Conversion of parks and open spaces enjoyed by allottees of a plan township cannot be converted as residential plots. Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakhya and another vs Mohsinul Islam and another 53 DLR (AD) 79.

Sections 22 & 23 (as amended), 29, 79(2), 93A & 93B—
Non—payment of compensation within one year from the date of decision of the Government for acquisition of land as contemplated under section 12 of 1982 Ordinance does not render such land liable to be released in that section 12 is not applicable to the facts of the instant cases which were started long before the Ordinance came into force in view of the provision of amended section 79 of the 1953 Act as no retrospectivity can be read into section 12 of the 1982 Ordinance. Jamir Ali (Md) and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Land & others 52 DLR (AD) 176.

Town Improvement Act, 1953
Sections 22, 29(1), 79(2), 93A and 93B
read with
Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 (II of 1982)
Section—12
Sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Town Improvement Act as amended by section 22 of the Town Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1953 empowers RAJTJK to dispose the acquired land by a sell, lease, exchange or otherwise and sub-section (2) of section 79 provides that acquisition of any land or interest in land for any scheme shall be deemed to be acquisitioned for public purpose within the meaning of the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 and provisions of the Ordinance shall apply to all proceedings relating to acquisition of property for such purpose. Inspite of repeal of section 93A and 93B of the 1953 Act the proceeding taken under these sections shall not affect such proceeding although section 12 of 1982 Ordinance provides that where compensation has not been paid or deposited within one year from the date of the decision of the Government the proceeding of acquisition shall stands abated. Claim for release of unutilized acquired land is not a vested right and nor failure of the requiring body to utilize the land acquired within 3 years from the date of acquisition in view of the decision of the Government creates no constitutional or legal right in the petitioners who claim for release of such land. Non-payment of compensation within one year from the date of decision of the Government for acquisition of land as contemplated under section 12 of the Ordinance does not render such land liable to be released. Section 12 is not applicable to the facts of the instant cases which was started long before the Ordinance came into force in view of the provision of amended section 79 of the 1953 Act as no retrospectively can be read into section 12 of the Ordinance of 1982. Md. Jamir Ali and others Vs The Secretary, Ministry of Land & ors., 20 BLD (AD) 245.

Respondent had no vested legal right to have open space between her house and the lake. There is no papers to show that the lake has been or is being filled up for the project. The narrow strip of vacant land which is being converted into plots is only an extension/addition of Gulshan residential plots by altering the layout plan, and would not adversely affect the environment of Gulshan or destroy the greeneries or the lake and that there has been no change of the master plan either and hence the impugned judgment and order of the High Court Division is set aside. Chairman, RAJUK and others vs Parvin Akhter 7 BLC (AD) 167.

Section 40 of the Act provides for matters for improvement schemes which may be undertaken by the RAJUK.
Section 40(b) empowers the RAJUK for "taking out or relaying out of the land in the area. but it has no power to change the layout plan converting the open spaces into residential or commercial plots.
RAJUK -Vs.- Mohshinul Islam 2 ALR (2013)(AD) 199

The writ petitioner allottee of the adjacent plot has no legal right to resist creation of new plot or sub—plots and alloting those to others. The writ petition is bad for defect of parties as the allottees have not been made parties to the petition. Syed Abdur Rahim vs Secretary, Ministry of Works, Government of Bangladesh and others 53 DLR (AD) 106.

Jurisdiction of Arbitration Court—
When notice of the Arbitration case was duly served upon the petitioner but he wilfully did not contest, the petitioner can not challenge the impugned judgment on ground of want of jurisdiction as the Sub-Judge was the only Arbitration Court at that time in Dhaka. Chairman, RAJUK Vs. District Judge and Arbitration Appellate Tribunal, Dhaka and others 4, MLR (1999) (AD) 138.

Town Improvement Act and Construction Act stand together—T.I. Act authorities give final shape to the Master Plan and constructional details of proposed building and its conformity to the Master Plan are done by an Authorised Officer under the Construction Act—He cannot question any plan sanctioned by T.I. authorities.
Refusal of the sanctioned plan by the Authorised Officer on the direction of the Provincial Government unauthorized—Government could vest itself with power for such refusal by resort to the provisions of Section 74(2) of the T.I. Act. Authorized Officer, D.I.T. Vs. A.W. Malik (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 229.

Layout plan— Question of title— immaterial—
Sanction of the RAJUK in respect of lay­out plan of Housing Society need not be dependent on title and possession in the land. Title is necessary for actual construction of a building under the Building Construction Act, 1952. The principle of promissory estoppel is available by way of defence against the Government and statutory body as well as against a private individual. When public interests clash with private interests, it is the former which will get the priority. Grihayan Ltd. Vs. Government of Bangladesh. 1, MLR (1996) (AD) 187.

Sanction obtained under section 75(2) of the TI Act for erection of the cinema— Authorised Officer cannot refuse it—Use of any land in variation of the Master Plan has to be approved by the Chairman, and in case of refusal by him by the Board of Trustees.
The respondent’s case was that sanction of the competent authority having been obtained to the erection of the cinema, under section 75(2) of the Town Improvement Act, it was not for the Authorised Officer to object, on the assumption that the erection of a cinema would interfere with the approved Master Plan. This contention was rightly upheld by the High Court and sub-section (1) of section 75 of the Town Improvement Act declares that if any person desired to use any land for any purpose other than that laid down in the Master Plan, he may apply in writing to the Chairman for permission so to do, and in case of refusal by the Chairman, appeal can be taken under sub-section (2) of the section, to the Board of Trustees, whose decision would be final. If resort has been made to this Section, ii is obvious that the Master Plan must be deemed to have been altered, to the extent permitted by the sanction accorded under this section. Authorised Officer DIT Vs. AW Mallik (1968) 20 DLR (SC) 229.

Three modes of acquisition under the Act.
Under the terms of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 land can be acquired in three ways under three different sections: One is by purchase on agreement under section 78, the other is by compulsory acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 under section 79 and third is acquisition on requisition of land under section 93A(4) (a) of the Act. Bangladesh Vs. Abdur Rashid & ors. (1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.

A glance at the Town Improvement Act indicates that this Act does not intend to exclude the function of court under the Land Acquisition Act if no tribunal is set up under sections 80 and 82. Bangladesh Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 27.

The expression “shall be construed as referring to the Court under the Land Acquisition Act” in s. 91A explained.
The point for consideration 8 what upon the true construction is the meaning of ‘be expression “shall be construed as referring to the court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894” in sec. 9A of the Town Improvement Act. One way of interpreting it is to treat the court in this section to mean tribunal under the Town Improvement Act, if the language of the section could be so construed. But the language used does not lend support to such a view. We can not apply the restrictive provisions of the Town Improvement Act to the proceeding or award of the said court by treating it is a tribunal under the Town Improvement Act. The expression “shall be construed as referring to” is the well-known language employed by the legislators in order to attract the provisions of an analogous enactment into the Act without enacting them over again. We may call the device the scissors and paste method. This explains the purpose. Bangladesh Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 27.

L.A. Act will be attracted when a court under this Act deals that matter referred to in S. 93A of TJ. Act—Appeal lies against the decision of the Land Acquisition Act acting under section 93A of the Town Improvement Act. Bangladesh Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 17.

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 151 r/w Order VII, rule 11
The Town Improvement Act, 1953
Section 93A, 93C
Rejected plaint–– It is apparent that the instant suit was barred by law. The provision of Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive and the said provision does not limit the inherent power of the court to reject the plaint in a fit case. ––The learned Joint District Judge, rightly rejected the plaint. The High Court Division erred in law in entertaining the appeal inasmuch as on perusal of plaint it appears that relief claimed therein was barred by the above quoted provision law as such the plaint was liable to be rejected forthwith even without asking the defendant to file his written statement since he plaintiffs admitted in the plaint that the suit land was acquired by the Government. Accordingly, the trial Court did same. ––The judgment and decree of the High Court Division is set-aside. The plaint of the instant suit is rejected. The Civil Petition is disposed of in the light of the judgment and order of the appeal. .....Rajdhani Unnayan kartipakkha =VS= Shamsunnahar, (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 47] ....View Full Judgment

If the concerned authority of the appellants find that full compensation of the acquired property was not paid in accordance with sub-section (5) section 93A, final assessment has to be made of the acquired land according to sub-section (5) of section 93A–
The Appellate Division finds that full compensation of the requisitioned property is not paid under that section. The learned Deputy Attorney General for the appellants could not produce any paper to show that compensation was paid to the respondent according to the provision of sub-section (5) of section 93A of the Town Improvement Act. Therefore, the appellants are directed to inquire into whether full compensation has been paid as per provision of sub-section (5) of section 93A or whether compensation has been paid on the basis of a provisional estimate prepared on rough and ready calculation as per section 93B. If the concerned authority of the appellants find that full compensation of the acquired property was not paid in accordance with sub-section (5) section 93A, final assessment has to be made of the acquired land according to sub-section (5) of section 93A. .....Ministry of Land =VS= Haji Ashraf Ali & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 228] ....View Full Judgment

In spite of repeal of sections 93A and 93B of the Town Improvement Act the pending acquisition of disputed land shall be continued under the aforesaid provision as if those have not been repealed. .....Ministry of Land =VS= Haji Ashraf Ali & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 228] ....View Full Judgment

Provisions of the section explained. What is meant by section 93 of the Town Improvement Act is that the correctness or regularity of any order made or action taken under the said chapter can be called in question only in the manner as laid down in chapter IC of the Act and it cannot be challenged in a collateral proceeding in a civil court. Dacca Improvement Trust Vs. Waliullah (1976) 28 DLR (SC) 150.

Compensation assessment by Land Acquisition Court acting under sec. 93A of the Town Improvement Act not appealable—No revision to the High Court would lie as the Land Acquisition Court acting under sec. 93A of T.I. Act is not a court subordinate to the High Court. Bangladesh Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC) 17.

In respect of trees standing on the land acquired under the TI Act under the provision of sec. 93A (5) of the LA Act which are applicable in such acquisition the owner thereof shall be entitled to get compensation for their market value at the relevant time. Bangladesh Vs. Abdul Mannan (1977) 29 DLR (SC)7 17.

Tribunal under the Town Improvement Act in assessing compensation does not possess the power to grant interest though the power is available when the acquisition is under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The question is: could this power be exercised by the Court while acting as such under the provisions of sections 91A of the Town Improvement Act, 1953. (1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.

Acquisition of land under these sections must precede an order of requisition—Reading the relevant provisions of the Act it is found that sections 93A and 93B of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 are related to the acquisition of land preceded by an order of requisition and they provide almost a self-contained code for the specific purpose, the third mode of acquisition under the Act. Bangladesh Vs. Abdur Rashid (1980) 32 DLR (AD) 92.

In that view of the matter there is absolutely no scope for any release of the requisitioned property by the Government. Even assuming that there may be some decision of the Board but that was not acted upon in accordance with law so as to release the property in favour of the original owners thereof. Abdul Huq & Ors. Vs Government of Bangladesh & Ors 13 BLT (AD)194

No restriction can be imposed on acquisition as to quantum of land for development scheme.
There is no provisions for release of the land acquired for development scheme under the Town Improvement Act. Delay in the implementation of the scheme does not render ground for release of the land. The resolution of the RAJUK has no statutory force. There cannot be any restriction for acquisition of land only to the quantum allotted to the allottees. Sacequeuddin Ahmed and others Vs. Jobea Ali and others. 3, MLR (1998) (AD) 91.

As per provisions of section 93A(4)(h) of the Town Improvement Act, 1953, there is absolutely no scope for any release of the requisitioned property by the Government. Apart from the provision under section 8B of the Emergency Requisition of Property Act, 1948 for withdrawal from acquisition, there is no provision in law for release of the property as has been claimed by the petitioners as the land has been admittedly requisitioned with a view to acquire the same for Greater Dhaka Development Project by the RAJUK under specified project. Mere non-use of the acquired land for the purpose for which it was acquired will not give any right to get return of the same. Non-payment of compensation also is no ground for release of the land acquired under the provision of Emergency Acquisition of Property Act, 1948 or Town Improvement Act, 1953. Abdul Huq and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Land and others 9 BLC (AD) 56.

Under Section 101(1) of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 it is the absolute right of RAJUK to deal with the property acquired for them. The release in favour of the owners was rightly done. [Para-6] Court of Wards Bhawal Raj Estate Vs. RAJUK 7 BLT (AD)-304.

Under Section 101(1) of the Town Improvement Act, 1953 it is the absolute right of RAJUK to deal with the property acquired for them. The release in favour of the owners was rightly done. Court of Wards Bhawal Raj Estate Vs. RAJUK 7BLT (AD)-304.

Town Improvement Act, 1953
Sections 102, 155
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 152 r/w General Clauses Act, 1897
Imposition of conversion fees–– RAJUK is a statutory body as per Article 152 of the Constitution read with the General Clauses Act, 1897, any delegated legislation [such as rules, notification or bye-laws] has to be published in the Bangladesh Gazette. It is stated that any imposition of conversion fees by RAJUK must be done through a delegated legislation [Rules] duly promulgated pursuant to section 102 of the Act, 1953 and published through gazette notification under section 155 of the Act, 1953 read with Article 152 of the Constitution and the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 102 of the Act, 1953 empowers the Government to make rules that are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, 1953. In particular, under section 102(g) of the Act, 1953, the Government is empowered to make rules for imposing fees in respect of any matter. All kinds of conversion, development, improvement and expansion of the Capital Dhaka City is governed under the authority of RAJUK pursuant to the Town Improvement Act, 1953. So, imposition of conversion fees or charges from residential to commercial building for approval is the internal policy of RAJUK and the writ-petitioners leased the property out to a commercial bank in 2008 which tried to make development in the property. ––Appellate Division is constrained to hold that the writ-petition filed by the writ-petitioners was not maintainable. This petition is disposed of. The judgment and order dated 11.12.2017 passed by the High Court Division is, hereby, set aside. .....Rajdhani Unnaiyan Kartipakkha =VS= Begum Sitara Chowdhury, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 102] ....View Full Judgment

Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) Order, 1972 (P.O.98 of 1972)
Sections 3, 4(d)
Private Residential Project Land Development Rules, 2004
Rule 8(1)
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 20 r/w 90(3)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 114 & Order XLVII rule 1 r/w
Town Improvement Act, 1953;
Environment Conservation Act, 1995;
Environment Conservation Rules 1997;
মহানগরী, বিভাগীয় শহর ও জেলা শহরের পৌর এলাকাসহ দেশের সকল পৌর এলাকার খেলার মাঠ, উন্মুক্ত স্থান, উদ্যান এবং প্রাকৃতিক জলাধার সংরক্ষণের জন্য প্রণীত আইন, ২০০০
Project: Ashiyan City Prokalpo–– It transpires that from the record that the Deputy Commission earlier gave ‘No-objection’ in respect of 55.6 acres of land in favour of the review petitioner-respondent No.1 for its project but it was entitled to retain only 33 acres of land as per Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) Order 1972 (P.O. 98 of 1972) and বেসরকারি আবাসিক ভূমি উন্নয়ন বিধিমালা, ২০০৪ at the relevant time. It is evidenced from the record that respondent No.1 got approval of other authorities, including utilities such as Dhaka Electric Supply Company, Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority, Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board and Titas Gas as well as the Fire Service and Civil Defence, Dhaka Transport Coordination Board, Dhaka Metropolitan Police and Water Development Board. ––Appellate Division is of the view that review petitioner-respondent No.1 is entitled to proceed his project in respect of 33 acres of land pursuant to the permission dated 25.09.2012 and annexures ‘C’, ‘K’ and ‘M’ will be applicable only in respect of the said quantum of land and permission of respective organizations. .....Bangladesh =VS= Ashiyan City Development Ltd. , (Civil), 2024(1) [16 LM (AD) 486] ....View Full Judgment

Government Building Act, 1899
Section 3
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 24, 27, 31 and 32
Town Improvement Act, 1953
Building Construction Act, 1952
(মহানগরী, বিভাগীয় শহর ও জেলা শহরের পৌর এলাকাসহ দেশের সকল পৌর এলাকার খেলার মাঠ, উন্মুক্ত স্থান, উদ্যান এবং প্রাকৃতিক জলাধার সংরক্ষণের জন্য প্রণীত আইন, ২০০০)
State necessity–– Construction of the residences for the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker–– The said residences are not meant for an individual person, but for the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker who uphold a unique position under the Constitution of our country and in the said way the impugned project is being implemented for the public interest being the same is a state necessity–– It appears that the said construction of residences of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker being for the public purpose in the government land is exempted from complying with provisions of other municipal laws. Therefore, the Town Improvement Act, 1953 and the Building Construction Act, 1952 have no relevance with the construction of the residences for the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker which are being constructed on Government’s own land after obtaining clearances from the Department of Architecture and on approval of the Prime Minister, the Chief Executive of the Government as per approved plan. But the High Court Division committed error of law failing to appreciate the said matter. ––It also deserves to mention here that the writ petitioners obtained Rule and an order of stay of the operation of any further construction of the impugned project in the High Court Division in Writ Petition No.3548 of 2003 on 18.05.2003. Against the order dated 18.05.2003 and 21.07.2003 passed by the High Court Division the writ respondents-appellants preferred Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal before this Division and obtained stay operation of the said orders till disposal of the Writ Petition. During the subsistence of stay order from this Division 100% of the construction work of the residential building for the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker has been completed. But the High Court Division without taking notice of the said completion of the construction work made the Rule absolute by the impugned judgment and order dated 21.06.2004 for which the interference by this Division is warranted. .....Bangladesh =VS= Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA), (Civil), 2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 496] ....View Full Judgment