Act/Law wise: Judgment of Supreme Court of Bangladesh (AD)
Limitation Act (Bangladesh) ARTICLE (See 'Limitation Sections' in another title) | |||
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Section/Order/ Article/Rule/ Regulation | Head Note | Parties Name | Reference/Citation |
Article 5 |
Limitation Act, 1908
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Tipu =VS= State | 14 LM (AD) 308 |
Article 10 (First Schedule) |
The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
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Jamuna Knitting and Dying Ltd. =VS= Messer’s Y. K. Co. Textile Ltd | 14 LM (AD) 139 |
Article 95 |
It is Article 95 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act which governs a suit to set aside a decree obtained by fraud or for other relief on the ground of fraud. It provides 3 years from the time when fraud comes known to the party wronged. Govt. of Bangladesh Vs. Ramananda Sarker. 9BLT (AD)-30 |
Govt. of Bangladesh Vs. Ramananda Sarker. | 9 BLT (AD) 30 |
Article 95 |
Limitation — Suit for declaration that auction sale was fraudulent, void and not binding — Period of limitation in such a suit When a plaintiff brings a suit it must be governed by some provisions of the Limitation Act — Whether such a suit is to be brought within three years from the date when the fraud became known to the party wronged The trial Court found that the plaintiff did not bring the suit within three years from the date of knowledge of the sale — The Subordinate Judge held that since the sale was void abilities there could not be any question of limitation — the suit, however, being, as it is, and the facts as found there can be no escape from the bar of limitation even though the auction sale was said to have been tainted with fraud and thus void. Syed Ahmed and others Vs. Abdul Mokarram and others, 7BLD (AD) 166 |
Syed Ahmed and others Vs. Abdul Mokarram and others, | 7 BLD (AD) 166 |
Article 113 |
The payment of compensation should reflect the benefit that the recipient would obtain by investing that sum of money had it been paid in due time. There is a general right of performance within a reasonable time. Approximately twenty years have elapsed from 1992 when there was no further impediment in the way of completing the sale. On the basis that money put into long term investment would, more or less, double in five years the seller is entitled to receive taka two crores by way of compensation. Mahua Khair vs Amena Begum All Ispahani 17 BLC (AD) 139 |
Mahua Khair vs Amena Begum All Ispahani | 17 BLC (AD) 139 |
Article 113 |
Limitation and genuineness of the agreement– In a case for specific
performance of contract where the written agreement for sale is not
registered, the oral evidence of witnesses with regard to execution of the
agreement, payment of consideration money, offer of remainder of
consideration money, if any, and the refusal to execute and register the
deed of sale assumes primary importance. In the instant case the oral
evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim is all the more important
because the defendants deny the deed of agreement altogether.
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Aminul Islam(Md.) alias Md. Amin =VS= Md. Ataur Rahman | 10 LM (AD) 148 |
Article 113 (first schedule) |
Limitation Act, 1908
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Mosammat Asma Khatun =VS= Md. Abdul Karim | 15 LM (AD) 440 |
Article 113 |
Specific performance of contract– From the Article 113 of the Limitation Act, it is clear that when date is fixed it means there is a definite date fixed for doing particular Act. Even in the second part the stress is on ‘when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused’. In a suit for specific performance, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the existence of a concluded contract between the parties and that the plaintiff is ready and willing at all material dates to perform its part of the contract. The plaintiff has failed to prove the same. From the date of deed of agreement, exhibit-‘A’, and the date of refusal as stipulated in the averments of the plaint it is evident that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. .....Delwar Hossain Majhi @Dulal Majhi =VS= Al-haj Mokhlesur Rahman Bepari,(Civil),2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 172] ....View Full Judgment |
Delwar Hossain Majhi @Dulal Majhi =VS= Al-haj Mokhlesur Rahman Bepari | 13 LM (AD) 172 |
Article 113 |
Article 113 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is the proper provision which governs a suit for specific performance of a contract. Under this article the period of limitation is three years from the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. It is nobody’s case that any date was fixed for performance. [Para-7] A. D. C. Wested Property) Vs. Md. Serajul Islam & Ors. 6 BLT (AD)-132 |
A. D. C. Wested Property) Vs. Md. Serajul Islam & Ors. | 6 BLT (AD) 132 |
Article 113 |
Article 113 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is the proper provision which governs a suit for specific performance of a contract. Under this article the period of limitation is three years from the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. It is nobody’s case that any date was fixed for performance, A.D. C. (Vested Properly) Vs. Md. Serajul Islam & Ors. 6BLT (AD)-132 |
A.D. C. (Vested Properly) Vs. Md. Serajul Islam & Ors. | 6 BLT (AD) 132 |
Article 113 |
The suit is instituted within 03 years from the date of refusal and hence the suit is not barred by limitation. ...Abdus Sattar(Md.) =VS= Nazrul Islam(Md.) , (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 457] ....View Full Judgment |
Abdus Sattar(Md.) =VS= Nazrul Islam(Md.) | 11 LM (AD) 457 |
Article 113 |
Limitation — Limitation in a suit for specific performance of contract — When it will start — Whether limitation will run from the expiry of the period mentioned in the notice by the plaintiff to the defendant to perform the contract after obtaining necessary permission for execution and registration of the sale deed or from the expiry of the Ordinance putting embargo on execution and registration of the sale deed with permission — Upon true construction of the relevant clause of the agreement it would appear that the plaintiff could ask for the deed amicably or through Court both after the expiry of the Ordinance, and during the continuance of the Ordinance upon fulfilling conditions therefor — Finding as to limitation that the suit was filed within three years from the expiry of the Ordinance is justified — Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964(1 of 1964), S.4. Rustam Dhali and others Vs. Sekander Dhali and others, 7 BLD(AD151 |
Rustam Dhali and others Vs. Sekander Dhali and others, | 7 BLD (AD) 151 |
Articles 114 and 139 |
Adverse possession must be notorious open and hostile and within the
knowledge of the land owner .
|
Md. Motiar Rahman Khan being dead his heirs: (1). Md. Rabiul Anam and others. -Vs.- Md. Abdul Aziz Khan and others | 8 ALR (AD) 191 |
Article 120 |
The plaintiff prayed for declaration of title stating that his cause for seeking such relief arose on 27-10-1969. The suit was filed on 3-9-1976. The relief so sought was barred in view of the provision of Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The other relief, that is relief b(l) was also barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. Abu Naser Md Wahidun Nabi vs Balai Roy 10 BLC (AD) 58. |
Abu Naser Md Wahidun Nabi vs Balai Roy | 10 BLC (AD) 58 |
Article 120 |
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
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Mortuz Ali Karar(Md.) =VS= Khatiza Banu | 12 LM (AD) 110 |
Article 120 |
The Limitation Act does not specifically provide for any particular period of limitation in filing suits by a Muslim for arrears of maintenance although Articles 128 and 129 of the first schedule provide for a period of 12 years each by a Hindu for arrears of maintenance and for a declaration Of his right to maintenance and the time for which period begins to run is when the arrears are payable. No such corresponding provisions exist in respect of suit filed by a Muslim for a corresponding relief. Residuary Article 120, providing for a period of limitation of 6 years from the time when the right to sue accrues in respect of a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first schedule, will be applicable to a suit for maintenance under ordinance of 1985. [Para-23] Jamila Khatoon Vs. Rustom Ali 4 BLT (AD)-97 |
Jamila Khatoon Vs. Rustom Ali | 4 BLT (AD) 97 |
Article 120 |
Limitation — Question of limitation in a suit seeking declaration that the proceedings under section 92 of the S.A.T.Act was void — Since no notice was issued by the Revenue Officer under sub-section 3 of section 92 of the S,A.T.Act inviting any objection against the taking over of the holding as abandoned’ holding, the period of limitation prescribed in that section will not be applicable — The suit attracts the general provisions of the Limitation Act under Article 120 of the Limitation Act — State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 (XXVIII of 1951), S.92 (4). Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Sailesh Chandra Bhattacharya, 4 BLD (AD) 295 |
Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Sailesh Chandra Bhattacharya, | 4 BLD (AD) 295 |
Article 120 |
Limitation—Bar of—Limitation commenced to run from the date when the cause of action first accrued — Since the plaintiff did not file the suit within six years from the date when the impugned notification was issued. the suit is clearly barred by limitation. M/s. Jute Trading Corporation Ltd. Vs. Khana Rani Githa and others, 5BLD (AD)218 |
M/s. Jute Trading Corporation Ltd. Vs. Khana Rani Githa and others, | 5 BLD (AD) 218 |
Article 134 |
The High Court Division also held that since the transactions are vitiated by fraud, the suit would be governed by Article 134 of the Limitation Act and the starting point of limitation would be 12 years from the date when the transfer became known to the present plaintiff. Parveen Sultana vs Sahera Khatun 12 BLC (AD) 175. |
Parveen Sultana vs Sahera Khatun | 12 BLC (AD) 175 |
Article 142 |
Adverse possession—In the instant case in their pleading the Mahaluxmi bank did not raise the plea of their acquiring title by adverse possession and so no issue was framed regarding acquiring of title of the bank in the suit land by their adverse possession. However, since the defendant No. 1 asserted that they acquired title also by adverse possession, issue No. 6 was framed regarding the acquiring of title by the defendant No. 1 on the basis of adverse possession. Even if the bank proves possession over period of 12 years, they will not succeed if the title remained with the defendant No. 1. Ruhul Amin vs Official Liquidator, Mahaluxmi Bank Ltd U BLC (AD) 1 |
Ruhul Amin vs Official Liquidator, Mahaluxmi Bank Ltd | BLC (AD) 1 |
Article 142 |
It appears that the right of adverse possession cannot stand since the defendant claims that he took settlement of the land from his landlord but on his failure to prove his such claim he cannot raise the alternative plea. Jamira Khatun vs Fazlul Karim 15 BLC (AD) 236. |
Jamira Khatun vs Fazlul Karim | 15 BLC (AD) 236 |
Article 142 |
The suit is governed by Article 142 of the Limitation Act and as such there has been miscarriage of justice. The High Court Division it appears exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below specially the appellate Court which is final Court of fact when there was no misreading and non-reading of the material evidence on record and mis-construction of the documents. There is also legal infirmity in the judgments of the Courts below. We are of the view that the High Court Division was not justified in making the Rule absolute and the same accordingly requires interference by us. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs. .....Sufia Begum =VS= Md. Tariqul Alam, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 428] ....View Full Judgment |
Sufia Begum =VS= Md. Tariqul Alam | 5 LM (AD) 428 |
Section 28 r/w Article 142 |
Limitation for filing a suit for recovery of kash possession of immovable
property is 12 years starting from the date of dispossession–– Both the
trial Court and the High Court Division correctly arrived at a finding that
when the result of the earlier Title Suit No.100 of 1974 reached its
finality by dismissing the Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.113 of
1985 on 18.03.1986 by this Division, the terminus a quo to claim possession
from the defendant began and the plaintiff ought to have file the suit for
recovery of khas possession within 12 years from the said date or disposal
of the said civil petition for leave to appeal i.e. on 18.03.1986. Since
the suit was filed on 16.03.1998, the suit is within 12 years from the date
of terminus a quo.
|
Jasmeen Ershad =VS= Shahar Banoo Mohsin Asgar | 15 LM (AD) 254 |
Article 142 |
The Specific Relief Act
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Monowara Begum(Most.) =VS= Malanch Bibi | 8 LM (AD) 102 |
Article 142, 149 (Schedule-1) |
Specific Relief Act, 1877
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Proddut Kumar Das =VS= A Rashid Howlader | 16 LM (AD) 472 |
Article 142 |
Onus to prove possession - followed by dispossession — Where neither the High Court Division nor the lower appellate Court found paintiff out of possession in the suit land be- fore institution of the suit the question of discharging such onus by the plaintiff is not relevant. Akhtar Hossain Shariff and others Vs. Munshi Akkas Hossain and others, 3BLD (AD) 334 |
Akhtar Hossain Shariff and others Vs. Munshi Akkas Hossain and others, | 3 BLD (AD) 334 |
Article 143 |
In the instant case it is apparent that plaintiffs claim of redemption did not become barred by limitation during the period as mentioned in Article 4 of the Order. The plaintiffs' right to file suit seeking redemption became timebarred on 26-12-1988. In that state of the matter the contention of the learned Advocate of the plaintiff-petitioners that plaintiffs' suit was not barred by limitation since he would get one year more from 26-12-1988 and thus the period for filing the suit seeking redemption was to expire in December, 1989 but the suit having been filed on 27th September, 1989 the same was not barred by limitation legally not well founded and sustainable. The High Court Division was not in error in holding that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation. Guljan Bibi vs Md Fazlu Miah 12 BLC (AD) 18. |
Guljan Bibi vs Md Fazlu Miah | 12 BLC (AD) 18 |
Article 144 |
It is a cardinal principle of law that the plaintiff has to prove his case independent of the weakness or defects of defendant's case. Even if a foreign judgment is-admissible in evidence, it does not improve the plaintiff's case as he has hopelessly failed to prove the alleged agreement for exchange with Ghosh brothers and the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation as he had been out of possession for long 20 years from 1949 to 1969. Moksed Ali Mondal vs Abdus Samad Modal 9 BLC (AD) 220. |
Moksed Ali Mondal vs Abdus Samad Modal | 9 BLC (AD) 220 |
Article 144 |
The High Court Division upon correct assessment of the materials on record held that the plaintiff has been able to prove his continuous, uninterrupted and hostile possession in the suit land for over 12 years and accordingly, held that good and infeasible title by adverse possession has accrued in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly, made the Rule absolute. Hari Thakur Deb Bigraha vs Md Abdul Hannan 13 BLC (AD) 38. |
Hari Thakur Deb Bigraha vs Md Abdul Hannan | 13 BLC (AD) 38 |
Article 144 |
It appears from the record that there is no sufficient pleading in support of plaintiff's claim of adverse possession in the suit land and there is also no legal evidence as well in support of plaintiff's claim. To enable a plaintiff to acquire title by adverse possession, his possessions must be of actual, open, notorious and hostile character as to amount to ouster of exclusion of the real owner. The plaintiff has utterly failed to prove his title in the suit lands. PW 1 stated that he got decree in Title Suit No.62 of 1997. The decree was executable but admittedly he failed to execute the decree and thus, the decree was rendered infructuous after expiry of three years of the date of passing the decree. Moreso, no right or title is conferred on the plaintiff on the strength of the said decree the suit land having been declared enemy property any other decree except that the suit land is not an enemy property was of no avail. Md Ali Bepary vs Garupranjan Chakraborty 14 BLC (AD) 97 |
Md Ali Bepary vs Garupranjan Chakraborty | 14 BLC (AD) 97 |
Article 144 |
Adverse possession — Question of giving the benefit of adverse possession in favour of the plaintiff when the plea of adverse possession can be taken by the defendant in a suit — The plaintiffs claim is against the real owner on the basis of a bainapatra and they were possessing the land for more than the statutory period adversely against him and have perfected their title by such possession against him and not against the defendnats — Plaintiffs have not derived title against the defendant by adverse possession but against the real owner — The defendant cannot plead point of limitation as the defendant was not in physical possession — Though the plaintiffs could not prove their bainapatra their physical possession had tilted in their favour against the true owner and the suit was therefore rightly decreed. — Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877), S. 42.Md Ashraf Au and another Vs. Fatique Chandra Saha and others, 3 BLD (AD) 315 |
Md Ashraf Au and another Vs. Fatique Chandra Saha and others, 3 BLD (AD) 315 | 3 BLD (AD) 315 |
Article 144 |
Adverse possession Tenant’s right to claim adverse possession — Plaintiff and her husband were tenants of the suit premises since 1947 and after 1953 they paid rent to the Evacuee Management Committee and thereafter to the Custodian of Enemy Property Her possession is therefore legal possession which can be termed as juridical possession — When the Custodian, Enemy Property released the property on the ground that the same is not enemy property he could not direct her to release the property to a particular individual whose title is denied by the owner. As against such person who claims to be part- owner of the property, plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession is valid in law. Mst. Aftabunnessa Vs. Md. Shamsul Huq Talukder, 4BLD (AD) 273 |
Mst. Aftabunnessa Vs. Md. Shamsul Huq Talukder, | 4 BLD (AD) 273 |
Article 144 |
Adverse possession against co-sharer — Sole possession is not exclusive
or adverse possession — Possession of a co-owner becomes adverse to other
co-owners from the moment when there is an ouster and exclusion
|
Hazera Begum and others Vs. Roushan Ara Begum and others, | 7 BLD (AD) 38 |
Article 148 |
Limitation for redemption suit is 60 years—
|
Guljan Bibi (Most) and others Vs. Md. Fazlu Miah and others | 12 MLR (AD) 112 |
Article 148 |
60 years limitation for the mortgagor to bring a suit to recover possession
from the mortgagee when the right so accrued.
|
Khanje Ali Sikder =VS= Hazi Mozaharuddin & others | 1 LM (AD) 51 |
Article 148 |
The suit for redemption of mortgage was not maintainable in law– The plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit land, rather it is defendant Nos.14-20 who are in possession of the suit land. Therefore, the suit for redemption of mortgage was not maintainable in law. The trial Court on misconception and misreading of the case as well as the provision of article 148 of the Limitation Act held that the suit was maintainable. The crucial fact to be decided in the suit was whether the mortgagor returned back the money to the mortgagee within 5(five) years as stipulated in the deed of reconveyance or not, but the plaintiffs failed to prove the said fact and thus after the expiry of the said period of 5(five) years the transaction became a past closed one. But the trial Court and the High Court Division failed to consider the said fact. We find merit in the appeal and accordingly, the same is allowed. ...Golzar Hossain =VS= Abdul Kadir, (Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 74] ....View Full Judgment |
Golzar Hossain =VS= Abdul Kadir | 9 LM (AD) 74 |
Article 148 |
The plaintiff filed a suit for redemption of mortgage and both the courts below found that a suit for redemption of mortgage is maintainable and the same having been filed within 60 years from the accrual of the cause of action the suit was not barred by limitation. The learned Single Judge wrongly held that the suit for redemption is barred by limitation. A reference to Article 148 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that the limitation of filing such a suit is 60 years and as such the learned single Judge wrongly held that the suit was barred by limitation. Asmat Ali Vs. Abdur Rafique Mridha & Ors. 9BLT(AD)-12 |
Asmat Ali Vs. Abdur Rafique Mridha & Ors. | 9 BLT (AD) 12 |
Article 148 |
Usufructuary mortgage — Limitation for redemption — Period for which mortgage can be entered into is not to be confused with the period of limitation for redemption. The maximum period for which a usufructuary mortgage can be entered into was fifteen years under section 95 of the State-Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. But by Ordinance No. XXI of 1961 section 95 was amended and thereby the maximum period of usufructuary mortgage was reduced to seven years. Unless earlier redeemed by repayment of the consideration a mortgagor acquires the right to redemption on the expiry of the maximum period of seven years, and if the mortgagee does not voluntarily restore possession of the land to the mortgagors, the latter may file a suit within a period of 60 years from the date of accrual of his right of redemption. Moulvi Abu Bakkar Vs. Nazir Ahmed, 2 BLD (AD) 151 |
Moulvi Abu Bakkar Vs. Nazir Ahmed, | 2 BLD (AD) 151 |
Article 149 |
In a suit for declaration of title by way of adverse possession the plaintiffs claim that they have been possessing the suit land for 86/87 years by constructing houses thereon and the Court of appeal below which is the final court of fact found on consideration of both oral and documentary evidence the right, title and possession of the plaintiffs in the suit land and the High Court Division also found that there was no error occasioning failure of justice in the impugned judgment for which no interference is called for. Government of Bangladesh represented by DC, Rajshahi vs Zahura Bewa and others 10 BLC (AD) 150. |
Government of Bangladesh represented by DC, Rajshahi vs Zahura Bewa and others | 10 BLC (AD) 150 |
Article 152 |
The limitation for filing an appeal before the District Judge is 30 days from the date of the Decree. Momtazuddin and another Vs. Yakub All, 13 BLD (AD) 219. |
Momtazuddin and another Vs. Yakub All | 13 BLD (AD) 219 |
Article 152 |
Partition decree — Execution — Limitation runs from the date when the hnal decree is engrossed on stamped paper and signed by the Judge. A decree, before it is prepared, drawn and sighed according to law, cannot be put into execution. The decree cannot be drown except on a requisite stamped paper, but as there is no law compelling a person interested in the decree to supply for the stamp paper within a particular period of time nor any provision to cancel or set aside the decree or dismiss the suit on this ground, the drawing of the decree may be delayed beyond the period of limitation for its execution. In such circumstances limitation will start from the date the decree is drawn and signed or it becomes executable. Aminullah Bhuiyan and others Vs. Abdul Hafiz and others, 1 BLD(AD)210. |
Aminullah Bhuiyan and others Vs. Abdul Hafiz and others, | 1 BLD (AD) 210 |
article 157 |
Applicability of article 157— as to the limitation against acquittal in
case started on police report—
|
Dr. M.A. Mazed and others Vs. Government of Bangladesh represented by Solicitor, | 9 MLR (AD) 164 |
Article 158 |
Limitation Act, 1908
|
M/s. Concord Engineers and Construction Ltd -Vs.- The Chief Engineer, Road and Highways Department, Government of the People's Republic Bangladesh | 4 ALR (AD) 51 |
Article 164 |
Limitation for filing application for setting aside exparte decree is 30 days from the date of decree or from the date of knowledge-High Court Division while exercising revisional power under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure can not sit as a court of appeal on the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court. Summons upon the defendants shall be served at the address where they ordinarily reside as required under Order 5 rule 17 C.P.C. Exparte decree can well be setaside on the ground of non-service of summons upon an applicatin under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed within 30 days from the date of knowledge thereof as provided under article 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Ful Meher Bibi being dead her heirs Sabura Khatiin and others Vs. Abdid Wahab and others 11 MLR (2006) (AD) 411. |
Ful Meher Bibi being dead her heirs Sabura Khatiin and others Vs. Abdid Wahab and others | 11 MLR (AD) 411 |
Article 164 |
The application order 9 rule 13 of the Code o Civil Procedure was not barred by limitation in the facts of this case as limitation is to be counted from the date of knowledge o defendant No. 8 under Article 164 of the Limitation Act as the summons was not duly served upon her. Ful Meher Bibi being dead her heirs Savura Khatun & Ors. Vs. Abdul Wahab & Ors. 13 BLT (AD)184 |
Ful Meher Bibi being dead her heirs Savura Khatun & Ors. Vs. Abdul Wahab & Ors. | 13 BLT (AD) 184 |
Article 173 |
In a money suit by Rupali Bank against a Private Ltd. company and its
Directors defendants, names of Director-defendants being struck off at
their instance and their transferees being impleaded subsequently in
presence of Banks representative, plaintiff-Bank without seeking any remedy
within 10 months and without giving any explanation of delay filed a review
petition which was rejected and against which in plaintiff Bank preferred
revisional application which was also rejected on ground of limitation —
No illegality done plaintiff directed to take action against its own wrong
doers.
|
Rupali Bank Vs. Tobacco Industry Ltd and others | 1 BLT (AD) 33 |
Article 181 |
A preliminary decree for sale of mortgaged property can be enforced only by applying for an order for a final decree in accordance with Order XXXIV, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the limitation for such application will be governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act. Rupali Bank Ltd, Dhaka vs Brick Linkers Ltd 16 BLC (AD) 107. |
Rupali Bank Ltd, Dhaka vs Brick Linkers Ltd | 16 BLC (AD) 107 |
Article 181 |
The Arbitration Act 1940
|
Gomati Water Development Division, Comilla=VS=Md. Shah Alam | 4 LM (AD) 121 |
Articles 181 and 182 |
Application for restitution—Application for restitution is not an
application for. execution of a decree but an independent application
governed by Article 181 and not Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
|
Shamuj Ali and others Vs. Kamalarama Bibi and others | 1 BLD (AD) 131 |
Article 181 |
Right to apply for restitution--Right to apply for restitution accrues
under Article 181 from the date of the final decree when appeal is
preferred from appellate decree of reversal and not from the date of the
decree of the first appellate Court reversing the decre of the trial
Court.
|
Shamuj Au and others Vs. Kamakirina Bibi and others, | 1 BLD (AD) 131 |
Article 181 |
Limitation — Period of limitation for filing a revisional application — Whether Article 18 I of the Limitation Act will apply — Courts power to revise an order suo motu is not restricted by any time limit — But a revisional application is to be filed within the period of 90 days — The High Court Division may in its discretion entertain an application beyond that period ir there is no negligence or laches on the part of the petitioner. — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), s. 115. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Vs. Md. Kobad Au and others, 7 BLD (AD) 268 |
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Vs. Md. Kobad Au and others, | 7 BLD (AD) 268 |
Article 181 |
Reasonable—Application under Article 181 is restricted to applications under. the Code of Civil Procedure and that the application for rectification of a Share-Register under section 38 of the Companies Act,1913,is left to be governed by the general principle that it shall be filed within a reasonable time and not after inordinate delay. What is reasonable time or an inordinate delay is left to be determined by the Court on consideration of facts and circumstances of a particular case. Tamizul Haque and another Vs. Shamsul Haque and others, 11BLD(AD)176 |
Tamizul Haque and another Vs. Shamsul Haque and others, | 11 BLD (AD) 176 |
Article 182(3) and (5) |
Applicability of article 182(3) to execution proceedings—
|
Kazi Shamsul Huq and others Vs. Rebeca Begum and others | 11 MLR (AD) 399 |
Article 182(3) & Article 182(5) |
We are or opinion that either the decree holder or the judgment debtor could inform the executing court regarding modification of the trial courts decree by the appellate court of the Executing Court could suo motu proceed with the pending Execution case No. 18 of 980 as the same did not become time barred. We are also of the view that in the instant case the provisions laid down in Article 182(3) of the Limitation Act providing for three years time after passing final order in the review application shall apply and the Provision of Article 182(5)of the Limitation Act is not applicable. Kazi Sahamsul Huq & Ors Vs. Robeya Begum & Ors 15 BLT (AD) 79. |
Kazi Sahamsul Huq & Ors Vs. Robeya Begum & Ors | 15 BLT (AD) 79 |