The writ-petitioner is entitled to get compensation for the manchinery and industries and shifting costs. Additional Director (Admin) vs. Md. Soke I Hossain Ibne Batuta (Mohammad Fazlul Karim J) (Civil) 5 ADC 920

When a proceeding is initiated for acquisition of some lands acquired for public purpose and in public interest and when notices under sections 3 and 6 were served and no objection as to specification or indefiniteness of the property was raised before the acquisition authority after the notices under the aforesaid provisions of law were served, such objection cannot be raised before any authority, subsequently, including the High Court Division' as has been decided in the case of Mizanur Rahman Vs. DC Mymensingh (7 BLC (AD) 17). The impugned judgment of the High Court Division it appears that a sketch map prepared by the authority as mentioned earlier, was filed and the High Court Division took notice of it but did not rely upon it because of its illegibility. That means the High Court Division took notice of this specification made in the sketch map but made the Rule absolute without taking the same into consideration in its true perspective which appears to be palpably erroneous. This civil appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court Division is set aside. …Power Grid Company of Bangladesh Ltd. =VS= Rowshan Ara Begum, (Civil), 2019 (2) [7 LM (AD) 69] ....View Full Judgment

We issue a writ and direct that the decision of the respondent Nos.1-3 in revoking the order of acquisition of land located at East Pahartali appertaining to B.S. Plot Nos.152 and 153 under police station Khulshi, Chittagong by memo dated 31st May, 2006 and the memos dated 22nd December, 2005 and 18th May, 2006 are declared to have been issued without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The respondent Nos.1-3 are hereby directed to proceed with the acquisition proceedings in accordance with law. However, we would like to observe that the acquisition notice should be issued upon the USTC which has already purchased the disputed land in question and is entitled to the compensation. .....Mohammad Zafar Iqbal =VS= Ministry of Liberation War Affairs, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 402] ....View Full Judgment

Public interest–
The public purpose and public interest have not been defined in the Ordinance. The ratio is that the public purpose includes a purpose in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the interest of an individual is directly or indirectly involved. The public purpose is not static concept, but is flexible and is capable of expansion to meet conditions of the complex society. A public purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, security, prosperity, contentment and the general welfare of the residents. It includes any purpose wherein even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited. Since it has been decided to acquire the property, in question, not for the purpose of any interest of the individual rather for the interest of the community at large, we are of the view that the decision of acquisition of the property in question was taken for public purpose. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any wrong in the judgment and order of the High Court Division which calls for any interference by this Division. .....Mrinalendu Paul =VS= Divisional Commissioner, Chittagong Division, (Civil), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 277] ....View Full Judgment

Private property could only be exercised for acquisition of land for public purpose or in public interest–– Notices under sections 3 and 6 had already been served–– The High Court Division observed that the acquisition proceeding had already been completed and the land in question vested in the requiring body and that the petitioners neither had any right, title or interest over the land nor it could demand re-grant of the land as a matter of right. The High Court Division noted that the power conferred by the Ordinance for acquisition of private property could only be exercised for acquisition of land for public purpose or in public interest and such land should be taken in general interest of the community as opposed to particular interest of some individuals. The High Court Division came to a finding that the purpose of acquisition of the land in question was for public purpose and as such, no interference was called for. .....Sentry Security Services Ltd. =VS= Deputy Commissioner, Dhaka, (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 181] ....View Full Judgment

lands had earlier been acquired by the Government for the purpose of con­struction of Dhaka-Chittagong High­way and thereafter only the case plots are left to them and they rent to develop the same for the purpose of setting up industry on these lands. M/S. Mollah In­dustrial Estate vs. Khawja Mohammad Arifullah (M.M. RUHUL AM IN C.J ) (Civil) 6 ADC 493

The Arbitrator has fixed compensation at the rate of Tk. 15 lakh per acre taking the average of the sale price of the land in the vicinity and determined the compensation at a reasonable amount which is at least about 3 times less than the sale figure of 5 sale deeds in the vicinity of the acquired land by the petitioner together with compensation at the rate of 20% upon the value of the sale deeds and with additional compensation at the rate of 10% till the amount is paid or offered for payment. Bangladesh Small & Cottage Industries Corporation vs Kazi Nazimuddin 15 BLC (AD) 210.

The objection raised in the facts of the case is merely technical and does not touch upon the genuineness of the requirement which is obviously of an immediate nature. It is on record that the petitioner filed successive objections for consideration. There being a consideration by the acquiring authority the impugned judgment need not be interfered. Zahed Hossain Mia vs Deputy Commissioner 50 DLR (AD) 15.

Acquisition process when reaches its finality— Government can exclude any land from acquisition— Court has no such power—
Court has no power to exclude any land from acquisition. Only the government can exclude any land from acquisition. Ameena Ahmed Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land and others 13 MLR (2008) (AD) 176.

Acquisition for public purpose— Scope of interference—
Where the land is urgently required for Government purpose and is acquired by duly serving notice under section 3 and hearing objection under section 4 of the Ordinance there is no ground to interfere with the acquisition proceedings. Zahed Hossain Mia Vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong and others. 3, MLR(1998) (AD) 135.

Acquisition of immovable property for public purpose— Service of notice- Constitutionality of—
­In a proceeding for acquisition of immovable property for public purpose notice under section 3 of the Ordinance of 1982 need not be served personally upon individual owner or occupier. Section 3 pre-supposes service of notice in the locality or near the property. Moreover it is held that section 3 of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 does not offend article 31 and 42 and as such is not ultra vires the Constitution. Abdus Salam Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reforms & others. 5 MLR (2000) (AD) 184.

Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982
Section 3:
The law gives the Deputy Commissioner to acquire any property if he is satisfied that the property is needed for public purpose. In the notice the Deputy Commissioner specifically mentioned the purpose for which the notice was served that it was for the public purpose of Baddyabhumi. This order clearly spelt out the actual existence of requirement for a public purpose within the meaning of section 3 of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982. If the reason for the issuance of the notice of acquisition was not one contemplated by law, the initiation of the proceedings would be void. It is the Deputy Commissioner who is primarily the judge of the facts which would attract section 3 of the ordinance. This opinion cannot be replaced by any other authority. …Mohammad Zafar Iqbal & ors Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Civil), 9 SCOB [2017] AD 25

The order of revocation does not reveal the purpose for such revocation. This shows that the decision communicated by the respondent No.1 was a colourable exercise of power. Before proceeding with the acquisition process the acquiring authority obtained Ministry of Planning Commission’s approval. The High Court Division also observed that a portion of the mass graveyard is located on the extended under construction academic building of the USTC. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court Division that the location of East Pahartali mass graveyard is a disputed question of fact is a self contradictory finding. To say otherwise, the High Court Division made this observation without application of its judicial mind. …Mohammad Zafar Iqbal & ors Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Civil), 9 SCOB [2017] AD 25

The preservation of the memory of the martyrs and the national heros is necessary:
A mausoleum for the memory of martyrs of the war of liberation is normally constructed on the site where the martyrs were killed and buried. This site cannot be shifted to another site. It is because a monument is built on the killing spot with a view to remember the memories of martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the independence of the country. The preservation of the memory of the martyrs and the national heros is necessary because this would remind our next generation the cruel assassination and mass killing by the Pakistani occupation army with their accomplices and also to show the outsiders that this is the evidence of our history of liberation war. If this memory is erased from the memory of our next generation, the very cause for which martyrs had sacrificed their lives would be fruitless.…Mohammad Zafar Iqbal & ors Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Civil), 9 SCOB [2017] AD 25

We are satisfied that the impugned order revoking the acquisition proceedings is nothing but sheer arbitrary abuse of the power and this cannot be legally sustainable in law. The High Court Division has totally ignored that aspect of the matter. The High Court Division in the premises, fell in an error in not interfering with the impugned order of the revocation of the acquisition proceedings initiated for the constitution of the monument at the site of the mass graveyard. The High Court Division also made conflicting findings and this has caused due to non application of judicial mind. The action of the respondents cannot be sustainable in law and the same is liable to be interfered with. …Mohammad Zafar Iqbal & ors Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Civil), 9 SCOB [2017] AD 25 ....View Full Judgment

Merely entries of the predecessors of the plaintiffs in the S.A and R.S. Khatians without any documents of title or ownership did not create of the respondents-plaintiffs title over the suit land– Said S.A. and R.S. records of right were published in the name of the previous owners from whom through L.A. Case No.48 of 1966-67, the land in question was acquired. Appellate Division is, therefore, of the considered view that such record of rights neither established the right title of the previous owners or their heirs upon the suit properties, because of acquisition of the said property. This Division finds that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court Division do call for interference. .....Deputy Commissioner, Natore =VS= Most. Majeda Beowa, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 129] ....View Full Judgment

Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982
Section 3, 5(1)
Land Acquisition Manual, 1997
Clause 7
No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything— The High Court Division, while declaring the entire proceedings of L.A. Case No.1/2010-2011 including the impugned Memo dated 23.11.2010 issued by the Ministry of Land as being unlawful, malafide and without jurisdiction, took cognizance of the said fictitious and non-existent note/concise report dated 08.11.2010. Resultantly, the entire judgment and order dated 13.02.2014 by the High Court Division is vitiated with fraud and the same is, accordingly, struck down. All the civil appeals bearing Nos.171- 174 of 2015 are hereby allowed. .....Deputy Commissioner, Ctg. =VS= Interbulk Overseas SA, (Civil), 2025(2) [19 LM (AD) 439] ....View Full Judgment

Payment of compensation of acquired land is not maintainable through with petition– Appellate Division is of the view that the writ-petition in respect of payment of compensation of acquired land is not maintainable and thus the judgment passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition No.3891 of 2015 is hereby set aside. The respondent-writ petitioners are not precluded from taking steps to get their compensation in accordance with law. The Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal is disposed of. ...Government of Bangladesh =VS= Md. Hadisur Rahman, (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 83] ....View Full Judgment

Whether the requiring body had paid the amount within one year of the said date is a matter between the Government and the requiring body. It is not the case of the petitioner that he was not paid compensation or that his compensation money was not deposited within one year from the date of decision to acquire under section 5 or the proviso to section 4(3)(b) of the Ordinance. As such he has no business to enquire when the requiring body paid the amount of compensation to the Government.
Md. Alauddin Khandker Vs Government of Bangladesh, 20 BLD (AD) 147.
Ref: Bangladesh vs. Subash Chandra Das, 46 DLR (AD) 63; Subash Chandra Das vs. Bangladesh, 5ODLR (AD) 106—Cited.

So, the decision of the High Court Divi­sion is based on the fact that the award for compensation was made on 8th April, 1991 and as the compensation money having been deposited by Rabi-tat on 12th December, 1991 within one year from the date of award for compen­sation, the deposit was made in time, the proceedings not abated. This finding is based on misconception of law, inas­much as, the High Court Division made the above observation on the basis of the substituted section 12 of the Ordi­nance, which provision would not be applicable in the said writ petitions. The Deputy Commissioner after hearing ob­jection approved the proposal of the Land Acquisition Officer under section 5 of the Ordinance by order dated 17th July, 1990. The earlier writ petitions were filed in 1992. In the premises, it is the unamended provisions of Section 12 would hold the field but the High Court Division wrongly considered the amended provision . Dr. Malik Mehdi Kabir vs. Rabitat-Al-Alam-Al-Islami (S.K. Sinha J) (Civil) 8 ADC 652

Acquisition of land for public purpose becomes final and the land so acquired vests in the Government after notification published in the official Gazette under section 11 of the Ordinance—Writ petition filed long after the acquisition is not maintainable—
By majority decision the apex court held that writ petition filed long after the acquisition is not maintainable and disputed fact can not be decided in the writ jurisdiction. The acquisition of land for public purpose becomes final and vests in the Government after the publication of notice under section 11 in the official Gazette. However the apex court further held that if the requiring body fails to utilise the land for the purpose it is acquired and the land remains unutilised for long time, the original owners may, approach the Government for the return of the same. M/S Mallah Industrial Estate and Government of Bangladesh and others Vs. Khaivja Mohammad Arifullah and others 14 MLR (2009) (AD) 265.

Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 (Amended by Act XX of 1994)
Sections 7(4) and 12(l) and
The Ordinance No. II of 1982
Section 5(1)
The requiring body made payment of the compensation amount within one year of the final decision to acquire the land– From the record that the requiring body made payment of the compensation amount on 08.06.1995 which was, therefore, within one year of the final decision to acquire the land. In the above facts and circumstances we find that the High Court Division was not correct in holding that the payment of compensation by the requiring body was not made within one year as required under the relevant law. ...Ministry of Land, Bangladesh =VS= Khorshed Alam Khan, (Civil), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 15] ....View Full Judgment

Constitution of Bangladesh
Article 102 read with
Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance [II of 1982]
Sections 7 and 8 (d) and (f)
When an amount claimed is not admitted amount or not a statutory amount, the writ under Article 102 of the Constitution is not maintainable.
The writ petition at instance of a ‘tenant’ who is not an owner of the land acquired in L.A. case itself is not maintainable.
The High Court Division observed that the petitioner claimed compensation on different heads is a repetition which gives the High Court Division a clear picture that there is no admitted amount as it has been claimed by the petitioner by that petition. In the decision of Water Development Board vs. Shamsul Haq reported in 51 DLR (AD) 169 Mr. Justice Mostofa Kamal (as his Lordship then was) in clear terms observed that when an amount claimed is not admitted amount or not a statutory amount, the writ under Article 102 of the Constitution is not maintainable. Further it would lead to a deplorable consequence if a tenant under the owner of a land which has been acquired by the government be allowed to put forward any claim under Article 102 of the Constitution. In the decision of Ismail Hossain Poshari and another vs. District Land Acquisition Officer and others 57 DLR (AD) 173 reference of arbitration in terms of section 28 of the Ordinance, 1982 has been spelt out. One can place his grievance, if so advised, under the said section of the Ordinance. On the High Court Division’s own discussions and findings as above the High Court Division is of the view that this writ petition at instance of a ‘tenant’ who is not an owner of the land acquired in L.A. case itself is not maintainable. This writ petition should be discharged only on that score. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Md. Abdul Mannan Miah. -Vs.- Bangladesh, represented by its Secretary, Ministry of Land and others (Spl. Original) 2019 ALR (HCD) Online 151 ....View Full Judgment

Writ respondent/appellant No.l, the requiring body in possession of the land in question having not been made a party in the present writ petition, the judgment and order passed therein suf­fers from error of law and further the High Court Division was also not justi­fied in directing the writ respondent/appellant Nos.2-4 to release the land in question as the appellant No.l, the requiring body, after getting possession of the acquired land made construction therein spending substan­tial amount thereby leaving no scope for them to return of the land in question to the respondent No.l and further, notice under section 3 of the Ordinance No. 11 of 1982 is not required to be served per­sonally on the owners of the acquired land. Chittagong Dock Sramik Parichalana Board vs. Shamsul Haque (Md. Tafazzul Islam) Civil 5 ADC 143

Release of Property on de-requisition—
Immovable property under acquisition can only be released before payment of compensation. Appropriate authority may withdraw any such property before payment of compensation upon de-requisition by notification published in the official Gazette. Impugned order is declared illegal and passed without any lawful authority. Khalilur Rahman being dead his heirs Abdur Rahman and others Vs. Executive Engineer, Roads and Higliwai/s and others 14 MLR (2009) (AD) 27.

The provision of section 12 will come into play only when the compensation is not paid or not kept in deposit account under section 10(1). Under section 12 no obligation as such is placed on the requiring body to deposit compensation within six months from the date of decision for acquisition.
Bangladesh vs Subash Chandra Das 46 DLR (AD) 63.

Payment of compensation and abatement or revocation of the acquisition proceeding for non-payment or non-deposit of compensation.
Section 10 of the Ordinance provides for payment of compensation after an award is made under section 7 and it stipulates that the Deputy Commissioner shall, before taking possession of the property, tender payment of compensation awarded by him to the persons entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay to them unless prevented by one or more of the contingencies mentioned in subsection (2) of section 10 of the Ordinance.
The provision of section 12 will come into play when the compensation is not paid to the persons interested or not kept in a deposit account in the Public Account of the Republic under sub-section (1) of section 10. Under this section no obligation has been placed on the requiring body to deposit compensation within six months from the date of decision for acquisition.
The expression “compensation has not been paid or deposited within 6 (six) months from the date of decision” for acquisition in sub-section (1) of section 12 is to be understood with reference to section 10 of the Ordinance.
In the absence of any material or averment to show that no compensation was paid under sub- section (1) of section 10 and there being no occasion for deposit of compensation in the Public Account under sub-section (2) of Section 10, the question of abatement does not arise. It is only in case of noncompliance of the provisions of Section 10 the question of abatement or revocation of the acquisition proceeding arises.
Reading Sections 8,9,10,12 and 15 of the Ordinance together, it is clear that abatement will take place if the acquiring authority fails to “pay” or “deposit” compensation in terms of section 10 within one year from the date of decision of the Government made under section 5 of the Ordinance. The requiring body is, therefore, required to deposit the compensation money before the expiry of one year from the date of decision of the Government.
Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land Administration Vs. Subash Chandra Das and others, 15 BLD (AD) 17

As soon as one year period expired from the date of final decision regarding acquisition if the requiring body fails to deposit compensation money the acquisition proceedings will automatically terminate. There is natural death of the acquisition proceedings and after its natural death, there is no scope to revive this proceedings.
Dr. Malik Mehdi Kabir: Md. Shahidullah Bhuiyan and others: -Vs.- Rabitat-Al-Alam-Al-Islami and others: (Civil) 11 ALR (AD) 68-78

When the requiring body can be asked to deposit the compensation money and when abatement or revocation of Acquisition Proceedings takes place.
The requiring body may be asked to deposit the compensation money only after the decision to acquire Is finally made by the Government under section 12 no obligation is placed on the requiring body to deposit compensation within six months from the date of decision for acquisition. [Paras 8& 11] Bangladesh Vs. Subash Chandra Das & Ors 2 BLT (AD)-30

(a) Requisite fund not being placed by the requiring body within time, the acquisition proceeding abated under section 12 (1) of the Ordinance with effect from 18-12-84 by a Gazette notification dated 13.1.55 and a fresh L.A. proceeding bearing the same number was started once again in respect of the case land. The appellant claimed Tk. 1,50,00,000 as compensation under section 12 (3) of the Ordinance as damages suffered by the owner consequent upon the abatement of the L.A. proceeding. Although the Arbitrator awarded a sum of Tk. 6,50,000/- in partial acceptance of the claim, the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal (District-Judge) disallowed this claim rightly on the ground that the provisions of section 12 (3) of the Ordinance are applicable only in a case of simple abatement of acquisition and not in a case when abatement is followed by a further proceeding for acquisition of the same land. [Para-4]
Khaled Akter Vs. Bangladesh 2BLT (AD)-59
(b) Matters to be considered are : first, the damage must be suffered in consequence of the abated notice or any proceeding thereunder; secondly, the damage suffered has to be specifically pleaded and proved and there cannot be any objective standard of the damage. It will vary from case to case; thirdly, the owner can also recover costs incurred by him in the prosecution of the abated proceeding. [Para-71]
Khaled Akter Vs. Bangladesh 2BLT (AD)-59
(c) Case land being in the effective control of respondent No. 2, handing over of possession to the appellant’s father was only a paper transaction. As the appellant never enjoyed physical possession of the case land, the award of interest from the date of taking possession does not arise. [Paras-15 & 16]
Khaled Akter Vs. Bangladesh 2BLT (AD)-59

The question of abatement under section 12 of the Ordinance is not relevant in as much as there was no averment in the Writ Petition that no compensation was paid under sub-section (I) of section IO or deposit made in the Public Account of the Republic as per provision of sub­section (2) of section 10. Subash Chandra Das & ors. vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reforms, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and others 50 DLR (AD) 106.

Non-payment of compensation within one year from the date of decision of the Government for acquisition ofland as contemplated under section 12 of 1982 Ordinance does not render such land liable to be released in that section 12 is riot applicable to the facts of the instant cases which were started long before the Ordinance came into force in view of the provision of amended section 79 of the 1953 Act as no retrospectivity can be read into section 12 of the 1982 Ordinance. Jamir Ali (Md) and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Land & others 52 DLR (AD) 176.

Abatement of an acquisition proceeding
Under section 12 of the Ordinance an acquisition proceeding shall stand abated if compensation has not been paid or deposited within 6 months (now one year) from the date of the decision of the authority concerned for acquisition of the property notwithstanding anything contained in the Ordinance. But in the instant case the question of abatement under section 12 of the Ordinance is not relevant in as much as there was no averment in the Writ Petition that no compensation was paid under subsection (1) of section 10 or deposit made in the Public Account of the Republic as per provision of sub-section (2) of section 10. Subash Chandra Das and others Vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land Administration and Land Reforms, Government of the People s Republic of Bangladesh and others, 16 BLD (AD) 119.

Abatement of acquisition proceedings—
As provided under section 12 of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance 1982, acquisition proceeding abates in the event of non­payment of compensation money to the owner or non-depositing to the Government the money by the requiring body under section 10 within one year from the date of decision of the Government under section 5 of the Ordinance. Such proceeding does not abate if the petitioner cannot establish the non-payment of compensation money to him within the statutory period. Alauddin Khandoker (Md) Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Land and others. 4, MLR (1999) (AD) 387.

Rabitat is a Non-Government Organization. This acquisition can not be taken for public purpose within the meaning of section 3 of the Ordinance— The acquisition of the immovable property has to be held to have been made for a public purpose and not otherwise. In this particular case, it is seen that the acquisition has been made not for any public purpose rather it is meant for private purpose for office complex of a Non-Government Organization and the acquisition is not needed for public purpose. The High Court Division has totally over looked this aspect of the matter. .....Dr. Malik Mehdi Kabir =VS= Rabitat-Al-Alam-Al-Islami, (Civil), 2024(2) [17 LM (AD) 529] ....View Full Judgment

Town Improvement Act, 1953
Sections 93(2) r/w 73(Uma), 74(2), 94A(1)
Acquisition and Requisition Ordinance, 1982
Section 12
General Clauses Act, XXIX of 1987
Section 6
Emergency Requisition of Property Act, 1948
Requisitioned and that after requisition the land owners are only entitle to get compensation— The land-in-question was acquired in L.A. Case No.138 of 1961-62 under the provision of Emergency Requisition of the Property Act, 1948 read with Sub-section 2 of Section 93 of the Town Improvement Act for public purpose that the petitioners though alleged non-receipt of certain amount of compensation for acquisition of land thereby the acquisition is not illegal or without lawful jurisdiction inasmuch as the said provision is not synonymous to Section 12 of the Acquisition and Requisition Ordinance, 1982 and there is no provision in the Emergency Requisition of Property Act, 1947 for any enhanced compensation due to non-receipt of compensation in time. Since payment or non-receipt of compensation is no ground for challenging the acquisition proceeding, the alleged legitimate expectation of Ex-owner to get compensation as per provision of Ordinance, 1982 is of no avail.
The High Court Division has misconceived the principle of legitimate expectation of giving an alternative plot which the law under consideration has not provided for.18. The High Court Division has also misconceived the provisions of law in applying the same in respect of the petitioner's case because the respondent's right, title and possession extinguished with the completion of the acquisition proceeding vesting right, title, interest and provision in the land under acquisition to the Authority inasmuch as the ex-owner/awardee has ceased to have any right, title and possession thereto upon acquisition of land. .....Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakkya =VS= Jahan Ara Begum, (Civil), 2024(2) [17 LM (AD) 638] ....View Full Judgment

Requisition and Acquisition of Property Act
Article 29(2)(d)
Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982
Section 15, 3, 5, 6
In a case where it is established that the requiring body has failed to use or utilize the acquired land for the purpose it was acquired the Government can make the requiring body surrender such land to the Deputy Commissioner and in that case on the application made by the real owners of the land the Government in its discretion may restore possession of such land to them— It is already noticed that the acquisition proceeding in the present case already reached its finality with the case land vested in the Government long before the said writ petitions were filed. Now even after this if the writ respondent No.5 is allegedly found to have failed to utilize or use the case land for the purpose it was acquired the court can not provide any relief by way of restoration of possession of the case land to the writ petitioners by setting aside the acquisition proceeding which acquisition was long complete and legally made. When any land is otherwise validly acquisitioned such acquisition can not be interfered with except on the ground that the acquisition was malafide and/or compensation for the land was not paid. No such case has been made out by the writ petitioners. In a case where it is established that the requiring body has failed to use or utilize the acquired land for the purpose it was acquired the Government can make the requiring body surrender such land to the Deputy Commissioner and in that case on the application made by the real owners of the land the Government in its discretion may restore possession of such land to them. (Per Md. Joynul Abedin, J) .....M/S. Mollah Industrial Estate =VS= Khawja Mohammad Arifullah, (Civil), 2025(1) [18 LM (AD) 454] ....View Full Judgment

Sub-Section I of Section 17 of the Ordinance provides that no property acquired by the Government shall, without prior approval of the Government, be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was acquired. The Ordinance coming into force on 13.4.82 and having not being given retrospective operation, cannot hit the contract earlier concluded with the Plaintiff. Pronab Kumar Chakraborty and Others Vs. The Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh and others, 14 BLD (HCD) 2

When a person whose land was acquired and the Deputy Commissioner awards compensation for said acquired land files a revision award case that itself can sufficiently be considered that the affected person did not accept the award made by the Deputy Commissioner as correct and thereupon having been aggrieved filed the revision award case, in that state of the matter it cannot be said that money awarded by the Deputy Commissioner for the acquired land was received by the affected persons without protest. Deputy Commissioner vs Abdur Rahman (Md. Ruhul Amin J)(Civil) 3 ADC 232

Arbitration in matters of preliminary assessment of compensation—
When the dispute as to preliminary assessment has been resolved by the Arbitrator and affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal well within their jurisdiction such decision cannot be interfered with merely on the ground that the assessment was made on the basis of photocopy of the kabala deeds in the absence of anything showing contrary thereto.
Dhaka City Corporation represented by its Mayor Vs. Abdus Salam, District Judge & Arbitration Appellate Tribunal, Dhaka. 4, MLR (1999) (AD) 399.

Compensation reassessment at the prevailing market rate—
There is nothing wrong in reassessment of compensation at the prevailing market rate by the Arbitration Court. Bangladesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Khulna Vs. Mrs. Sayera Khatun and others - 4 MLR (1999) (AD) 180.

Arbitration revision case is maintainable not-withstanding the awardee having received , the compensation money—
When arbitration revision case is filed by the awardee after he had received the compensation money, this fact shows that he received the compensation money under protest and did not agree to the correctness of the award. The mere receipt of the compensation money by the awardee does not by itself render the arbitration revision case not maintainable. The apex court held the arbitration revision case so filed quite maintainable. Government of Bangladesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner Dhaka and another Vs. Abdur Rahman and others. 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 233.

It is clear that the Arbitrator is a Civil Court for a limited purpose as enumerated in section 36 of the Ordinance and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the Arbitrator is a Civil Court for all purposes, although in section 32(3) it has been provided that every award passed by the Arbitrator shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of section 2(2) and section 2(9) respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for substantive right of review by the aggrieved party and Order XLVII, CPC provides for the procedure. The mere fact that in section 32(3) of the Ordinance it has been said that the award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of such award a judg­ment within meaning of section 2(2) and section 2(9) respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure it will not confer any substantive right of review on the petitioner in the absence of any specific provisions for review in the Ordinance. Atiq Ullah vs Bangladesh 13 BLC (AD) 31.

Whether a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable in respect of the judgment passed by the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal. In view of the decision reported in 38 DLR (AD) 172 Member Appellate Tribunal in deciding the appeal over the decision of the Arbitrator exercised a judicial function and as such he is a Court and for that matter his decision is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction. Khaled Akbar vs Government of Bangladesh 42 DLR 66.

An arbitrator is deemed to be a civil court for limited purpose. As such arbitrator can not review its award in exercise of power under Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908—
Section 34 of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 provides for appeal against an award passed by Arbitrator. An arbitrator is deemed to be a civil court for limited purpose as contemplated under section 36 of the Ordinance and as such arbitrator has no power to review the award passed by him under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The review petition is held by the apex court not maintainable. Atiqullah (Md.) Vs. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh represented by Land Acquisition Collector and others 12 MLR (2007) (AD) 41.

Exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil Court should not be readily inferred. If the order passed or action taken by any authority is malafide, such court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit to see whether the action is in conformity with the law in question. Soleman Bibi and ors. vs ·Administrator, Farajikandi Complex and ors 45 DLR 727.

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Order XLIII Rule 1 sub-Rule (r)
Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982
Section 44
Temporary injunction–– Without hearing the other side the High Court Division should not pass any final order which may affect the other side adversely–– The order of the trial Court rejecting the prayer for temporary injunction was an appealable order as per provision of Order XLIII Rule 1 sub-Rule (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since there is specific provision of law for preferring appeal and that revisional application before the District Judge was misconceived one, the learned District Judge rightly rejected the application for ad-interim injunction. The High Court Division most illegally, without consideration as to whether civil revisional application was at all maintainable in the Court of District Judge or not and that the suit itself was barred under section 44 of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982, or not erroneously directed the parties to maintain status-quo in respect of the suit land. Repeatedly this Division has observed that without hearing the other side the High Court Division should not pass any final order which may affect the other side adversely. The impugned order is an example of gross illegality committed by the High Court Division. Be it noted that Court itself is not authorised to make such exparte order without giving the other side an opportunity of being heard. ––Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order of the High Court Division is liable to be set aside. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditious as possible preferrably within 6 months from the date of communication of this order. .....ADC (L.A.), Khulna =VS= Md. Kayem Ali, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 493] ....View Full Judgment

Acquisition and Requisition of the Immovable of the Property Ordinance, 1982
Section 44 r/w
Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Section 107
Registration Act, 1908
Sections 17, 49
The plaintiffs could not succeed on the weakness of the defendants’ case–– The plaintiffs would not be entitled to any claim on the land solely based on an entry in the revenue record since the revenue record does not confer title to the property nor do they have any presumptive value on the title. ––Since the plaintiffs have failed to prove their settlement, they are not entitled to get any decree. The trial Court has committed a serious error of law in decreeing the suit and directing the Government to pay compensation to the plaintiffs. The High Court Division in First Appeal, without ascertaining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to get a decree or not, erroneously noted the order of abetment of appeal which has caused a total failure of justice. Both the Courts have misappreciated the evidence and ignored the weight of evidence on record. ––Appellate Division finds merit in the appeal. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside. The judgment and decree dated 15.06.2016 passed by the High Court Division is also set aside. .....Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate =VS= Nahar Haider Nannu, (Civil), 2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 506] ....View Full Judgment

Ousts the jurisdiction of court in matters of acquisition of immovable property—
On the completion of acquisition the property so acquired absolutely vests in the government. Non-utilisation of such property does not create any vested right in favour of the original owner to get back the property in qustion. Section 44 of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the court in matters of acquisition of immovable property and as such the suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent is not maintainable. Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakha Vs. Abdul Jakir and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 332.

Embargo against all legal proceedings.
As soon as an L. A. Case is initiated for acquiring a property all legal proceedings in respect of the said property stand stopped by operation of law in view of the clear embargo envisaged in section 44 of the Ordinance.
Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakha (RAJUK) -Vs.- Jonab Ali being dead his heirs 2 ALR (2013)(AD) 57

Provides for framing Rules for carrying out the purpose of the law—
Acquisition of Immovable Property Rules, 1983—
Rule 8(3)— Provides for assessment of compensation of land and buildings acquired under Ordinance No. II of 1982 in consultation with the Public Works Department—
In the instant arbitration case the Arbitrator allowed the prayer for appointment of a Private Engineering firm for assessment of the compensation of the land and building acquired under the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 instead of directing the Public Works Department to assess the compensation as required under rule 8(3) of the Acquisition of Immovable Property Rules, 1983. The apex court held the assessment should have been made by the Public Works Department and the Arbitrator was required strictly to act in accordance with law and such an action of the Arbitrator being opposed to law was not to be taken into consideration and upheld the judgment and order of the appellate court and setaside the decision of the High Court Division being erroneous. The apex court further held the principle of waiver with regard to performance of state functionaries will be disastrous to discipline and create anarchy and as such disapproved the proposition. Land Acquisition officer, Pubna and others Vs. Alhaj Md. Abdul Latif Biswas and another 15 MLR (2010) (AD) 81.

Mutation, Water Development Board, the (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948, Deputy Commissioner, cancellation of mutation, repealed, স্হাবর সম্পত্তি অধিগ্রহণ ও হুকুম দখল আইন, ২০১৭ (The Act, 2017), valid acquisition, acquisition of the property:
That there being no decision of the Government for acquisition of the property in question, there is no valid acquisition of the property and in the meantime the said proceeding having become non-est due to repeal of the said section 47 of the said Ordinance, 1982, there is no further scope to take decision for acquisition of the property. ...East West Property Development (Pvt.) Ltd. & anr. Vs. D.C Manikgonj, (Civil), 13 SCOB [2020] HCD 40 ....View Full Judgment

The provision give life to all proceedings and matters including all notices, notifications and orders relating to requisition and acquisition of any property under the (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 "as if that Act had not ceased." Abdul Bashar (Alhaj), being dead his legal heirs (a) Hosne Ara Begum & others vs Bangladesh and others 48 DLR 553.

Emergency Requisition of Property Act of 1948
Section 5(7)
Acquisition and Requisition Ordinance 1982
Section 48
While applying the proposition of law enunciated in 42 DLR (AD) 99 in the matter of assessment of compensation that there should be some proximity between the requisition, notice of acquisition and of actual acquisition, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case that no step has yet been taken for acquisition of the land on publication of the notification under section 5(7) of the Act, Appellate Division directs the authority to take immediate steps to that effect and assess the compensation at present market value. This Division’s aforesaid order for assessment of compensation at present market value is passed to secure substantial justice in the case in order to avoid any alleged substantial injury that has been suffered by the writ petitioner and is confined to the facts and circumstances of this case only. .....Rajshahi Development Authority =VS= Sultan Ahmed, Adv., (Civil), 2025(2) [19 LM (AD) 402] ....View Full Judgment

Additional compensation in respect of the Government khas land– High Court Division stayed operation of the impugned Memo dated 28.04.1999 so far as it relates to additional compensation of 50% of the market value in respect of the Government khas land of 1749.6810 acres out of total land of 2492.3573 acres on condition that the petitioner would furnish a Bank guarantee for the said total amount of additional compensation in respect of the government khas land. Writ petition (appellants herein) has therefore been fully satisfied and the Board of Governors of Bangladesh Export Processing Zone has decided in its 16th meeting to publish necessary gazette notification. Hence, the appeal has become infructuous and is liable to be dismissed. We are of the view that the appeal has become infructuous and accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. .....Government of Bangladesh =VS= Korean EPZ Corporation (BD) Ltd, (Civil), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 194] ....View Full Judgment

Additional compensation in respect of the Government khas land–
High Court Division stayed operation of the impugned Memo dated 28.04.1999 so far as it relates to additional compensation of 50% of the market value in respect of the Government khas land of 1749.6810 acres out of total land of 2492.3573 acres on condition that the petitioner would furnish a Bank guarantee for the said total amount of additional compensation in respect of the government khas land. Writ petition (appellants herein) has therefore been fully satisfied and the Board of Governors of Bangladesh Export Processing Zone has decided in its 16th meeting to publish necessary gazette notification. Hence, the appeal has become infructuous and is liable to be dismissed. We are of the view that the appeal has become infructuous and accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. .....Government of Bangladesh =VS= Korean EPZ Corporation (BD) Ltd, (Civil), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 194] ....View Full Judgment