|
Sections 2(65), 28, 336
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Public Corporation (Management Co-ordination) Ordinance, 1986
Sections 2(e), 14A
Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006
Sections 2(65), 28, 336
‘Workers’ as defined in Section 2(e) of the Public Corporation
(Management Co-ordination) Ordinance, 1986 read with Section 2(65) of the
Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 Consequently, their age of retirement should be
governed by Section 14A of the Ordinance, 1986, which prescribes 60(sixty)
years as the age of retirement— Appellate Division finds that the High
Court Division rightly held the petitioners to be “workers” employed
under the Government-owned enterprises or corporations, having regard to
the factual stance of each petitioner and in view of the definitions
contained in Sections 2(e) and 14 of the Public Corporation (Management
Coordination) Ordinance, 1986, read with Sections 2(65), 28, and 336 of
the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006. This finding derives support from a
number of reported and unreported decisions of the High Court Division, as
well as from the decision of this Division in M.A. Hai and others v.
Trading Corporation of Bangladesh, reported in 40DLR(AD)207, observing,
inter alia, that the services of workers employed in any public enterprise
or corporation are governed by Section 14A of the said Ordinance, and
accordingly, such workers are entitled to remain in service until
completion of sixty (60) years of age. This Division finds no ground to
intervene with the decisions delivered by the different Benches of the
High Court Division in their respective cases on the matter in hand.
.....Platinum Jubilee Jute Mills Limited =VS= Md. Rahmatullah, (Civil),
2025(2) [19 LM (AD) 227]
....View Full Judgment
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Platinum Jubilee Jute Mills Limited =VS= Md. Rahmatullah |
19 LM (AD) 227 |
|
Sections 4(7)(8), 117, 234, 303(e) and 307
|
Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006
Sections 4(7)(8), 117, 234, 303(e) and 307
Bangladesh Labour Rules, 2015
Rule 107
Workers Welfare Foundation Act, 2006
Section 14(2)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
Section 561A
For quashing a proceeding under section 561A of the Code— On this point,
this Division in the case of Ali Akkas Vs. Enayet Hossain and others,
reported in 17 BLD(AD)44 held ‘to bring a case within the purview of
section 561A of the Code for the purpose of quashing a proceeding, one of
the following conditions must be fulfilled:
(I) Interference even at an initial stage may be justified where the facts
are so preposterous that even on admitted facts no case stands against the
accused;
(II) Where the institution and continuation of the proceeding amounts to an
abuse of the process of the Court;
(III) Where there is a legal bar against the initiation or continuation of
the proceeding;
(IV) In a case where the allegations in the FIR or the petition of
complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged and
(V) The allegations against the accused although constitute an offence
alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the
case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.’
The Indian Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (reported in AIR
1960 SC 866) summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can
and should be exercised to quash the proceedings are:
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the
offence alleged;
(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused persons constitute an
offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of
the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.” .....Professor Muhammad Yunus =VS= The State, (Criminal),
2025(1) [18 LM (AD) 392]
....View Full Judgment
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Professor Muhammad Yunus =VS= The State |
18 LM (AD) 392 |
|
Section 4
|
Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006
Section 4
Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965
Section 4
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Articles 40, 102
Casual workers— The posts of Cargo Helpers and Traffic Helpers were
abolished from the approved manpower set-up of Biman— For appointment to
permanent posts either as Cargo Helpers and Traffic Helpers or in similar
posts on supernumerary basis— The High Court Division while disposing of
the Rule with direction upon the appellant writ respondent duly considered
the position of law as well as facts that the respondents writ petitioners
do qualify to become permanent in their respective posts having served for
more than the required period with unblemished record of service.
The appellant Biman is, hereby, directed to take necessary steps to make
the service of the respondents writ petitioners permanent, who are still
working with Biman as casual workers in the posts of Cargo Helpers and
Traffic Helpers with satisfactory service record, within 3(three) months
from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment and order. Meanwhile,
the respective respondents writ petitioners shall get half of the service
benefits from the date of the judgment and order dated 02.06.2016 of the
High Court Division till their services are made permanent in their
respective posts. However, on attaining their age of superannuation, Biman
will be at liberty to abolish the respective posts, in accordance with
law. .....Biman Bangladesh Airlines Limited =VS= Md. A.K. Azad, (Civil),
2025(2) [19 LM (AD) 335]
....View Full Judgment
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Biman Bangladesh Airlines Limited =VS= Md. A.K. Azad |
19 LM (AD) 335 |
|
Section 1(4)(ka)
|
We have next drawn our attention to Section 1(4)(ka) of the
বাংলাদেশ শ্রম আইন, ২০০৬.
Section 1(4)(L) contemplates organizations which shall fall within the
exception of Section 1(4)(L) and shall not fall within the meaning of
বাংলাদেশ শ্রম আইন, ২০০৬. We have
particularly drawn attention to Section 1(4)(L) and which is reproduced
hereunder:
“সরকার বা সরকারের অধীনস্থ
কোন অফিস” which means Government office or institutions
owned by the government. Since we are of the considered finding and opinion
that the বাংলাদেশ দুগ্ধ
উৎপাদনকারী সমবায় ইউনিয়ন
লিমিটেড is a public body and is owned by the government
therefore it is needless to state that the organizations owned by the
government falls within the exception of Section 1(4)(L). Consequently the
provisions of বাংলাদেশ শ্রম আইন, ২০০৬
shall not be applicable in the petitioners case. Such being the position,
we are also of the considered view that the petitioners’ are not workers
rather they are permanent employees under a particular selection grade.
.....Mesbaul Alam & ors Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Spl. Original) 19 SCOB
[2024] HCD 14
The employees must be afforded due process before seizing him of his
employment. In not affording due process is a direct infringement into the
employee’s fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution.
.....Mesbaul Alam & ors Vs. Bangladesh & ors, (Spl. Original) 19 SCOB
[2024] HCD 14
....View Full Judgment
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Mesbaul Alam & ors Vs. Bangladesh & ors |
19 SCOB [2024] HCD 14 |
|
Sections 26 , 283 and 307
|
Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006
Sections 26 , 283 and 307 r/w
Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898]
Section 561 A —No complaint can be made directly without seeking redress
to the Labour Court for non-payment of service benefits.
Mere non-payment of termination benefits or illegal termination of a worker
is not an offence as evident from section 26. It will be an offence if
after illegal termination, the Labour Court directed the owner/ employer to
pay the termination benefits or re-employ him and if the owner/ employer
disobeys the direction it will be a penal offence under section 283 and not
otherwise.
S.M. Zahidul Islam (Zahid) Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST)
represented by its Advisor Mr. S.M. Rezaul Karim -Vs.- Syed Ahmed Chowdhury
and others. (Civil) 11 ALR (AD) 84-88
|
S.M. Zahidul Islam (Zahid) Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) |
11 ALR (AD) 84 |
|
Section 33
|
The Public Corporation (Management Co-ordination) Ordinance, 1986
Section 14A
বাংলাদেশ শ্রম আইন, ২০০৬
Section 33
Writ petitioners and according to Section 14A of the Ordinance, 1986, their
retiring age is 60 years, but they had been given retirement at the age of
57 years in violation of the said provisions of law–– Appellate
Division’s considered view is that the provisions of the Ordinance, 1986
will prevail over those of শ্রম আইন, ২০০৬ so far as
it relates to the age of retirement. Therefore, the age of retirement from
service of the writ petitioners-respondents is 60 years as envisaged under
Section 14A of the Ordinance, 1986. ––It appears from the above that
Section 33 of শ্রম আইন, ২০০৬ does not provide for any
provision for agitating grievances against the order of retirement.
Therefore, regarding the cases in hand, Appellate Division’s considered
opinion is that the grievances arose out of age of retirement does not come
within the mischief of Section 33 of শ্রম আইন, ২০০৬
and as such this Division finds that the writ petitions were quite
maintainable. .....Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation
=VS= Ayub Ali, (Civil), 2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 536]
....View Full Judgment
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Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation =VS= Ayub Ali |
13 LM (AD) 536 |
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Sections 234(1)(b), 235 and 242(1)
|
Penal Code, 1860
Sections 405/409/420/467/468/471/109
Money Laundering Protirodh Ain, 2012
Section 4(2) and section 4(3)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
Section 494 r/w
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958
Section 10 (4)
Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006
Sections 234(1)(b), 235 and 242(1)
Companies Act, 1994
Section 28
It appears from the record that not a single beneficiary raised any
objection regarding this deduction for which the same cannot be termed as
criminal breach of trust, dishonest intention and misappropriation of the
same being absent in the transaction— Mr. Md. Asaduzzaman, learned
Attorney-General along with Mr. Mohammad Arshadur Rouf, learned Additional
Attorney General, Mr. Md. Jahirul Islam Sumon, learned Deputy
Attorney-General, Mr. Md. Asad Uddin, learned Deputy Attorney-General and
Ms. Fatima Akter, learned Assistant Attorney-General, appearing for the
State-respondent No. 1, has submitted that the proceeding, which has been
sought to be quashed by the appellants, had already been withdrawn by the
Commission, and therefore, the instant appeal has become infructuous for
all practical purposes.
The facts disclosed in the FIR and Charge sheet prima facie do not disclose
any offence and the proceeding apparently appears to be mala fide and
malicious one and therefore, the High Court Division should have quashed
the proceeding it being an abuse of the process of the Court. Appellate
Division is of the view that the High Court Division was not right in
rejecting the application for quashing the proceeding of Special Case No.
09 of 2024. Consequently, this Division finds merit in the appeal.
Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and
order dated 24.07.2024 passed by the High Court Division in Criminal
Miscellaneous Case No. 43434 of 2024 is, hereby, set aside. .....Professor
Dr. Muhammad Yunus =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2025(2) [19 LM (AD) 499]
....View Full Judgment
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Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus =VS= The State |
19 LM (AD) 499 |