of article 157— as to the limitation against acquittal in case started on police report—
In case of appeal against acquittal in a complaint case the limitation is 60 days as provided under section 417(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But in case of appeal against acquittal in a case initiated on police report the limitation is 6 months under article 157 of the Limitation Act. Dr. M.A. Mazed and others Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by Solicitor, 9 MLR (2004) (AD) 164

Limitation Act, 1908
Section 158 r/w
Arbitration Act,1940(X of 1940)
Section 33
The Appellate Division found that since the award was a nullity and void ab initio and the same has no validity or existence in the eye of law. Similarly the question of limitation of filing of the objection within 30 days as required under section 158 of the Limitation Act is unwarranted and uncalled for because the award being a nullity and void ab-initio and need not be avoided, no question of limitation is applicable.
M/s. Concord Engineers and Construction Ltd -Vs.- The Chief Engineer, Road and Highways Department, Government of the People's Republic Bangladesh, Sarak Bhaban, P.S. Ramna, Dhaka. 4 ALR (AD) 2014 (2) 51

Limitation for filing application for setting aside exparte decree is 30 days from the date of decree or from the date of knowledge-High Court Division while exercising revisional power under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure can not sit as a court of appeal on the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court. Summons upon the defendants shall be served at the address where they ordinarily reside as required under Order 5 rule 17 C.P.C. Exparte decree can well be setaside on the ground of non-service of summons upon an applicatin under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed within 30 days from the date of knowledge thereof as provided under article 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Ful Meher Bibi being dead her heirs Sabura Khatiin and others Vs. Abdid Wahab and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 411.

The application order 9 rule 13 of the Code o Civil Procedure was not barred by limitation in the facts of this case as limitation is to be counted from the date of knowledge o defendant No. 8 under Article 164 of the Limitation Act as the summons was not duly served upon her. Ful Meher Bibi being dead her heirs Savura Khatun & Ors. Vs. Abdul Wahab & Ors. 13 BLT (AD)184

In a money suit by Rupali Bank against a Private Ltd. company and its Directors defendants, names of Director-defendants being struck off at their instance and their transferees being impleaded subsequently in presence of Banks representative, plaintiff-Bank without seeking any remedy within 10 months and without giving any explanation of delay filed a review petition which was rejected and against which in plaintiff Bank preferred revisional application which was also rejected on ground of limitation — No illegality done plaintiff directed to take action against its own wrong doers.
The order of the trial court striking off the names of the defendants guarantors is improper, but as it was passed in presence of the Banks representative and no action was taken in time by seeking remedy from the superior Court, the petition for correction of the order, being delayed, was legally rejected. The petitioner Bank should take action against the wrong doer. [Paras-3 & 4] Rupali Bank Vs. Tobacco Industry Ltd and others 1 BLT (AD)-33

A preliminary decree for sale of mortgaged property can be enforced only by applying for an order for a final decree in accordance with Order XXXIV, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the limitation for such application will be governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act. Rupali Bank Ltd, Dhaka vs Brick Linkers Ltd 16 BLC (AD) 107.

The Arbitration Act 1940
Section 14(2) r/w
The Limitation Act
Article 181
The award to be filed in Court should be made within 3(three) years from the date when right to apply accrues– Knowledge of the filing of the award acquired otherwise than in the way prescribed by section 14(2) should be distinguished from the service of notice under section 14(2) of the Act, and that if no notice envisaged by that section is served, direction to cause the award to be filed in Court should be made within 3(three) years from the date when right to apply accrues according to the residuary provision of Article 181 of the Limitation Act. .....Gomati Water Development Division, Comilla=VS=Md. Shah Alam, [4 LM (AD) 121] ....View Full Judgment

Application for restitution—Application for restitution is not an application for. execution of a decree but an independent application governed by Article 181 and not Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
An application for restitution is an independent application, no matter its object is the recovery of the fruit of a decree passed earlier but subsequently reversed. Application for restitution is an application for which no limitation has been specifically provided for in the law and as such it attracts the residuary provision of Article 181. A restitution application is not an application for execution of a decree and as such it is not governed by Article 182 but it is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act. Shamuj Ali and others Vs. Kamalarama Bibi and others, 1BLD (AD) 131

Right to apply for restitution--Right to apply for restitution accrues under Article 181 from the date of the final decree when appeal is preferred from appellate decree of reversal and not from the date of the decree of the first appellate Court reversing the decre of the trial Court.
In a case where second appeal is filed challenging the decree of reversal of the first appellate Court and restitution takes place during pendency of second appeal, the restitution may be set at naught by the reversal of the decree in the second appeal and possession of the property will change hands once again. When appeal is the extension of the original cause there is no reason why the “right to apply “should not be taken to accrue on the date of the final decree of the appellateCourt if appeal is preferred from the decree of reversal of the first appellate Court. Shamuj Au and others Vs. Kamakirina Bibi and others, 1 BLD (AD)131

Limitation — Period of limitation for filing a revisional application — Whether Article 18 I of the Limitation Act will apply — Courts power to revise an order suo motu is not restricted by any time limit — But a revisional application is to be filed within the period of 90 days — The High Court Division may in its discretion entertain an application beyond that period ir there is no negligence or laches on the part of the petitioner. — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), s. 115. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Vs. Md. Kobad Au and others, 7 BLD (AD) 268

Reasonable—Application under Article 181 is restricted to applications under. the Code of Civil Procedure and that the application for rectification of a Share-Register under section 38 of the Companies Act,1913,is left to be governed by the general principle that it shall be filed within a reasonable time and not after inordinate delay. What is reasonable time or an inordinate delay is left to be determined by the Court on consideration of facts and circumstances of a particular case. Tamizul Haque and another Vs. Shamsul Haque and others, 11BLD(AD)176

Applicability of article 182(3) to execution proceedings—
Limitation for execution of decree is three years. Execution case filed within the period of limitation can well be continued after disposal of appeal and the dismissal of review. Article 182(5) is applicable when the decree is altered or modified in revision. But when revision is dismissed article 182(3) of the Limitation Act, 1908 shall be applicable and as such the pending Execution case can well be continued. Kazi Shamsul Huq and others Vs. Rebeca Begum and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 399.

We are or opinion that either the decree holder or the judgment debtor could inform the executing court regarding modification of the trial courts decree by the appellate court of the Executing Court could suo motu proceed with the pending Execution case No. 18 of 980 as the same did not become time barred. We are also of the view that in the instant case the provisions laid down in Article 182(3) of the Limitation Act providing for three years time after passing final order in the review application shall apply and the Provision of Article 182(5)of the Limitation Act is not applicable. Kazi Sahamsul Huq & Ors Vs. Robeya Begum & Ors 15 BLT (AD) 79.