The Services (Re-organization and Conditions) Act, 1975
Sections 2, 3 and 5 r/w
The State Owned Manufacturing Industries Workers (Terms and Conditions of Service) Act, 1974 r/w
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 r/w
Employment Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965
A trade union can definitely enter into agreement with the management for improvement of the service and conditions of its members, but not in derogation of the laws prevalent at the relevant time–
Findings of the High Court Division and the leave granting order as quoted above, the only question which is to be decided in the appeal is whether the agreement entered into by the trade unions and the corporation on behalf of the nationalized enterprises, namely, Carew and Company on 20.11.1984 fixing the scales of pay and grades and other emoluments in violation of the laws could be said to be valid and implemented and whether the said agreement created any vested right to the writ-petitioners and the same could be enforced by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Division under article 102 of the Constitution.
A trade union can definitely enter into agreement with the management for improvement of the service and conditions of its members, but not in derogation of the laws prevalent at the relevant time. We find no merit in this appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed. …Sohrab Ali Miah =VS= Bangladesh Sugar & Food Industries Corporation, (Civil), 2019 (2) [7 LM (AD) 56] ....View Full Judgment

The appellants' argument that by receiveing the same scale of pay the preventive officers and appraisers have become members of the same grade with effect from 26-6-83 and therefore, the Preventive Officers became senior as a class to those who have been appointed directly as Appraisers after 26-6-83 cannot be accepted for the simple reason that these two classes of officers are graded differently and these posts have not been treated as equivalent posts, although they are drawing the same scale of pay. Azizul Huq Sikder and others vs Collector of Customs, Chittagong 49 DLR (AD) 172.

Respondent Nos. 2-61 belong to 1st BCS Examination whilst the appellants' batch belongs to 2nd BCS Examination and hence appellants are as a batch junior to the respondents. The amended sub-rule 3(g) is neither illegal nor in contravention to the conditions laid down in the advertisement- The notional date of joining had to be worked out" in order to make the seniority of the first BCS batch consistent with the BCS Seniority Rules of 1983. There is no scope for any confusion as to the inter-se seniority between the appellants and respondent Nos. 2-61 as the respondents are senior in the service to the appellants. AHM Mustain Billah and 4 others vs Bangladesh and 60 others 6 BLC (AD) 7.

In exercise of power under section 4 of the Services (Reorganisation and Conditions) Act, 1975 the Health Directorate and Family Planning Directorate Order 1978 was published in the official Gazette on 27-12-98 being SRO No. 293 which having not been challenged the petitioner cannot challenge the subsequent order and notifications, etc. made in exercise of power given in the said SRO. Syeedur Rahman Khan (Md) vs Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 6 BLC (AD) 53.

The Grades of Appraisers and Preventive Officers still remain the same as in the Notification dated 20-12-77. Preventive Officers cannot claim upgradation by implication. It must be done by an act of volition by the Government by Gazette Notification. Azizul Huque Sikder and others vs Collector of Customs, Chittagong and others 49 DLR (AD) 172.

Power of the Government to reorganise services—Scale once granted cannot be withdrawn long after—
Government under section 5 of the Act has the power to reorganise services and alter the terms and conditions of service. Time scale granted earlier and having been drawn by the Government Servant for long cannot be interfered with on ground of non-entitlement. Bangladesh Government represented by Secretary Ministry of Industries Vs. Md. Shahjahan and others. 2, MLR (1997) (AD) 351.

Read with The Services (Grades, Pay and Allowances) Order, 1977 Section-5 Read with The Surplus Public Servants Absorption Ordinance, 1985 (No. XXJV of 1985)
Sections-5 & 6
Whether in a graded service, seniority counts from the date of entry in a grade
The appellant joined the President’s Secretariat in Islamabad on 29.9.70 as an Upper Division Assistant. On return to Bangladesh he was taken in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the same post carrying a scale of pay of Tk. 310-670/- which was in Grade-VIl of National Scale of Pay. His service was declared as surplus by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by a memo date 23.6.76 and his name was forwarded to the Ministry of Establishment for absorption. By an order dated 20.11.76 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the appellant to join the Taxes Department as Inspector of Taxes. He was released from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 22.11.76 and on the same day he was absorbed as Inspector of Taxes in the office of the Income Tax Commissioner, Dhaka (North Zone) in Central Salary Circle-2 in the same scale of pay as above. At the time of filing the petition before the Administrative Tribunal the appellant was serving in the Contractors’ Circle-3 at Dhaka (East Zone). At the time of preparation of the List of Seniority the appellant found that his period of service was counted not from the date of his joining the service on 29.9.70, but from the date of joining as Inspector of Taxes on 22.11.76. Appellants prayer for a direction to reckon the period from 29.9.70 for the purpose of counting his seniority.
Held: Establishment Division issued Memo No. ED(R-1 1) S-59/77-25 (500) dated 20.3.79. This memo is the sheet-anchor of the appellant’s case. It is his case that in 1976 the post of Inspector of Taxes and an Upper Division Assistant were equivalent posts because they carried the same grade and scale of pay and there was no other yardstick of measurement of equivalence between a minister rial post and an executive post at that time.
The appellant is right. Subject to the implementation of the recommendations of the National Pay Commission by an order notified in the Official Gazette under section 5 of Act No. XXXII of 1975, if the appellant’s seniority was fixed at any time between 22.11.76 (when he joined the Taxes Department as Inspector of Taxes) and 30.6.77 (When the New National Grade and Scale of Pay was not yet introduced), he could have reasonably claimed the counting of his past service for determining his seniority. The respondents could not then have been heard to say that the post of Inspector and the post of Upper Division Assistant are higher or lower posts, entailing higher or lower degrees of responsibility. The Inspector of Taxes and Upper Division Assistant being equivalent posts both for purposes of grade and scale of pay the appellant was entitled from 22.11.76 to 30.6.77 to count his previous service for fixation of seniority, in terms of the Establishment Division’s Memo dated 20.3.79. But both the appellant and the respondents missed the essential point in the entire litigation, namely, that on and from 1.7.77 the amalgamation of Upper Division Assistant and Inspector of Taxes into the same grade and scale of pay was done away with, making it a thing of the past, and obliterated event, leaving no trace of any vested right that may have accrued upto 30.6.77. From 1.7.77 an Upper Division Assistant and Inspector of Taxes are not equivalent posts, either in respect of grade or in respect of scale of pay. The appellant will not be considered to have been absorbed in an equivalent post. Yes, he was absorbed in an equivalent post in 1976, but the equivalence “ceased to exist” from 1.7.77. Because of the respondents’ inability to bring into sharp focus this vital legal aspect of the matter the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal has made a foray into redundant considerations, like the distinction between the duties of an Upper Division Assistant and an Inspector of Taxes. The basic legal position is that from 1.7.77 the appellant remains absorbed in a post different in grade and scale of pay from the post of Upper Division Assistant and therefore with no assistance from the Establishment Division Memo dated 20.3.79 and the various other Government Memos brought to our notice by Mr. Abdur Rab Chowdhury can the appellant in any way be permitted to count his previous service from 29.9,70 to 2 1.11.76 for fixation of his seniority. [Para-13] Md AFB Jahan Mia Vs. National Board of Revenue & Ors. 5 BLT (AD)-121.

Service (Pay and Allowances) Order, 2015
Clause 7(1)
Services (Re-organization and Conditions) Act, 1975
Section 5
Higher grade— The provision of time scale, however, was formally incorporated in the modified National Pay Scales from 01.06.1985. According to the provision as mandated in the National Pay Scales, 1985, 1991, 1997, 2005 and 2009 respectively the employees between 20th to 10th grade were entitled to the time scales on completion of 8, 12 and 15 years of the respective service period. This pecuniary benefit of up-gradation of pay scale was a huge incentive so was given in order to bring efficiency in public service and to reduce dissatisfaction among the employees concerned for not having promotion for lack of posts and at the same time working in the same post for a long time.
Later, pursuant to the decision of the writ-respondent-government to omit the existing provision of time scale the Service (Pay and Allowances) Order, 2015 (in short, the Service Order, 2015) was framed by the government by the order of the President of the Republic, in exercise of power as provided under Section 5 of the Act, 1975 prescribing new pay scales and other financial benefits to the officers and employees of the Republic, public bodies, corporations and nationalized enterprises respectively. In the said Service Order, 2015 though some provisions of up-gradation of scales of pay had been provided in clause 7 but the provision of time scale was not kept intact.
Similarly, the writ-petitioners of Writ Petition No. 10912 of 2017 also attained the eligibility to move to the next higher grade as per the provision of ÒD”PZi †MÖ‡Wi cÖvc¨ZvÓ under Clause 7(1) of the Service Order, 2015. Even, the respondent No.4, Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC) in compliance with the provision of the said order, issued an office order bearing Memo No. 36.02.012.00.02.002.2014/1872(250) dated 07.09.2016 allowing them the benefits of the respective provision of the Service Order, 2015. However, said office order was rendered ineffective in view of issuance of the impugned Circular bearing No.07.00.0000.161.00.002.16 (Part-1)-232 dated 21.09.2016 by the writ-respondent No.3.
The operating part of the impugned judgments and orders dated 04.01.2017 and 04.12.2017 respectively passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition Nos.13300 of 2016 and 10912 of 2017 so modified thus stand as under:
“In the result, the Rule is made absolute in part without any order as to costs.
Clause (ga) as contained in the impugned Paripatra being Circular No.07.00.0000.161.00. 002.16(Part-1)-232 dated 21.09.2016 issued by the respondent No.3 (Annexure-c) is hereby declared to have been issued without lawful authority and is, of no legal effect as being ultra vires the Constitution.” .....Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh =VS= Ibrahim Alam Bhuiyan, (Civil), 2025(1) [18 LM (AD) 569] ....View Full Judgment

Bangladesh Service Rules, Part-1
Rule 42
Bengal Statue 1781, Bengal Regulation No.1793, Act of 1964, Act of 1865, Act of 1871, Act of 1877 and Act 16 of 1908, Act of 1964
Service (Reorganization and Condition) Act, 1975
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Article 102, 105
Supreme Court of Bangladesh (Appellate Division) Rules, 1988
Order XXVI
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Order XLVII, rule 1
Extra Mohorars— Writ-petitioners are entitled to united grades and pay of scale, equal pay and other benefits of service— The respondents-writ-petitioners invoked writ jurisdiction under Article 102 of the Constitution to protect their rights as Government employees and against hostile and discriminatory action of the appellant-writ respondents as such writ petition is very much maintainable. .....Ministry of Law, Bangladesh =VS= Abdur Rahman Bhuiyan, (Civil), 2024(1) [16 LM (AD) 35] ....View Full Judgment

Para 2(X)—
In broad concept the service of the Republic means all services of Bangladesh. It is a generic term and person who is getting emolument because of his service in the Republic is a public officer. In that sense, the member of the judicial service and the magistrate exercising judicial functions are no doubt public officers in the generic term. But within the scheme of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh the nature of judicial service has been contemplated as distinct and· separate from other works performed by other officers of other cadre services. The judicial service is, of course, included in the definition of service of the Republic but they have been separately treated within the scheme of the Constitution as reflected in Articles 115, 116, 116A and 152(1) of the Constitution. Secretary, Ministry of Finance Dhaka vs Md Masdar Hossain and others 52 DLR (AD) 82.

Para 2(X)—
Per Latifur Rahman J : Article 136 of part IX speaks of reorganisation of service of the Republic by creation, amalgamation or unification of services and such law may vary or revoke any condition of service of a person employed in the service of the Republic. This concept of reorganisation of service is available to all other civil posts including executive service of Republic other than members of the judicial service and magistrates exercising judicial functions as they have been treated separately under Articles 115, 116 and 116A of the Constitution. Article 136 refers to all general services of civil posts. 'Judicial service' has been separately treated in the relevant constitutional provisions and as such conditions of service are to be separately framed under Article 133 and it cannot be tagged as Bangladesh Civil Service (Judicial) under paragraph 2(x) of Act XXXII of 1975. Secretary, Ministry of Finance Dhaka vs Md Masdar Hossain 52 DLR (AD) 82.

Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
Articles 117, 102, 103, 27, 29 and 31
Services (Re organization and Conditions) Act, 1975
The writ petition under Article 102 of the Constitution is not maintainable— Bangladesh and others vs. Sontosh Kumar Shaha and others (6 SCOB [2016] AD), para-78, page-31 the Appellate Division in clear terms has categorically found, inter-alia, that under Article 102(5) and Article 117(2), the High Court Division cannot exercise jurisdiction over matters relating to terms and conditions of public service except in cases involving a challenge to the validity of law or violation of fundamental rights. However, to invoke fundamental rights in service related matters, a public servant or an employee of a statutory corporation must clearly and specifically plead such violations. Mere evasive statement of violation of fundamental rights or making stray statements that the order is discriminatory or mala fide, will not suffice in this respect. Delwar Hossain Mia -Vs Bangladesh, 52DLR(AD)121, where this Division held that a person in the service of the Republic who intends to invoke fundamental rights for challenging the vires of law will seek his remedy under Article 102(1), but in all other cases he will be required to seek remedy under Article 117(2) of the Constitution. Bangladesh v. AKM Enayetullah, 11BLC(AD)205, the respondent sought judicial review of his retirement order by filing a writ petition before the High Court Division. The High Court Division, however, allowing the prayer made the Rule absolute. In appeal, the Appellate Division overruled the decision, determining that the Administrative Tribunal is the proper forum for a government servant to agitate any violation in the matter of the terms and conditions of service and in such view of the matter, impugned judgment of the High Court Division is liable to be set aside.
The High Court Division while making the Rule absolute declaring that the Government is legally obliged, under the Services (Re-organisation and Conditions) Act, 1975, to bring uniformity in the pay scales of the petitioners and Sub-Assistant Engineers by treating them at par, did not give an iota of observation and findings on the maintainability of the Rule Nisi in view of having alternative efficacious remedy, as provided under Article 117 of the Constitution. As such, there is no doubt to find that the High Court Division erred in law by making the Rule absolute, for, the case of the respondents-writ petitioners lacks maintainability in relation to question of law at the very outset. The judgment and order passed by the High Court Division calls for intervention by Appellate Division. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. .....Ministry of Land, Bangladesh =VS= Md. Mozibul Haque, (Civil), 2025(2) [19 LM (AD) 91] ....View Full Judgment