The Dhaka University Order, 1973
Article 4 & 25 r/w
The Medical and Dental Council Ain, 2010
Section 43
Admission of Student decision involving policy–
It is now settled that the court will not interfere with policy decision merely because it feels that another policy decision could have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical (Balco Employees Union V. India, 2002 (2) SCC 3330). This court accepted the views taken in that case and we find no cogent reason to differ from the same. Same principle is applicable in case of admission of students, inasmuch as, it is the policy decision of the University authority. Every organ of the State should be allowed to perform its onerous responsibility in accordance with their respective laws. If the court interferes with their internal administration and the eligibility of admission of students in any University, this will tantamount to exercise of a power not vested in law. The court should refrain itself from interfering with the internal administration of an authority if such authority does not contravene the law. .....VC, University of Dhaka =VS= A.K.M. Muid, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 470] ....View Full Judgment

When any election is held in accordance with the provision of any statute that election can be questioned only under the provision of that statute. But when the election is held in violation of the provision of law such election can be questioned in any other forum and not in the forum as provided in that law. Dhaka University represented vs Mr Giasuddin Ahmied Chowdhury @ Gias kamal Chowdhury (Mahmudul A ruin Choudhury C. J.) (Civil) 1 ADC 71

Re-instate service former post–– The writ-petitioner, in fact, has been terminated from the service in the garb of clause-2 of the appointment letter. ––Appellate Division does not find any error in the impugned judgment apparent on the face of the record or that the courts attention was not drawn to any particular statutory provision of law for which an error has crept in the impugned judgment. Thus, there is no scope to review the impugned judgment. Since the respondent No.1 is out of service he will not get any previous financial benefit and promotion for the period of which he was out of service. The Authority of University of Dhaka is directed to re-instate him to his former post. .....University of Dhaka =VS= Hafez Mohammad Jalaluddin Chy., (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 630] ....View Full Judgment

“Employee concerned”—Statute 45(4) of the first Statute is not applicable to the plaintiff-respondent who was a Lower Division Assistant of the University. [Para-8] Dhaka University & Anr Vs. Syed Md. Ismail 4 BLT (AD)-249

Article 46 of the First Statutes—
From Article 46 it is clear that if there is a notification by the Registrar at the order of the Vice Chancellor that casting of votes will take place at certain centres outside Dhaka on a certain date and time the Presiding Officers are required to count the ballots immediately after the close of polling and they are to send their reports to the Vice Chancellor in detail who in turn after consolidation of the result is required to announce the result. But here in the present case it appears that though admittedly the polling in some centres took place outside Dhaka but those were not counted there. They were sent to the Vice Chancellor and ballots were counted in the University premises and the result announced. This is contrary to the clear provision of Article 46 of the Statute and a flagrant violation of the same. Dhaka University and others vs Gias Kama! Chowdhury and others 7 BLC (AD) 53.

Article 46(3) of the First Statutes—
In the present case nothing has been produced either before the High Court Division or before the Appellate Division under what, circumstances this election could not be held during the year in question and hence the election held in 1999 for the year 1997-1998 violating the provisions of Article 46(3) of the First Statutes is no election in the eye of law. Dhaka University and others vs Gias Kamal Chowdhury 7 BLC (AD) 53.

Article 46(l)(i)(e), (9), (16) and (17) clearly provides that counting must be at the place of voting. If the polling is held outside Dhaka then the ballots must be counted by the Presiding Officers at those polling centres. There is no ambiguity in the law and as such there cannot be any compromise on any legal provision and Annexure-17 dated 11-6-1999 cannot give any authority to the Vice Chancellor to shift the counting to Dhaka from outside polling centres. This is clearly against the provision of the Statutes. Furthermore, sub-section (13) of this section has provided that voting at each centre shall take place under the direction, control and supervision of the Presiding Officer. So, when a Presiding Officer is appointed it is his duty to ensure the casting of votes and also counting of the same after close of the poll. But in the present case polling took place in some centres outside Dhaka but in view of resolution Annexure-17 sealed covers containing ballot papers were brought to Dhaka and counted here which is against the clear provision/intention of the law. The questioned election has been conducted not in accordance with the provisions of Dhaka University Order 1973 and the First Statutes and this election is no election in the eye of law. Dhaka University and others vs Gias Kamal Chowdhury and others 7 BLC (AD) 53.

When the election that was held is no election in the eye of law the provision of sub-article (17)(ii) of Article 46 of the First Statutes providing that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition has got no manner of application and in such a case an aggrieved person can invoke the writ jurisdiction without exhausting the alternative forum prescribed by law and the High Court Division has not committed any wrong or illegality in holding that the writ petition is maintainable. Dhaka University and others vs Gias Kamal Chowdhury and others 7 BLC (AD) 53.

Technical ground cannot be any reason for not entertaining the writ-petition– The writ-petitioner did not avail the efficacious remedy as provided under section 52 of the University of Dhaka Order, 1973 which provides for an appeal to the Chancellor and found out that the writ-petitioner filed an appeal against the impugned order addressing the Vice-Chancellor which was rejected. The High Court Division, considering the facts and circumstances, found that the said appeal was preferred by the writ-petitioner under the provision of section 52 of the Dhaka University Order, 1973 which could have been and should have been forwarded to the Chancellor by the Vice-Chancellor of the Dhaka University. The High Court Division found that the writ-petitioner exhausted the provision of section 52 of the Dhaka University Order, 1973 by preferring an appeal against the impugned order and, therefore, the writ-petition was maintainable.
We are of the opinion that where it has been found that the writ-petitioner inspite of being innocent, was harassed so much by the Dhaka University authority, this technical ground cannot be any reason for not entertaining the writ-petition. That there is no merit in this appeal and hence this appeal be dismissed on contest without any order as to cost. ...University of Dhaka =VS= Ahmed Ar Razi, (Civil), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 682] ....View Full Judgment

Regulation No. 7 of the Enquiry Committee and Tribunal (Teachers and Officers) Regulations, 1980;
section 45(5) of the First Statute of the University of Dhaka and Article 52 of the Dhaka University Order, 1973:
In the instant case, prior to referring the allegations to the Enquiry Committee set up by the Syndicate for enquiry into the allegations brought against the petitioner, the Syndicate omitted to frame a formal charge against the petitioner with a statement of the allegations on which the charge is based and also specifying therein the penalty proposed to be imposed in terms of Regulation No. 7 of the Enquiry Committee and Tribunal (Teachers and Officers) Regulations, 1980 and hence, the entire exercise by the respondent No. 2 University of Dhaka and its officials leading up to the purported demotion of the petitioner in service by the Syndicate is void ab-initio and, as such, non est in the eye of law, rendering the said purported demotion to be without lawful authority and is of no legal effect. Moreover, under section 45(5) of the First Statute of the University of Dhaka only those orders of the Syndicate which are passed on the recommendation of the Tribunal are appealable, whereas, in the instant case, since the impugned order of demotion of the petitioner in service was passed by the Syndicate without any recommendation of the Tribunal, there is no appealable order from the Syndicate and, hence, no question of preferring any appeal under Article 52 of the Dhaka University Order, 1973 arises and, thus, there is no applicability of the decision reported in 44 DLR (AD) 305 in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. ...Samia Rahman Vs. Bangladesh and others, (Civil), 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 182 ....View Full Judgment

Appeal to Chancellor— Not alternative efficacious remedy— Writ jurisdiction may be invoked—
Any person aggrieved by an order of the authority of the University may appeal to the Chancellor for redressment of grievance. The Chancellor then decide the appeal after affording an opportunity of hearing to the other-side or many appoint a Commission to enquire and report which are to be routed through the Syndicate. The remedy by way of appeal is cumbersome and is not efficacious and as such the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Division under article 102 of the Constitution can well be invoked.
The Controller of Examination, Universiiy oj Dhaka Vs. Mohiuddin and others. 12 BLD (AD) 309.

Article 56(3) of the Dhaka University Order, 1973:
It is clear that the Syndicate did not frame any formal charge against the petitioner under Article 56(3) of the Order, 1973. The committee formed by the Syndicate cannot be termed as a statutory Enquiry Committee. It can be termed as a fact-finding committee. Accordingly, the show cause notice dated 08.06.2022 can be considered as a notice in relation to the fact-finding committee, not a statutory notice forming part of a formal disciplinary proceedings inasmuch as no formal disciplinary proceeding were initiated against the petitioner. .....Prof. Dr. Md. Rahmat Ullah Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Spl. Original), 19 SCOB [2024] HCD 140
It is true that the power to ‘appoint’ includes the power to ‘suspend’. It is well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed while a departmental enquiry is pending against the delinquent even though there is no such term in the service rules. .....Prof. Dr. Md. Rahmat Ullah Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Spl. Original), 19 SCOB [2024] HCD 140 ....View Full Judgment

The Syndicate’s decision to release the petitioner temporarily from his duties is beyond the purview of law:
In the instant case, the Syndicate did not deliberately use the term ‘suspension’ (সাময়িক বরখাস্ত), rather it used the term ‘সাময়িক অব্যাহতি’ (temporary release) which is not synonymous to ‘suspension’ for the reason that the syndicate did not take any decision to initiate any formal departmental proceedings against the petitioner by framing formal charge. The Syndicate formed a committee which seems to be merely a factfinding committee. In our view, there was no exigency or circumstances envisaged by law to release the petitioner temporarily from his duties. Moreover, the term ‘temporary release from duties’ is uncommon in service jurisprudence. The University Order, Statutes and Service Regulations do not recognise such action. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the Syndicate’s decision to release the petitioner temporarily from his duties is beyond the purview of law and the said decision was taken without lawful authority and without jurisdiction. .....Prof. Dr. Md. Rahmat Ullah Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Spl. Original), 19 SCOB [2024] HCD 140 ....View Full Judgment

Constitution of fact finding committee—permissible—
Constitution of fact-finding committee for ascertaining the prima-facie truth of the allegations being covered by article 56(3) of the Order is not illegal and as such cannot be quashed. A.H.Mahbubul Alam (Professor) Vs. The University of Dhaka and others. 2, MLR (1997) (AD) 358.

The respondent, a Lower Division Assistant of the University of Dhaka, was removed from service for misconduct as he misconducted himself by violating the service discipline in refusing to vacate the staff quarter illegally occupied by him. Before removing him from service the University authority thrice asked him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service for violation of service discipline. The respondent’s grievance that his removal from service offends against the principle of natural justice is without any substance. Dhaka University and another Vs Syed Md. Ismail, 16 BLD (AD) 103.

Dismissed from Service on the ground that they were convicted.
Workers and as such the writ petitions at their instance against their dismissal from service were not maintainable without first approaching the Labour Court for relief and in that view of the matter the judgment of the High Court Division is liable to be set aside Meghna Textile Mills Ltd vs Md. Barkatullah & others (4) (M. M. Ruhul Amin J) (Civil) 3ADC 32

Disciplinary Action against the offi­cers and employees of the Board.
The settled principle of law is that sen­iority alone is not the sole basis for pro­motion and that seniority does not create a claim for being promoted although the same create a right in favour of an employee to consider his case of promo­tion along with the case of others who are posted in the similar situation. Promotion is to be earned by rendering meritorious service and other than sen­iority promotion is also conditioned by other factors, such as efficiency, good conduct, character, integrity, sense of value, honesty and temperamental suit­ability. Chairman, Board of lSE Jessore vs Md. Nazir Ahmed (Md. Ruhul Amin J) (Civil) 3ADC 550

Dhaka University Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Statutes
“Misconduct”—the plaintiff-respondent on 5-5-76 forcibly occupied university staff quarter No. 40/C without any authority — The learned Judge of the High Court Division failed to notice that the respondent was removed from service for misconduct because he misconducted himself by violating the service discipline in refusing to vacate staff quarter No. 40/C — dismissing the suit is restored. [Paras - 13 & 15] Dhaka University & Anr Vs. Syed Md. Ismail 4 BLT (AD)-249.