Act/Law wise: Judgment of Supreme Court of Bangladesh (AD)
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act [XXVIII of 1950] | |||
---|---|---|---|
Section/Order/ Article/Rule/ Regulation | Head Note | Parties Name | Reference/Citation |
Section 2A |
Interest of any 'local authority' is exempt from acquisition under the SAT Act. The Municipality is a local authority. Narendar Nath vs Municipal Committee 39 DLR (AD) 16. |
Narendar Nath vs Municipal Committee | 39 DLR (AD) 16 |
Sections 2(12) & 20(2a) |
"Hat" or "Bazar" definition of—A hat or bazar sitting once in a week is not uncommon in this country. If a hat sits once a week regularly then it will come under mischief of the SAT Act. The expression "particular days" in the definition of 'hat or bazar' if read together with necessary emphasis that the word 'particular' deserves, then it will be clear that the word 'days' will also include a day as well in view of the provision of the General Clauses Act and the history of relevant legislation. Bangladesh vs Shakhipur lslamia High School 45 DLR (AD) 23. |
Bangladesh vs Shakhipur lslamia High School | 45 DLR (AD) 23 |
Sections 2(12) and 20 |
Non-retainable khas—hat and bazar— Building with shop standing on land within the periphery of a hat or bazar—The land not being physically attached to the hat or bazar, nor shown in the settlement record as such shown in the settlement record as such cannot be treated as part of hat or bazar. Mohammad Doser Ali Vs. Bangladesh and others, .1BLD (AD) 423 |
Mohammad Doser Ali Vs. Bangladesh and others | 1 BLD (AD) 423 |
Sections 2(16) and 96 |
Whether “Tilla Ban” or elevated homestead is non-agricultural land— Whether a holder of a contiguous land can pre-empt the same? —Whether particular land is non-agricultural land is to be determined with reference to the use thereof and if it is held on lease with reference to the purpose of the said lease—It is to be determined upon evidence and there is no material on record to hold the same as non-agricultural land—There seems to be no reason at all for holding that the case land is non-agricultural land—The wide definition of land is capable of taking in even a ‘Tilla Ban’ (elevated homestead land) unless it can be shown that it is nonagricultural land—Non-Agricultural Tenancy Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949(XXIII of 1949), S. 2(4). Sayeda Khatun and another Vs. Rahman and others, 6BLD (AD) 330 |
Sayeda Khatun and another Vs. Rahman and others | 6 BLD (AD) 330 |
Section 2A |
Lease under the Municipality— Whether after the acquisition of rent receiving interest a lease under the Municipality has become a tenant under the Government — Whether he can be evicted from the land by the Municipality — Whether Municipality is a local authority — Whether the land belonging to the Municipality is exempt from acquisition — Local authority is understood to mean an authority entrusted with the administration of a local fund —The Municipality is a local authority — The property had vested in the Municipality which is not a rent receiver and therefore exempt from acquisition of the property — The defendant did not acquire tenancy right under the Government — Defendant also did not acquire tenancy right under the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act since land belonging to the Municipality is exempt from its provisions—General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of l97), S. 3(38) — Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, l949(XXVIII of 1949), S. 85. Narendra Basu Roy and another Vs. Municipal Committee, Mymensingh, 6BLD (AD) 297 |
Narendra Basu Roy and another Vs. Municipal Committee, Mymensingh | 6 BLD (AD) 297 |
Section 2(13), 117(1)(c) |
The Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949
|
Abul Kasem Md. Kaiser =VS= Md. Ramjan Ali | 9 LM (AD) 284 |
Section 2(13), 117(1)(c) |
The Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949
|
Abul Kasem Md. Kaiser =VS= Md. Ramjan Ali | 9 LM (AD) 284 |
Section 3 |
If there is no service for acquisition under section 3 the presumption is, there has been no acquisition under the State Acquisition & Tenancy Act. Narendar Nath vs Municipal Committee 39 DLR (AD) 16. |
Narendar Nath vs Municipal Committee | 39 DLR (AD) 16 |
Section 3(4)(e) |
After the abolition of all rent receiving interests in the country there is only one class of tenancy under the Government whose rights and liabilities are governed by a uniform law. Government of Bangladesh vs Abani Kanta Chakrobory 38 DLR (AD) 93. |
Government of Bangladesh vs Abani Kanta Chakrobory | 38 DLR (AD) 93 |
Sections 3(1), 43(2), 46C and 46E(3) |
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions of the learned Advocates of the respective parties and on perusal of the Rule 42A of the State Acquisition Rules, 1955 as well as the application filed by the leave petitioner Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate dated 14-7-2002 and the gazette notifications dated 24-3-1952 and 29-2-1956 as well as ground rent payment receipts issued by the Government revenue office and earlier by the Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate and also the transfer made through registered deed of gift and having regard to the fact that the SA record of right and RS record of right were correctly prepared in the names of the writ petitioners and or their predecessors-in-interest in respect of their respective lands arid also the fact of admission, as to the possession of the writ petitioners in their respective case lands in the draft Mahanagar record of right, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division. The learned Advocate appearing for the leave petitioner, when confronted with the aforesaid gazette notifications dated 24-3-1952 and 29-2-1956, as to acquisition of rent receiving interest and the vesting of lands of the leave petitioners, including the case lands, found it difficult to substantiate the locus standi of the leave petitioner in challenging the draft records of right prepared in the names of the respective writ petitioners in respect of their respective case lands prepared during the Mohanagar Survey. Further, with the publication of the gazette notifications dated 24-3-1952 and 29-2-1956 the leave petitioner ceased to have any right, title and interest and possession in the case lands, because of acquisition, and vesting of said lands in the Government. Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate vs Rasheda Begum 15 BLC (AD) 115 |
Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate vs Rasheda Begum | 15 BLC (AD) 115 |
Section 9 |
Fourth Amendment of the section in 1951 provided that the amendment made shall have retrospective effect with effect from the very beginning. Shafiqur Rahman vs Idris Ali 37 DLR (AD) 71. |
Shafiqur Rahman vs Idris Ali | 37 DLR (AD) 71 |
Section 9 |
The appellants need not have joined the pre—emptor respondent because to join in the application for pre-emption filed by contiguous land—holder is unnecessary—Section 26F of Bengal Tenancy Act limited pre-emption to co—sharers only, either by purchase or by inheritance; it did not extend the right of preemption to a tenant having land contiguous to the land transferred. Shafiqur Rahman vs Idris Ali 37 DLR (AD) 71. |
Shafiqur Rahman vs Idris Ali | 37 DLR (AD) 71 |
Section 9 |
Transfer of land by rent receiver— Transfer of land up to ten bighas by the rent receiver after the publication of notice for acquisition whether valid—after the Amendment in 1961 no permission for such trnasfer was necessary—The amendment had retrospective effect. Mvi Haifzuddin Ahmed Vs. Mahabubul Huq and others, 4BLD (AD) 77. |
Mvi Haifzuddin Ahmed Vs. Mahabubul Huq and others | 4 BLD (AD) 77 |
Section 11 |
Title Suit– Chakran tenant– Question of limitation the appellate Court,
being the last Court of fact observed that the cause of action arose on
14.11.1999 when the defendants challenged the plaintiffs title, and the
defendants did not claim to have denied the plaintiffs title earlier.
|
.Amal Chandra Dhupi alias Das =VS= Lakshan Chandra Das | 10 LM (AD) 5 |
Section 19(1) |
High Court Division's failure to appreciate the approach and findings of
the lower appellate Court. A large part of the judgment is devoted to
defendant's weakness in the case including rejection of objection under
section 19(1) of State Acquisition and Tenancy Act which was wholly
unnecessary as it did not prove or strengthen the plaintiffs case.
|
Naim-uddin Sardar vs Md Abdul Kalam | 39 DLR (AD) 237 |
Sections 19(1), 22 |
Leave was granted to consider whether, in view of the provision of section 22 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 the learned judges of the High Court Division were wrong in holding that the lands in question were not liable to assessment of rent. In view of the provisions of section 22 of the Act all lands are subject to assessment and payment of rent. Bangladesh vs Zeenat Taxile Mills 40 DLR (AD) 189. |
Bangladesh vs Zeenat Taxile Mills | 40 DLR (AD) 189 |
Sections 19, 22, 23, 26 and 50 |
Rent of land — Whether an understanding that rent was not payable on an entry in the khatian showing lands to be rent-free can make it escape from payment of rent — The Government direction to pay rent in respect of the lands acquired for and delivered to the requiring body is in accordance with law — No declaration by the Court that the suit land is not liable to be assessed under the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act can be given — Government has no power to grant exemption from payment of rent in respect of lands mentiohed in the Act and if such exemption is granted it will be beyond its power. Bangladesh Vs. MIS. Zennath Textile Mills Limited and others, 8BLD(AD)189 |
Bangladesh Vs. MIS. Zennath Textile Mills Limited and others | 8 BLD (AD) 189 |
Sections 19 (2) and 53 |
Whether the High Court Division committed error of law in interfering with
the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below in the absence of any
legal infirmity in such findings ?
|
Sohel Ahmed and others -Vs.- Illias Ali Chowdhury being dead his heirs: Mubin Chowdhury | 9 ALR (AD) 44 |
Section 19A |
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Sarhab Ali Molla(Md.) =VS= Md. Farid Master | 14 LM (AD) 338 |
Section 20 r/w 90(3) |
Bangladesh Land Holding (Limitation) Order, 1972 (P.O.98 of 1972)
|
Bangladesh =VS= Ashiyan City Development Ltd. | 16 LM (AD) 486 |
Section 20(2a) |
Hat and Bazar—If a hat sits once a week regularly, then whether it will come under the mischief of the Act? If we read the “expression” particular days” in the definition of ‘hat or bazar together and give the necessary emphasis the word particular’ deserves, then it will be clear that ‘days’ will also include a day as well in view of sub-section (2) of section 13 of the General Clauses Act and in view of the history of the legislation of the acquisition of interest in hats and bazars by the Government. Government of Bangladesh Vs. Shakhipur Islamia High School, 12BLD(AD)170 |
Government of Bangladesh Vs. Shakhipur Islamia High School | 12 BLD (AD) 170 |
Section 20 |
Fishery non—retainable—Fishery’ is a non-retainable khas land under section 20 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act and it vested absolutely in the Government. Sharping Matsh&ibi Samabaya Samity Ltd. Vs. Bangladesh and others, 7BLD(AD) 106 |
Sharping Matsh&ibi Samabaya Samity Ltd. Vs. Bangladesh and others | 7 BLD (AD) 106 |
Section 20(2a) |
Land or building in hat or Bazar are non-retainable which vest in
Government—
|
Bangladesh and another Vs. Money' Kumar Roy Chowdhury | 1 MLR (AD) 165 |
Section 20 |
The High Court Division took correct view that the plaintiff could not prove that the ex-landlord auction purchased he suit land and made the same khas and thereafter, the same vested in the Government as excess non-retainable khas land of the ex-landlord. But no paper has been produced by the plaintiff in that respect to show that the Provisions of section 20 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 were duly complied with in the matter of acquisition of khas lands in excess of the limit imposed by law. Bangladesh vs Md Ali Khondker 12 BLC (AD) 160. |
Bangladesh vs Md Ali Khondker | 12 BLC (AD) 160 |
Section 20(2a) |
The submission of the learned Counsel is of no merit since prepa ration of the compensation assessment roll and the publication thereof has the legal presumption that the land claimed by the plaintiffs is of non-retainable class of land and that as on the publication of the compensation assessment roll in the gazette, the land has vested in the Government the plaintiffs are not entitled to raise any claim in the land and, as such, relief sought in the suit was not available to them. Gopal Das Soni vs Bangladeshi BLC (AD) 69. |
Gopal Das Soni vs Bangladeshi | BLC (AD) 69 |
Section 20, 90 & 86 |
Appellate Division sum up as under:
|
Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah | 3 LM (AD) 74 |
Sections 20(4A), and 20(5) |
Tarapur Tea Estate– The transfer of the tea estate was made by resorting
forgery, inasmuch as, the writ petitioners procured a forged permission.
Secondly, it is reported that after taking possession, the writ petitioners
set up a medical college and established a housing estate and a market.
Naturally they demolished the tea plantations and used the land for
commercial purpose which is not permissible under any law of the land.
|
Ministry of land, Bangladesh =VS= Abdul Hye | 9 LM (AD) 230 |
Section 22 |
In view of the express provisions of section 22 even the Government cannot, by an order or agreement, exempt any land from assessment of rent, for the words used in the section are mandatory, namely, "all lands shall be subject to the payment of fair and equitable rents. Bangladesh vs Zeenat Taxtitle Mills 40 DLR (AD) 189. |
Bangladesh vs Zeenat Taxtitle Mills | 40 DLR (AD) 189 |
Sections 42,43 & 44 |
Provisions made in the sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Act point to inevitable conclusions that every interest which is liable to be acquired under the Act has to be paid for and that except in the cases of acquisition under Chapter-II of the Act the Interests which are acquirable vest in the Government only if assessment of compensation in regard to the same has been made and published as provided in the Act. Government of Bangladesh vs Abdul MotalebU BLC (AD) 50. |
Government of Bangladesh vs Abdul Motaleb | BLC (AD) 50 |
Sections 43(2) & 44(3) |
Publication of a notification in the official Gazette declaring that a compensation assessment-roll has been finally published for a village specifying in such notification the date of the final publication of the compensation assessment-roll is a conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof. After the said notification all interests of tenants in respect of their non-retainable property would vest in the Government with effect from the first day of the agricultural year next following the date of publication. Even if there be any defect in the preparation and publication of the compensation assessment-roll that by itself shall not stand in the way of the vesting. Ali Akbar (Md) vs Government of Bangladesh 50 DLR (AD) 143. |
Ali Akbar (Md) vs Government of Bangladesh | 50 DLR (AD) 143 |
Section 43 (2) Read with Section-44 (3) |
Publication of a notification in the official gazette declaring .that a compensation assessment-roll has been finally published for a village or group of villages or local area as the case may be, speci1ring in such notification the date of the final publication of the compensation assessment-roll, as required under section 43 (2) is a conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof. After the said notification all interests of tenants in respect of their non-returnable property would vest in the Government under section 44 (3) of the said Act with effect from the first day of the agricultural year next following the date of publication of such notification in the official gazette. Even if there be any defect in the preparation and publication of the compensation assessment-roll that by itself shall not stand in the way of the vesting. [Para-9] Md. Ali Akbar Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh & Ors. 5 BLT (AD)-145 |
Md. Ali Akbar Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh & Ors. | 5 BLT (AD) 145 |
Sections 43(2) and 72 |
Once notification under sub-section (2) of section 43 of the Act is published in the official gazette, such notification is conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof and section 72 of the Act bars a civil Court from entertaining any suit in respect of the preparation, signing and publication of a Compensation Assessment Roll or any Part thereof under Chapter V or Chapter VA of the Act. Bangladesh represented by the Secretary Ministry of L.A. and LR Vs Chowdhury Tanbir Ahmed Siddiky, 17 BLD (AD) 131. |
Bangladesh represented by the Secretary Ministry of L.A. and LR Vs Chowdhury Tanbir Ahmed Siddiky | 17 BLD (AD) 131 |
Sections 48(4) 51 & 55 |
Since the Special Judge is a 'Court' such Court is subordinate to the High Court Division. Any order passed by a Special Judge is amenable to the High Court Division under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Government of Bangladesh vs Abdul MotalebU BLC (AD) 50. |
Government of Bangladesh vs Abdul Motaleb | BLC (AD) 50 |
Sections 51 and 81A |
Pre-emption—Non-agricultural land— Omission of sub-section (2) and (3) in section 81 and insertion of section 81A in State Acquisition and Tenancy Act have not rendered section 24 of Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act ineffective or impliedly repealed—Section 24 of Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and not section 96 of State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is applicable for pre-emption of land falling within Municipal area. Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others, 1BLD(AD)269 |
Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others | 1 BLD (AD) 269 |
Section 75A |
No estoppel against Statute—Whether this rule of law can be invoked by one to take advantage of his own fraud?—The rule is attracted only when its invocation will defeat the public policy behind statute—If, in disregard of the obligation imposed by section 75A upon the landlord he has alienated his land he cannot subsequently raise an objection to nullify his own auction—The plaintiff—appellant has filed the suit certainly not for the benefit of the Government. nor can there be any reason to suppose that the statutory provisions would be nullified if the declaration sought for is not granted—If he is allowed to succeed it will allow him to take advantage of his own fraud—Evidence Act, 1 872 (I of 1872), S. 115. Sree Sudir Chandra Saha and another Vs Matuan Bewa, being dead her heirs Nazmul Rahman Sarker and others, 6BLD (AD)182 |
Sree Sudir Chandra Saha and another Vs Matuan Bewa, being dead her heirs Nazmul Rahman Sarker and others | 6 BLD (AD) 182 |
Section 76 |
In respect of fisheries which are governed by section 76 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, in the absence of rules framed thereof the Government must follow some standards or guidelines, and must not act arbitrarily. SMS Samity vs Bangladesh 39 DLR (AD) 85. |
SMS Samity vs Bangladesh | 39 DLR (AD) 85 |
Section 76 |
Family— What it means— The expression ‘family’ is to be understood in the height of the given enactment—In so far as settlement of khas land is concerned the expression ‘family’ has not been used in definite sense—The emphasis is only that the land should be cultivable by himself or by members of the family— Evidence was led by the plaintiff to prove that his nephew ploughed the land who resided with him—This evidence was not rebutted—So it cannot be said that the plaintiff did not answer the description of the persons to whom settlement could be made. Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Syeduddin Ahmed, 4 BLD (AD) 61. |
Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Syeduddin Ahmed | 4 BLD (AD) 61 |
Sections 76 and 148 |
Settlement of Government khas land— Whether can be made to Government servants. their children of female members of the family of a Government servant—Whether such settlement is valid by lapse of time—No settlement of Government khas land can be made in favoui of Government servants, their children or female members of their family— the plaintiff respondents being sons of a Government servant were not entitled to take settlement of Government khas land—Any settlement granted in violation of express provisions of law and Government Circular cannot become valid by any lapse of time—There is no provision of law to cure such illegality—In view of the fraud subsequently revealed vitiating the transaction, delay is no bar to the cancellation. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Maymensingh and others Vs. Satyendra Kishore Roy; 6BLD(AD)169 |
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Maymensingh and others Vs. Satyendra Kishore Roy | 6 BLD (AD) 169 |
Section 76 |
Government’s right to deal with its properties by granting lease or
license--- Lease or license granted by the Government— Whether Government
is entitled to deal with its property in any manner it likes or award a
contract to any person it chooses without any constitutional limit upon
it—Lease or licence to use Government property is regulated by the state
for the welfare of its people—Lease of fishery exclusively owned by the
Government is a new kind of wealth which the Government distributes by way
of settlement amongst the class of people who deserves it— In doing so
Government was to enter into agreement but such lease agreement can by no
stretch of imagination be termed as ordinary contract entered into by two
individuals as trading ventures—On the other hand, when the Government
deals with this new kind of wealth for the welfare of the citizens and
regulates distribution of such wealth by way of settlement or lease, the
Government acts in its sovereign capacity—When authority over- steps or
commits breach of rule or even commits breach of principle of natural
justice the same can be challenged by filing writ petition—Government
Estate Manual, 1958, Rules 205 and 206.
|
Sharping Matshajibi Shamabaya Sainity Ltd. Vs. Bangladesh and others | 7 BLD (AD 106 |
Section 81A(2) |
Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, Sections—85(2) and 24
|
Md. Mosaddeque Hossain Vs. Dr. Esmat Mirza and others | 18 BLD (AD) 57 |
Section 81A |
Transfer of the Property Act
|
Abdul Halim Gaznabi =VS= M.M. Badsha Shirazi | 15 LM (AD) 529 |
Section 81 |
Section 81 of the Tenancy Act authorised the Government to lease out khas
land to a leasee for any particular period and the rights and liabilities
of the lease shall be governed by the terms and conditions as may be set
forth in the lease
|
Most. Sharbanu Khatun -Vs.- Md. Nahurul Islam and others | 8 ALR (AD) 197 |
Section 86(1)(2)(3) |
Section 86(1)(2)(3) as amended by State Acquisition and Tenancy (Fourth
Amendment) Order, 1972. (President's Order No. 135 of 1972) dated
4-11-1972.
|
Syed Nizamuddin Mohsin vs Bangladesh | 41 DLR (AD) 141 |
Section 86 |
Diluvion and extinguishment of tenant’s right—When diluvion had taken place before commencement of P.O. No. 135 of 1972 and the lands reappeared before the commencement of the Order, the right, title and interest of the tenant got extinguished with the diluvion—The lands having reappeared before the commencement of the Order, it vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances to be at its disposal until the tenant’s right to re-possession was finally recognised by a competent authority—Presidents Order No. 135 of 1972, Article. 2. Syed Nizamuddin Mohsin being dead his heirs Vs. People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others, 9BLD(AD)116 |
Syed Nizamuddin Mohsin being dead his heirs Vs. People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others | 9 BLD (AD) 116 |
Section 86(2) (3) |
STATE ACQUISITION AND TENANCY (4TH AMENDMENT) ORDER, 1972
|
Ganaprajatantri Bangladesh Sarker Vs. Joinal Abedin Dewan and others | 15 BLD (AD) 234 |
Section 86(2) (3) (5) |
The right, title and interest of the original tenant or his successor-in-interest shall subsist in the land during period of loss by diluvion if such lands re-appear in situ within 30 years of their loss. Under Section 86(3) the collector is to take immediate possession of the land and under section 86(5) the collector would allot the land to the tenant whose land was diluviated. .....Nurul Anwar Chowdhury =VS= DC, Cox’s Bazar, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 30] ....View Full Judgment |
Nurul Anwar Chowdhury =VS= DC, Cox’s Bazar | 15 LM (AD) 30 |
Section 86(5) |
Deputy Commissioner, Cox's Bazar was the only writ-respondent and he not being the original owner of the suit land, his admission, denial or silence has no bearing upon the original title-holders–– The observation made by Appellate Division holding that "there is no denial that the writ petitioner was the successor-in- interest of the land in question by purchase" which is an error apparent on the face of the record, because the Deputy Commissioner, Cox's Bazar was the only writ-respondent and he not being the original owner of the suit land, his admission, denial or silence has no bearing upon the original title-holders which would only be decided in the other Class suit No. 42 of 2012. ––This Civil Appeal is disposed of. The Parties are directed to maintain status-quo in respect of possession and position of the disputed land. The Joint District Judge, 1st Court, Cox’s Bazar is directed to hear and dispose of the Title Suit No. 42 of 2012 within 1(one) year from date. The Judgment and order passed in writ petition No. 98 of 2010, C.P No. 2120 of 2011 and the present civil Appeal being No. 344 of 2019 will have no bearing effect to decide the said suit. .....Nurul Anwar Chowdhury =VS= DC, Cox’s Bazar, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 30] ....View Full Judgment |
Nurul Anwar Chowdhury =VS= DC, Cox’s Bazar | 15 LM (AD) 30 |
Section 86 |
Section 86 by Act XV of 1994 would be prospective in operation and that the new provision would not be applicable in respect of those land which were diluviated and alluviated prior to that date, that is to say, the said land would be treated as khas land of the Government in accordance with the old provision. .....Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 74] ....View Full Judgment |
Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah | 3 LM (AD) 74 |
Section 86 |
The amendment is prospective in operation and the High Court Division is not correct in giving retrospective operation of the substituted provision of sub-section (2) of section 86 of the Act of 1950. .....Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 74] ....View Full Judgment |
Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah | 3 LM (AD) 74 |
Section 87 |
Accretion of land to the holding of a tenant—If such accretion is by artificial or mechanical process due to development work—Whether such increment will form part of the holding of the tenant—As the suit was filed in 1963 and Ordinance No. VIII of 1967 was not retrospective in nature the accretion of the land to the holding due to development work would not deprive the plaintiff from the same—Plaintiffs suit is not also hit by abatement clause nor his right is disturbed by the operation of sub-section (2) because the provision is also not retrospective but prospective. Makku Mian and others Vs. Ali Hossain Buiyan and others, 4BLD (AD) 209 |
Makku Mian and others Vs. Ali Hossain Buiyan and others | 4 BLD (AD) 209 |
Section 87 |
The High Court Division correctly concurred with the findings of the appellate Court that the land in question was accreted land and the plaintiffs took lease from the Government in the year 1970 under Section 87 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act and they have been in possession for long 32 years and correctly decreed the suit. Zahur Ali Sk vs Jogendra Nath Samaddar 16 BLC (AD) 35. |
Zahur Ali Sk vs Jogendra Nath Samaddar | 16 BLC (AD) 35 |
Section 89 |
Distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land in making a gift
by a Muslim—There is not indication in section 129 of T.P. Act
restricting its application to any particular class of land—After the
enactment of S.A.T. Act very little distinction is maintained between
incidents of agricultural land and non-agricultural land.
|
Jobed Ali Vs. Abu Sheikh being dead his heirs Md. Naimuddin and others | 3 BLD (AD) 1 |
Sections 89 and 96 |
State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Rabiul Islam (Md) =VS= Sultan Mahmud | 13 LM (AD) 490 |
Sections 89, 96 |
Evidence Act, 1872
|
Matiar Rahman Bhuiyan =VS= Md. Ekram Hossain Bhuiyan | 16 LM (AD) 1 |
Sections 89 and 96 |
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Md. Habibur Rahman Bhuiyan and others -Vs- Mosammat Galman Begum and others | 1 ALR (AD) 133 |
Sections 90 and 96 |
Pre-emption under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885)—Whether the same can be allowed in favour of the pre-emptor applicant who admitedly owns more than 100 bighas of land exceeding the land ceiling prescribed by PO No. 98 of 1972— The question of land holding limitation upto 100 bighas of land does not arise as the Munsifs order was passed in 1967 when there was no law limiting and holding to 100 bighas. Appeal dismissed. Azizur Rahman vs Bhayetullah 40 DLR (AD) 224. |
Azizur Rahman vs Bhayetullah | 40 DLR (AD) 224 |
Section 90 |
The suit land compromises 99 acres which is located in the coastal area. There is no doubt that the suit land is the government khas land. Therefore, the lease was made in violation of section 90 of the State Acquisition of Tenancy Act. We would like to observe here that the government cannot lease out any khas land to any person in violation of law. If the government wants to lease out the suit land such lease should be granted in due process of law keeping in mind the prevailing law of the land. .....Government of Bangladesh =VS= Messers Friends Industries Corporation, (Civil), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 202] ....View Full Judgment |
Government of Bangladesh =VS= Messers Friends Industries Corporation | 4 LM (AD) 202 |
Section 92(4) |
Limitation —Question of limitation in a suit seeking declaration that the proceedings u/s. 92 S.A.T. Act was void—Since no notice was issued by the Revenue Officer under sub- Usufructuary mortgage—Limitation for section (3) of Section 92 of the S.A.T. Act inviting any objection against the taking over of the holding as “aboadnoned “ holding the period of limitation prescribed in that section will not be applicable—The suit attracts the general provisions of Limitation Act under Article 120 of the Limitation Act—Limitation Act, 1908(IX of 1908), Art. 120. Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Sailesh Chandra Bhattacharya, 4BLD (AD) 295 |
Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Sailesh Chandra Bhattacharya | 4 BLD (AD) 295 |
Section 92 |
Escheat —Question of onus — When the claim is founded on escheat the
onus lies on the claimant to show that the owner of the estate died
without. Heir—A child of a prostitute mother under the Hindu Law did not
escheat to the Government as the Government failed to prove that the owner
died intestate without leaving any heir. (Per B.H. Chowdhury, J).
|
Geeta Rani Dasi alias Shamina Khatun Vs. Bangladesh | 5 BLD (AD) 13 |
Section 92 |
The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
|
Government of Bangladesh =VS= Md. Abdul Malek | 4 LM (AD) 216 |
Section 95 & 95A |
The legislative intent of section 95A is that cases of sale attended with agreement for recoveyance whether or not registered would be within the ambit of complete usufructuary mortgage for a period of 7 years and provisions of section 95(4)(5) would apply to such transfers. A contrary view would make the provision of section 95A nugatory and frustrate its purpose. Abdus Salam Sheikh and others vs Puspa Rani Shil and others 49 DLR (AD) 71. |
Abdus Salam Sheikh and others vs Puspa Rani Shil and others | 49 DLR (AD) 71 |
Sections 95 & 95A |
President's Order No. 88 of 1972 created special forum for restoration of mortgaged property. But it did not take away right of redemption available to a mortgagor by filing a mortgage suit. Asmat Ali vs Abdur Rafique Mridha and others 52 DLR (AD) 132. |
Asmat Ali vs Abdur Rafique Mridha and others | 52 DLR (AD) 132 |
Section 95A |
Redemption suit–
|
Belayeth Hossain =VS= Nasrin Akhter | 7 LM (AD) 40 |
Section 95A |
The appellant sold the land to respondent No. 1 by Kabala dated 24.6.1967 and the agreement for reconveyance of the said land executed on the same day stipulated a period of 4 (four) years from the said date. The time for reconveyance expired on 23.6.1971 — so the transaction cannot be said to be alive and subsisting on the date of promulgation of P.O. No. 88 of 1972, i.e. on 3.8.1972, section 95A will have no application to the transaction which was past and closed — appeal dismissed with cost. [Paras-7 & 10] Abdul Kaleque Samarnath Vs Abdul Kaleque Samarnath & Ors. 3BLT (AD)-140. |
Abdul Kaleque Samarnath Vs Abdul Kaleque Samarnath & Ors. | 3 BLT (AD) 140 |
Section 95A |
Cases of sale attended with agreement for reconveyance whether or not registered would be Within the ambit of complete usufructuary mortgage for a period of 7 years and provisions of Section 95 (4) (5) would apply to such transfers. A contrary view would clearly make the provision of Section 95A nugatory and frustrate its purpose. [Para-6] Abdus Salam Sheikh & Ors Vs. Pusspa Rani Shil & Ors. 5 BLT (AD)-58 |
Abdus Salam Sheikh & Ors Vs. Pusspa Rani Shil & Ors. | 5 BLT (AD) 58 |
Section 95A Read with Section-95(4) and (5) |
Respondent No. 4 sold .87 acres of land to the appellant by a registered kabala dated 11.1.1965 corresponding to 27th Poush 1371 B.S and handed over the possession of the said land to the appellant. On the same date a contemporaneous agreement was made between the appellant and respondent No. 4 to the effect that the appellant would enjoy the usufruct of the land for 5 years with effect from first Ashar 1371 B.S. toAgrahayan 1376 B.S. and if the respondent could return the entire consideration money to the appellant within the next 2 years starting from the month of Poush 1376 B.S. then the respondent would get back the land and in case of failure of the respondent to repay the consideration money within the stipulated period he would have no right to claim the land or anything from the appellant — In order to recover the disputed land under the agreement which expired on 10.1.72 long before the promulgation of P.O. No. 88 of 1972 on 3,8.72, respondent No. 4 filed R.P. Case No. 67 of 1973 on 25.6.1973 against the appellant for redemption of the land which was allowed — Held : It was a case of an out and out sale with a contemporaneous agreement for reconveyance — relied on 32 DLR (AD) 233 — the appeal is allowed. [Para- 15] Anwaruddin Bepari Vs. The Asst. Comm. (Land) & Ors. 4 BLT (AD)-52 |
Anwaruddin Bepari Vs. The Asst. Comm. (Land) & Ors. | 4 BLT (AD) 52 |
Section 95 |
Usufructury motagage- Limitation for redemption—Period for which mortgage can Inviting any objection against the taking over be entered into not to be confused with the of the holding as abandoned’ holding, the period of limitation for redemption—Limitation period of limitation prescribed in that section Act 1908 (IX of 1908) Article—148. Moulvi Abu Bakkar Vs. Nazir Ahmed, 2 BLD (AD) 151. |
Moulvi Abu Bakkar Vs. Nazir Ahmed | 2 BLD (AD) 151 |
Section 95A |
Section 95A of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act as amended by P.O. 88
of 1972, P.O. 136 of 1972 and P.0.24 of 1973 is not discriminatory and does
not violate fundamental right relating to property.
|
Bangladesh Vs. Haji Abdul Gani Biswas and others | 1 BLD (AD) 8 |
Section 95A |
Usufructuary mortgage—A transfer of a holding by way of an out and out sale with an agreement to recovery or whether the transferor receives from the transferee any consideration and the transferee acquires the right to possess and enjoy the usufruct of such holding etc. for a specified period in lieu of such consideration, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the documents relating to the transfer, be deemed to be a complete usufructuary mortgage for a period not exceeding 7 years. Asmatunnessa and others Vs. Tenu Khan and another, 12BLD(AD)216 |
Asmatunnessa and others Vs. Tenu Khan and another | 12 BLD (AD) 216 |
Section 95A |
The kabala under pre-emption was not an out and out sale deed but a kot
kabala and as such, the same was not pre-emptable–
|
Dadan Biswas =VS= Abdul Barek Bepari | 1 LM (AD) 203 |
Section 95A |
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Abdul Hamid Gayeen(Md.) =VS= Abdul Karim Khan | 11 LM (AD) 629 |
Section 96 |
Consideration of the documents as to the devolution of the vendor's interest on the pre—emptor did not materially affect the decision. Bhupati Ranjan Shame & others vs Afizuddin Sheikh 40 DLR (AD) 264. |
Bhupati Ranjan Shame & others vs Afizuddin Sheikh | 40 DLR (AD) 264 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption—Co-sharer in one of the plots of the holding is a co-sharer in the holding—Impleading of a co-sharer, whether by inheritance or by purchase, in an application for pre-emption under section 96 of the Act is mandatory—Omission to implead a co-sharer in the application renders the pre-emption application liable to be dismissed for defect of party. Sultan Ahmed vs Akhtaruzzaman 42 DLR (AD) 1. |
Sultan Ahmed vs Akhtaruzzaman | 42 DLR (AD) 1 |
Section 96 |
The omission to implead a co-sharer was pointed out at the earlier point of time, but the same was not rectified—In the circumstances, the order of the trial Court which was restored by the High Court was not sustainable. Sultan Ahmed vs Akhtaruzzaman 42 DLR (AD) 1. |
Sultan Ahmed vs Akhtaruzzaman | 42 DLR (AD) 1 |
Section 96 |
Long line of decisions of the erstwhile Dhaka High Court has followed the principle that the date of accrual of the right of pre-emption is not the date of execution of the same deed· but the date of registration under section 60 of the Registration Act. Abdul Motalib vs Iman Ali Mollah 42 DLR (AD) 123. |
Abdul Motalib vs Iman Ali Mollah | 42 DLR (AD) 123 |
Section 96 |
As a rule no amendment is allowed where its effect will take away any legal
right, which might have accrued by lapse of time. Here the transferee has
failed to show what legal right had accrued to him which will be washed
away by allowing the amendment—Then again as a rule the Court refused an
amendment if the amendment introduces a totally new and inconsistent case
which may require further evidence to be adduced by the opponent—In this
case no legal right accrued to the respondent except the right of rateable
pre-emption—The amendment is allowed and it will relate back to the date
of the institution of the pre-emption case.
|
Shushil Ranjan Dutta vs Al-Haj Moulvi Idris Mia | 42 DLR (AD) 110 |
Section 96 |
Right of pre-emption—Waiver and acquiescence in pre-emption: Facts proved in a particular case may give rise to waiver and acquiescence and a pre-emptor may be held to be estopped from enforcing his right of pre-emption. It will be a question of proper inference from the facts provided in each particular case as to whether the plea of waiver and acquiescence exists or not. Akhlasur Rahman vs Safarullah 42 DLR (AD) 189. |
Akhlasur Rahman vs Safarullah | 42 DLR (AD) 189 |
Section 96 |
Right of pre-emption—Nature of the right—The foundation of the right is avoidance of inconvenience and disturbance which would arise from the introduction of a stranger into the land. Law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disability upon ownership of a property to the extent that it restricts the owner's unfettered right of sale and compels him to sell the property to his cosharer or neighbour. The benefit and the burden of the right of pre-emption run with the land and can be enforced by and against the owner of the land for the time being. The right can be waived or relinquished at an earlier date than on the date of actual completion of sale under the law or thereafter. Akhlasur Rahman vs Safarullah 42 DLR (AD) 189. |
Akhlasur Rahman vs Safarullah | 42 DLR (AD) 189 |
Section 96 |
When a valid order under section 117 of State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is given, the court is not competent to ignore the said order when disposing of a case under section 96 of the said Act. M Banik vs Nitya Ranjan 39 DLR (AD) 75. |
M Banik vs Nitya Ranjan | 39 DLR (AD) 75 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption—Cause of action —Cause of action for pre-emption accrues on the date of registration of a sale deed when registration is compulsory, because the right to pre-emption arises on completion of a transfer. If a pre-emption application is filed before registration of the sale deed, it is not to be dismissed on the ground of pre—maturity if the same is registered during the pendency of preemption proceeding. Ayesha Khatun vs Jahanara Begum 43 DLR (AD) 9. |
Ayesha Khatun vs Jahanara Begum | 43 DLR (AD) 9 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption–
|
Anwar Hossain @ Babul Miah (Md) =VS= Hakimuddin | 7 LM (AD) 45 |
Section 96 |
Muktipatra—Its real import The pre-emptee failed to prove his motive for acquisition of the case land in the benami of Swapan Kumar—the question of deed of release by him in favour of pre-emptor Momtaz Ali does not arise and so the impugned deed is a transfer deed. The judgment of the High Court Division is liable to be set aside and the pre-emptor is entitled to the pre-emption. Abdur Rashid vs Momtaz Ali Karikar 44 DLR (AD) 270. |
Abdur Rashid vs Momtaz Ali Karikar | 44 DLR (AD) 270 |
Section 96 |
Right of pre-emption— Waiver and acquiescence—Statutory right of pre-emption cannot be taken away by mere verbal assurance of the person having such right, unless other facts and circumstances clearly make out a case of acquiescence or waiver. Fazaruddin vs Maijuddin 44 DLR (AD) 62. |
Fazaruddin vs Maijuddin | 44 DLR (AD) 62 |
Section 96 |
The right of pre-emption accrued to the pre-emptor is not affected by the subsequent acquisition of co-shareship by the pre-emptee. Abdul Baten vs Abdul Latif Sheikh 45 DLR (AD) 26. |
Abdul Baten vs Abdul Latif Sheikh | 45 DLR (AD) 26 |
Section 96 |
Right of pre-emption is a heritable right—In a pending proceeding the heirs are entitled to be substituted in the place of the deceased pre-emptor so as to proceed with the case. Inu Mia and others vs Mokhlesur Rahman & others 45 DLR (AD) 171. |
Inu Mia and others vs Mokhlesur Rahman & others | 45 DLR (AD) 171 |
Section 96 |
Principle of contiguity— Preemption in respect of two plots transferred when cannot be allowed—Admittedly the pre-emptor 's land, plot No. 2575, is contiguous to plot No. 2574, but it is not contiguous to plot No. 2573. If both these plots were closely contiguous to each other and formed a compact block of land, then only the principle could be applied. Jahiruddin Mollah vs Hosne Ara Begum 45 DLR (AD) 118. |
Jahiruddin Mollah vs Hosne Ara Begum | 45 DLR (AD) 118 |
Section 96 |
Since the Khatians are different the pre-emptor cannot be held to be a co-sharer in the case holding and as such she is not entitled to pre-emption. Fatema Bibi vs Sree Manik Lal Somaddar & others 50 DLR (AD) 97. |
Fatema Bibi vs Sree Manik Lal Somaddar & others | 50 DLR (AD) 97 |
Section 96 |
Subsequent becoming of co-sharers by inheritance during pendency of the case cannot alter the character and status of the original pre-emptor. Momtazuddin Sarker and others vs Abdur Rob and others 53 DLR (AD) 67. |
Momtazuddin Sarker and others vs Abdur Rob and others | 53 DLR (AD) 67 |
Section 96(1) |
There being no evidence of record by the pre-emptee challenging the date of knowledge of the pre-emptor about the transfer of the land, the contention that the application for pre-emption is barred by limitation is untenable in law. Jafar Ali vs Hushiar Ali 46 DLR (AD) 187. |
Jafar Ali vs Hushiar Ali | 46 DLR (AD) 187 |
Section 96(1)(4) clause (b) of sec. 96 (6)— |
Court's direction to make deposit in case of rateable pre-emption.
|
Abdul Hadi Bepari vs Safaruddin Mondal | 38 DLR (AD) 265 |
Section 96(3)(b) |
The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants canvassed that it was
statutory obligation on the part of the pre-emptor to deposit the balance
consideration within the period and since he failed to do so the prayer was
illegally granted. This point has no substance.
|
Serina Begum vs Mafizul Islam | 42 DLR (AD) 77 |
Section 96( 4) |
Transferee—co-sharer—His right to purchase when lost— The pre-emptee tried to resist the claim of the pre-emptor but did not join in the application for pre-emption. Such pre-emptee cannot be granted relief in the name of even—handed justice on the ground that the parties being co—sharers by purchase stood on equal footing. Golchera Khatun vs Sayera Khatoon 45 DLR (AD) 133. |
Golchera Khatun vs Sayera Khatoon | 45 DLR (AD) 133 |
Section 96(10)(c) |
A cousin sister's son is within three degrees of consanguinity from the donor. Shamsul Islam and others vs Badiar Zaman alias Bablu and another 48 DLR (AD) 88. |
Shamsul Islam and others vs Badiar Zaman alias Bablu and another | 48 DLR (AD) 88 |
Section 96 |
Defect of parties—As a matter of fact, some of the S.A. recorded tenants as appeared from the khatian filed in this case have been omitted. In view of the legal position the application for pre-emption was not legally maintainable for non-impleading necessary parties in the pre-emption proceeding. [Para- 12] Indrojit Kundu & Ors Vs. Biswajit Kundu & Ors 7 BLT (AD)-386 |
Indrojit Kundu & Ors Vs. Biswajit Kundu & Ors | 7 BLT (AD) 386 |
Section 96 |
The land in question was transferred by a kabala dated 18-1-78 and
registered on 22-1-81 the respondents knew of the transfer long before the
date of registration and as such limitation will start from the date of
this knowledge as contended by the petitioners Advocate.
|
Md. Moslem Uddin & Anr Vs Md. Abdul Hakim & Ors. | 3 BLT (AD) 134 |
Section 96 |
In the present case admittedly the application for pre-emption was filed after 7 years of transfer and a heavy burden lies on the pre-emptor to discharge the onus of proof that he filed the case within four months from the date of his knowledge. The pre-emptor having failed to discharge the initial onus by adducing cogent and reliable evidence the learned Single Judge ought to have held that the application for pre-emption is barred by limitation. [Para- 13] Abdul Mazid Howlader & Anr Vs. Lahajuddin Howlader & Ors. 4 BLT (AD)-275 |
Abdul Mazid Howlader & Anr Vs. Lahajuddin Howlader & Ors. | 4 BLT (AD) 275 |
Section 96 (10) (c) |
Read with Section-23 of Succession Act, 1925
|
Shamsul Islam & Ors. Vs. Badiar Zarnan & Anr | 4 BLT (AD) 12 |
Section 96(3), 96(4) |
The State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Mosharaf Hossain(Md.) =VS= Mst. Rekha Khatun | 10 LM (AD) 91 |
Section 96 |
The right of pre-emption is not a right to the land sold but a right to the offer of the land about to be sold. If a pre-emptor waives or gives up his right without raising any objection to the sale in favour of third party, the Court may hold that pre-emptor has already given up his right. From the pleadings and evidence adduced by the pre-emptees it appears that the pre-emptors had voluntarily abandoned their known right. There are cogent evidence reflecting the pre-emptors conduct which clearly established the abandonment of such right. It was argued by the pre-emptor respondents that the right of pre-emption could accrue to the pre-emptors only after sale of the land by the vendor, and thus they could not be said to have waived it by their refusal to purchase the case land before its actual sale to the pre-emptors . The right of pre-emption can be waived even before sale, by express refusal to purchase the case land or by conduct reflecting clearly that the pre-emptors were not interested in its purchase. ...Iqbal Hossain Talukder(Md.) =VS= Most. Siddika Begum, (Civil), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 143] ....View Full Judgment |
Iqbal Hossain Talukder(Md.) =VS= Most. Siddika Begum | 10 LM (AD) 143 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption– The appellate Court set aside the order of the trial Court
upon holding that the right to preemption must subsist till the conclusion
of the pre-emption case. When the case was decided by the trial Court on
13.05.1992 Chandra Kumar and Bashanta Kumar no longer owned any land in the
case jote and therefore they had no subsisting right to pre-empt the case
land.
|
Kamrun Nahar =VS= Mariam Begum | 10 LM (AD) 306 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption– The lower appellate Court did not properly assess the evidence on record and the reversal of the findings of the trial Court was not based on correct appreciation of the deposition of the witnesses– We are of the view that the appellate Court came to a finding without properly assessing the evidence of the witnesses. The pre-emptor’s claim of knowledge 15 years after the pre-emptee’s purchase of the case land is not supported by any witness. In our view the trial Court correctly dismissed the case for pre-emption upon finding that the application is barred by limitation. Hence, we are of the view that the reversal of the order of the trial Court by the appellate Court was not in accordance with law and the High Court Division erred in upholding the erroneous judgement and order of the appellate Court. We find merit in the appeal, which is allowed. The judgement and order of the High Court Division as well as those of the appellate Court are hereby set aside and the judgement of the trial Court is restored. ...Sree Probitra Mohan Sutradhar =VS= Md. Asgar Miah, (Civil), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 600] ....View Full Judgment |
Sree Probitra Mohan Sutradhar =VS= Md. Asgar Miah | 10 LM (AD) 600 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption--Provisions of section 96(2) regarding joinder of necessary parties is mandatory and not merely directory—Consequence of non-joinder Of necessary parties in spite of objection taken is the same in pre-emption proceeding as in suits. Abdus Samad and others Vs. Md. Soharab Au and others, 1BLD(AD) 77 |
Abdus Samad and others Vs. Md. Soharab Au and others | 1 BLD (AD) 77 |
Section 96(2) |
Pre-emption—Necessary Parties —Cosharers and contiguous landholders—lmpleading of such persons not necessary if they have not subsisting right of pre-emption or have waived their right of pre-emption. Md. Abdul Jalil Vs. Durjan All alias Siddique Hossain and others, 1BLD (AD) 241 |
Md. Abdul Jalil Vs. Durjan All alias Siddique Hossain and others | 1 BLD (AD) 241 |
Section 96(2) |
Burden of Proof—Onus of proof that the left-out co-sharer has no subsisting right of pre-emption is upon the pre-emptor. Md. Abdul Jalil Vs. Durjan All alias Siddique Hossain and others, 1BLD (AD)241 |
Md. Abdul Jalil Vs. Durjan All alias Siddique Hossain and others | 1 BLD (AD) 241 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption—Application for preemption by contiguous landholder—Preemptor’s land contiguous to some of the plots transferred, but the plots transferred are contiguous to each other and in a compact block— Pre-emptor entitled to pre-empt all the plots transferred—Pre-emption is allowed to help consolidation and amalgamation of holdings. Haji Tajamal All Vs. Abdus Sattar and others, 3BLD (AD) 6 |
Haji Tajamal All Vs. Abdus Sattar and others | 3 BLD (AD) 6 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption—Application for pre-emption filed before the registration of the kabala in question was complete—Application premature—Prematurity can be cured if at the time of the trial the kabala was registered, otherwise prematurity would remain—When the question of prematurity was raised only at the appellate stage and registration was complete during the pendency of the appeal, prematurity held cured at the appellate stage. Lebu Miah Vs. Ganesh Chandra Nath and others, 3 BLD (AD)57 |
Lebu Miah Vs. Ganesh Chandra Nath and others | 3 BLD (AD) 57 |
Section 96 (10)(a) |
Transfer to co-sharer by inheritance— not pre-emptible—Transfer to a co-sharer whose interest in the tenancy accrued by inheritance cannot be pre-empted—Even if the father of such cosharer acquired interest in the tenancy by purchase he is a cosharer by inheritance—Transfer to such a cosharer by inheritance is immune from pre-emption. Abdul Haque Miah and another Vs. Abdur Rashid and others, 3BLD(AD)103 |
Abdul Haque Miah and another Vs. Abdur Rashid and others | 3 BLD (AD) 103 |
Section 96(2) |
Pre-emption case —Omission of a necessary party is fatal to pre-emption case—Respondent No. I being a co-sharer was a necessary party in the pre-emption proceeding— Failure to make her a party in the proceeding has vitiated it—The mere fact that her name was not disclosed did not absolve the preemptors of their mandatory duty to impleaci her by ascertaining necessary particulars. Jalaluddin Fakir Vs. Shahjahan All Molla and others, 4BLD(AD)27 |
Jalaluddin Fakir Vs. Shahjahan All Molla and others | 4 BLD (AD) 27 |
Section 96(2) |
Waiver of right of preemption
|
Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan and others Vs. Dengua Mia | 4 BLD (AD) 32 |
Section 96(4) |
Functus officio—Whether the Court is functus officio and cannot extend time to deposit money for rateable pre-emption—The trial Court while allowing rateable preemption directed that in case the appellant failed to deposit money within two months his application for rateable pre-emption ‘shall stand dismissed—The order being capable of automatic operation it became final when the default occurred—The trial Court rightly refused extension of time on the ground that it became functus officio. Abdul Hadi Bepari Vs. Safaruddin Mondal and others, 6BLD(AD)332 |
Abdul Hadi Bepari Vs. Safaruddin Mondal and others | 6 BLD (AD) 332 |
Section 96(6)(b) |
Rateable pre-emptionad justment of deposite—Whether the Court can direct to adjust the amount to be deposited for rateable pre-emption in favour of the transferee from the amount deposited by the pre-emptor in his favour—Deposit’ for rateable pre-emption by a subsequent claimant being a transferee, the Court may in its discretion exempt a transferee—pre-emptee from making the deposit and to adjust the amount due from him against pre-emption money already deposited, if a prayer is made to the Court in appropriate time.’ Abdul Hadi Bepari Vs. Safaruddin Mondal and others, 6BLD(AD)332 |
Abdul Hadi Bepari Vs. Safaruddin Mondal and others | 6 BLD (AD) 332 |
Section 96 |
The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
|
Jamuna Knitting and Dying Ltd. =VS= Messer’s Y. K. Co. Textile Ltd | 14 LM (AD) 139 |
Section 96 (10)(b) |
Transfer by way of exchange not Preemptable—
|
Idris Mia (Ma) Vs. Haji Abdul Mannan Sarker and others | 4 MLR (AD) 18 |
Section 96 |
Partial pre-emption can be allowed–– The trial Court as well as the
Appellate Court refused to allow pre-emption. However, the High Court
Division in revision allowed partial pre-emption relying on the case of
Karimunnessa Begum Chowdhurani and others Vs. Niranjan Chowdhury & another,
reported in 43 DLR (AD)108. ––In the cases of Ahmed Hossain & ors. Vs.
Basharat Ali and ors. reported in 32 DLR (AD)54, wherein principle of
partial pre-emption has been discussed. ––Reported in 31 DLR (AD)88
pre-emption was allowed to a contiguous land holder in respect of two out
of three plots comprising the land transferred. In the cases of Haji
Tajamal Ali being dead his heirs: Kamarunnessa and ors. Vs. Abdus Sattar
and others reported in 34 DLR (AD)217, it has been observed as follows:
“This rule (partial pre-emption) is applicable to a case where
pre-emption is sought by a co-sharer tenant who is required to pre-empt the
entire (wrongly typed as enslre) land transferred, but is not applicable in
a case where a contiguous land holder seeks pre-emption and
‘contiguity’ being the only basis for his claim, he may pre-empt only
that part of the land transferred to which his land is contiguous unless
the land transferred is a compact block of area.”
|
Muntachir =VS= Ruposhi Begum | 15 LM (AD) 1 |
Section 96 |
The suit land was wrongly recorded in Khas Khatian No. 1 in the name of the
government–– The defendant No. 1 claims that the government gave lease
of the suit land to Abdul Mannan and some others, but the defendant No. 1
could not produce any document in support of the said lease. Moreover, none
of the lessees deposed before the Court to prove the claim. ––Regarding
possession, the plaintiff examined four witnesses including himself. P.W.1
deposed that he is in possession of the suit land. P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 also
deposed supporting the possession of the plain-tiff in the suit land.
|
DC, Noakhali =VS= Md. Rafiquzzaman Bhuiyan | 15 LM (AD) 197 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption–– In the instant case, the trial Court allowed the preemption and the Court of appeal below being the final Court of fact affirmed the judgment and order passed by the trial Court.––However, in revision the High Court Division held that the alleged transfer was not out and out sale but it was an exchange (ewaj) and, that the pre-emptor failed to prove that the alleged transfer was not a deed of ewaj, rather sale deed. ––From the evidence, it reveals that to defeat the right of the pre-emptor the alleged transaction was made showing exchange. The High Court Division measurably failed to appreciate this aspect and thus, miscarriage of justice has been occurred. .....Uzzal Sarker =VS= Kutub Uddin, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 437] ....View Full Judgment |
Uzzal Sarker =VS= Kutub Uddin | 15 LM (AD) 437 |
Section 96 (10) (b) |
Pre-emption–– The suit is bad for defect of parties but the High Court Division non-considering the same reversed the findings of the last court of fact–– On conclusion of the trial, the learned Senior Assistant Judge, Burichang, Comilla Sadar, Comilla after hearing the parties, considering the evidences and documents on record allowed the pre-emption case in favour of the pre-emptor by his judgment and order dated 6-9-1998. ––Feeling aggrieved, by the judgment and order of the trial Court, the pre-emptees as appellants preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No.82 of 1998 before the learned District Judge, Commilla. On transfer, the learned Additional District Judge, First Court, Comilla by his judgment and order dated 20-11-2002 allowed the appeal, and, thereby, set-aside the judgment and order of the trial Court, and, dismissed the pre-emption Case No.13 of 1997. A single Bench of the High Court Division upon hearing the parties, made the Rule absolute by the impugned judgment and order dated 20-3-2007, and set-aside the judgment and order of the Appellate Court below, and, affirmed the judgment and order of the trial Court. The impugned deed clearly shows that the case land was exchanged through a deed of exchange and in that view of the matter the pre-emption case was not maintainable as per clause (b) of Sub-section 10 of section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 and thus the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set-aside. ––Appellate Division opines that the single Judge of the High Court Division upon erroneous view made the Rule absolute by the impugned judgment and order which is liable to be set-aside. .....Shiraj Ali =VS= Shahid Meah, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 452] ....View Full Judgment |
Shiraj Ali =VS= Shahid Meah | 15 LM (AD) 452 |
Section 96 |
The trial Court after hearing the parties allowed the pre-emption finding that the pre-emptor was a co-sharer by inheritance and that the pre-emptee failed to prove that he was also co-sharer which was affirmed upto to the High Court Division. Any ground not canvassed before the Courts below cannot be raised before the Appellate Division. Abdul Kashem vs Amirun Nahar 11 BLC (AD) 147. |
Abdul Kashem vs Amirun Nahar | 11 BLC (AD) 147 |
Section 96 |
Ex-parte order which has been obtained by practising fraud cannot be sustained–– It is well settled principle that a decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non-est in the eye of law. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated and cannot be allowed to stand. This is fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration, the High Court Division erred in law in maintaining the order of pre-emption partially. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 29.04.2007 and 30.04.2007 passed by the High Court Division in Civil Revision No.5369 of 2000 is hereby set aside. .....Md. Shafiullah Patwari =VS= Momin Mia, (Civil), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 476] ....View Full Judgment |
Md. Shafiullah Patwari =VS= Momin Mia | 15 LM (AD) 476 |
Section 96 |
অগ্রক্রয়যোগ্য- গ্রামাঞ্চলে অবস্থিত জমি রাষ্ট্রীয় অধিগ্রহণ ও প্রজাস্বত্ব আইনের ৯৬ ধারা অনুসারে অগ্রক্রয়যোগ্য, যদিও সে জমি বসতবাড়ি হিসেবে ব্যবহৃত হয়- আপিল বিভাগে নিষ্পত্তিকৃত বিভিন্ন মামলায় অনেক সিদ্ধান্ত রয়েছে যেখানে বলা হয়েছে যে, "আইনে এখন এটা প্রতিষ্ঠিত যে মিউনিসিপিলিটির বাইরে রায়তের বসতবাড়ি রাষ্ট্রীয় অধিগ্রহণ ও প্রজাস্বত্ব আইনের ৯৬ ধারা অগ্রক্রয়যোগ্য" (স্ব-অনুদিত)। আপিল বিভাগের বিচারপতি জনাব রুহুল আমিন মো: ফজলু মিয়া এবং অন্যান্য বনাম আসাবুর রহমান এবং অন্যান্য, ১০ বি. এল. সি. (এডি)১০ মামলায় এই অভিমতটি ব্যক্ত করেন। অত্র বিভাগ ২০১৩ খ্রিস্টাব্দে আব্দুল কুদ্দুস বনাম রাকিব আলি এবং অন্যান্য ১ সি. এল. আর. (২০১৩)১৩৩, মামলায় একই দৃষ্টিভঙ্গি ব্যক্ত করেন যেখানে বলা হয়েছে যে ,"এটা সুস্পষ্টভাবে প্রতিষ্ঠিত যে, গ্রামাঞ্চলে অবস্থিত জমি রাষ্ট্রীয় অধিগ্রহণ ও প্রজাস্বত্ব আইনের ৯৬ ধারা অনুসারে অগ্রক্রয়যোগ্য, যদিও সে জমি বসতবাড়ি হিসেবে ব্যবহৃত হয়"। ...মোঃ নুরুল ইসলাম বনাম সফুরুন্নেসা, (Civil), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 290] ....View Full Judgment |
Nurul Islam =VS= Sofurunnesa/ নুরুল ইসলাম (মোঃ) =বনাম= সফুরুন্নেসা | 10 LM (AD) 290 |
Section-96 |
State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Alhaj Md. Maruf Hasan Swapan & another =VS= Kohinur Aziz & others | 1 LM (AD) 273 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption–
|
Abdul Mobin (Md.) =VS= Abdur Rab | 4 LM (AD) 6 |
Section 96 |
The prayers for preemption of the original preemptor and the co-preemptor of the case land are allowed in equal share. The original preemptor shall be entitled to withdraw the money deposited by him in excess of his proportion. .....Masum Ali (Md) =VS= Laynur Begum, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 266] ....View Full Judgment |
Masum Ali (Md) =VS= Laynur Begum | 3 LM (AD) 266 |
Section 96 |
State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Shantipada Shil =VS= Sunil Kumar Sarker | 3 LM (AD) 459 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption–
|
Syed Emdad Hussain =VS= Muzahar Ali Mallick | 3 LM (AD) 466 |
Section 96 |
We must state the law that the pre-emptors were not at all required to file a separate suit for the declaration that the deed in question was not an ewaj deed, but it was an out and out sale deed, as the question could very well be raised and decided in the miscellaneous case itself filed for pre-emption of the land transferred by the deed in question. And it appears to us that the suit was filed on misconception of law by the Bar at the woe of pre-emptors. .....Ruhul Amin (Md) =VS= Md Forkan Ullah, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 65] ....View Full Judgment |
Ruhul Amin (Md) =VS= Md Forkan Ullah | 5 LM (AD) 65 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption–– It is true, the right of pre-emption accrues after transfer of the land and statutory right of pre-emption cannot be taken away by mere verbal assurance of the person having such right unless other facts and circumstances clearly make out a case of acquiescence or waiver. 'Acquiescence'–– In this case, the lower Appellate Court arrived at finding that the pre-emptor Md. Saher Ali was a co-sharer by inheritance of the case holding, the case was not barred by limitation and also not bad from having defect of parties. In addition, the High Court Division too concurred with these findings of the Courts below.–– It is the long standing prime principle of appreciation of evidence that finding of facts, arrived at by the lower Appellate Court is immune from interference in revisional jurisdiction, apart from in certain well definite circumstances such as non-consideration and misreading of material evidence affecting the merit of the case, or misconception, misapplication or misapprehension of law.–– Appellate Division finds no substance in all of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants. The High Court Division upon correct assessment of the materials on record arrived at a correct decision. This Division, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the same. .....Dr. Nurul Huq =VS= Md. Shaher Ali, (Civil), 2022(2) [13 LM (AD) 29] ....View Full Judgment |
Dr. Nurul Huq =VS= Md. Shaher Ali | 13 LM (AD) 29 |
Section 96 |
Whether the pre-emptors had no locus-standi to file the case as the case
khatian had already been separated–
|
Akhtaruzzaman Mollah(Md.) =VS= Jahirul Alam | 5 LM (AD) 166 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption of the case–
|
Tafazzal Haq (Md.) =VS= Nazrul Islam (Md.) | 5 LM (AD) 284 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption of the case–
|
Ramoni Golder =VS= Gopal Chandra Chowdhury | 5 LM (AD) 288 |
Section 96 |
Conversion of application filed under section 24 of the Non-Agricultural
Tenancy Act to section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950:
|
Md. Rabiul Islam & ors. Vs. Sultan Mahmud & ors. | 15 SCOB [2021] AD 95 |
Section 96 (3) |
Pre-emption application fail for non deposit of the value of the deed under
Section 96 (3) of the Act, 1950–
|
Ruhul Amin (Md) =VS= Md Forkan Ullah | 5 LM (AD) 65 |
Section 96(10)(c) |
The Appellate Division finds that the two registered deeds were executed on 31.07.2001 by opposite party No. 2 Saiful Islam who is the 2nd party in the divorce agreement. The total quantum of land is 66 decimals which is the quantum of land mentioned in the divorce agreement executed and signed by the parties on 31.07.2001. Thus the nexus between the registered land deeds and the divorce agreement is obvious on the face of the record. The claim of respondent No. 1 that the transfer of land was in lieu of dower is clearly established. .....Md. Shahidul Islam =VS= Sobejan Khatun & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 75] ....View Full Judgment |
Md. Shahidul Islam =VS= Sobejan Khatun & others | 1 LM (AD) 75 |
Section 96(10) |
State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Nur Mohammad Mondal =VS= Mohammad Golam Rabbani | 5 LM (AD) 390 |
Section 96 and 89 |
From a conjoint reading of the above provisions of law it is divulged that sub-section 3 of Section 96 of the Act requires that an application for pre-emption must be accompanied by deposit of the entire consideration money of the property transferred as stated in the notice under section 89 together with compensation @ 10% thereof. The statutory deposit being a condition precedent to the application being entertained, its non-compliance renders the application liable to be dismissed. Therefore, direction for depositing the rest statutory compensation deposit and consideration out of time would not cure the lacuna, thus, is also illegal and without jurisdiction. …Md. Rabiul Islam & ors. Vs. Sultan Mahmud & ors., (Civil), 15 SCOB [2021] AD 95 ....View Full Judgment |
Md. Rabiul Islam & ors. Vs. Sultan Mahmud & ors. | 15 SCOB [2021] AD 95 |
Section 96 |
Conversion of Pre-emption application filed under section 96 of the State
Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 to section 24 of the Non-Agricultural
Tenancy Act, 1949:
|
Md. Rabiul Islam & ors. Vs. Sultan Mahmud & ors. | 15 SCOB [2021] AD 95 |
Section 96 r/w section 90 |
On perusal of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the State
Acquisition and Tenancy Act it appears that the right of pre-emption is not
available to a co-sharer tenant or tenants holding land contiguous to the
land transferred unless he is a person to whom transfer of the holding or
the portion or share thereof, as the case may be, can be made under section
90. …Abdur Rashid being dead his heirs Md Hossain & ors. Vs. Nurul Amin &
ors, (Civil), 16 SCOB [2022] AD 77
|
Abdur Rashid being dead his heirs Md. Hossain & ors. Vs. Nurul Amin & ors | 16 SCOB [2022] AD 77 |
Section 96 |
We have no hesitation to hold that even after subsequent transfer by the stranger preemptee to another co-sharer of the holding, the pre-emptory right of a co-sharer preemptor will not be defeated as because the subsequent transfer is subject to the right available against the original transfer and the subsequent transferee would be impleaded as party in the pre-emption proceeding and he would be entitled to get the consideration and compensation money as deposited by the pre-emptor. …Abdur Rashid being dead his heirs Md Hossain & ors. Vs. Nurul Amin & ors, (Civil), 16 SCOB [2022] AD 77 ....View Full Judgment |
Abdur Rashid being dead his heirs Md. Hossain & ors. Vs. Nurul Amin & ors | 16 SCOB [2022] AD 77 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption– On the basis of the comments of the Tahsilder, Dandkandi
Tahsil Office, the Circle Officer (Revenue), Dandkandi, allowed the prayer
of the pre-emptor and eventually, the pre-emptor’s name was mutated. And
accordingly, the pre-emptor started paying rents separately. So factually
and legally, there was no separation or sub-division of the case holding
but separation of jama only to pay the rent. But both the learned Senior
Assistant Judge and the learned Additional District Judge without
considering the relevant provisions of law and the mutation proceedings
initiated by the concerned Tahsilder and the order of the Circle Officer
(Revenue), Dandkandi treated the separation of jama as separation of the
case holding and held erroneously that there was separation or sub-division
of the case holding and thus the pre-emptor ceased to be a co-sharer in the
case holding and therefore, it was not entitled to pray for pre-emption of
the case land as a co-sharer in the case holding. However, both the Courts
below found that the pre-emptor was a contiguous land owner to the case
land.
|
Atiqur Rahman Chowdhury(Md.) =VS= M/S. Marshu Ltd. | 8 LM (AD) 244 |
Section 96(1) r/w 96(4) |
The right of pre-emption accrues after transfer of the land and statutory right of pre-emption cannot be taken away by mere verbal assurance of the person having such right unless other facts and circumstances clearly make out a case of acquiescence or waiver–– It is accepted that the pre-emptor-appellant had the knowledge of the sale of disputed land, he is entitled to pre-empt the case land. Because, on the basis of discussed case laws above along with section 96(1) read with 96(4) of the SAT Act, the pre-emptors’s right to pre-empt the case land accrued on the date of registration of the case Kabala that is on 06.12.2004 and remained intact for next four (04) months. After obtaining certified copies of the case Kabala on 18.12.2004 the pre-emptor filed the case on 17.01.2005, which is well within limitation period. .....M.A. Majid =VS= Shahab Uddin, (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 40] ....View Full Judgment |
M.A. Majid =VS= Shahab Uddin | 14 LM (AD) 40 |
Section 96 |
The Registration Act, 1908
|
Chand Miah (Md) =VS= Alauddin Sarker | 12 LM (AD) 167 |
Section 96 |
Subsequent transfer by the stranger pre-emptee to another co-sharer of the holding, the pre-emptory right of a co-sharer pre-emptor will not be defeated– In the present case the vendor¬-opposite party Sekandar Mia sold the case land to pre-emptee-opposite party Feroj Mia who was a stranger in the case land and said Feroj Mia transferred the land to opposite party no.6 Abdur Rashid, predecessor of the present appellants, on 21.06.1992 who was a co-sharer in the holding as such considering the view taken by their lordship in the case of 50 C.W.N. 806 as well as 35 DLR 238 and also distinguishing the facts of 35 DLR (AD) 225, Appellate Division has no hesitation to hold that even after subsequent transfer by the stranger pre-emptee to another co-sharer of the holding, the pre-emptory right of a co-sharer pre-emptor will not be defeated as because the subsequent transfer is subject to the right available against the original transfer and the subsequent transferee would be impleaded as party in the pre-emption proceeding and he would be entitled to get the consideration and compensation money as deposited by the pre-emptor. .....Abdur Rashid =VS= Nurul Amin alias Abu Taher, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 13] ....View Full Judgment |
Abdur Rashid =VS= Nurul Amin alias Abu Taher | 12 LM (AD) 13 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption– From the judgment of the lower appellate Court it appears that it held that the pre-emptor has no right to file the pre-emption case over the case land because of the fact that the pre-emptee appellant, Dr Forman Ali Miah, when purchased the case land the applicant Nizamuddin was not the co-sharer tenant in the case jote and further held that the pre-emptee has residence contiguous to the case land whereas the applicant Nizamuddin has no such residence contiguous to the case land. The Court of appeal below further held that Kuddus Mollah also transferred some land from the case jote to one Abdul Kader on the same day i.e. on 15-6-1994 but the applicant-Nizamuddin, did not raise any objection to that transfer. Considering all these aspects the Court of appeal rightly allowed the appeal upon setting aside the order of pre-emption which the High Court Division failed to consider in its true perspective. Appellate Division holds that the High Court Division erred in law in making the Rule absolute and thereby allowing the pre-emption case by the impugned judgment and order upon setting aside the judgment of the lower appellate court which is based on proper appreciation of fact and law and, as such, the impugned judgment is required to be interfered with. .....Dr Md Forman Ali Miah =VS= Nizamuddin, (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 138] ....View Full Judgment |
Dr Md Forman Ali Miah =VS= Nizamuddin | 12 LM (AD) 138 |
Section 96 |
The Court of Appeal being the last Court of fact is not open to interfere with in revisional jurisdiction unless it is shown that the same has been based upon gross misreading of evidence or founded on misconception or misapplication or misapprehension of law or of any misinterpretation of any material document or otherwise perverse being contrary to law, evidence and materials on record, while the appellate Court below dealt with all material points raised by the respective party at the time of hearing, as the appellate Court below did not exceed its jurisdiction, rather its decisions were based on exact and precise analysis of the legal aspects involved in the pre-emption case. Whereas the revisional Court appears to be travelled beyond its jurisdiction and thereby made the Rule absolute which is liable to be interfered with. .....Khairuzzaman Mondal(Md.) =VS= Most. Zakia Akhtar (Fenshi) , (Civil), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 700] ....View Full Judgment |
Khairuzzaman Mondal(Md.) =VS= Most. Zakia Akhtar (Fenshi) | 12 LM (AD) 700 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption– Settled clearly that any land within rural area, whether agricultural or homestead is pre-emptable under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act– The pre-emptor was a contiguous land holder while he instituted the case for pre-emption. In the meantime, the original pre-emptor has died and his heirs have been substituted in this case. The documents filed by the appellant before this Court though show that the substituted pre-emptors have sold out some of their lands but on examination of these deeds it is apparent that the pre-emptors still have some lands contiguous to the case land. We find no merit in this appeal. The High Court Division rightly allowed the case for pre-emption after setting aside the judgment and order of the appellate Court below and the trial Court. ...Aftabuddin(Md.) =VS= Abdul Musabbir, (Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 24] ....View Full Judgment |
Aftabuddin(Md.) =VS= Abdul Musabbir | 9 LM (AD) 24 |
Section 96 |
It is now a well settled principle of law that the cause of action under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act accrues on the date of the registration of the deed of sale, when registration is compulsory[Ayesha Khatun (Musammat)-Vs-Musammat Jahanara Begum and others, 43 DLR (AD)9]. .....Matiar Rahman Bhuiyan =VS= Md. Ekram Hossain Bhuiyan, (Civil), 2024(1) [16 LM (AD) 1] ....View Full Judgment |
Matiar Rahman Bhuiyan =VS= Md. Ekram Hossain Bhuiyan | 16 LM (AD) 1 |
Section 96 |
Even if the case land was a part of homestead situated within the rural
area, the case for pre-emption under section 96 of the State Acquisition
and Tenancy Act was very much maintainable.
|
Md. Aftabuddin -Vs.- Abdul Musabbir and others | 2019 ALR (AD) Online 347 |
Section 96 |
Pre-emption– Last and final Court of fact, it’s findings, observations and decisions are not open to be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction, unless it is shown that the same has been based upon gross misreading of evidence or founded on misconception or misapplication or misapprehension of law– The Court of appeal being the last and final Court of fact, it’s findings, observations and decisions are not open to be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction, unless it is shown that the same has been based upon gross misreading of evidence or founded on misconception or misapplication or misapprehension of law or of any misinterpretation of any material document or otherwise perverse being contrary to law, evidence and materials on record. In the present case when both the Courts below dealt with all material points raised by the respective parties at the time of hearing, and the Courts below did not exceed their jurisdictions, rather their decisions were based on exact and precise analysis of fact and legal aspects involved in the pre-emption case, thus interference in the said decision by the revisional Court is serious error of law occasioning failure of justice. This appeal is allowed without any order as to costs and the impugned judgment and order dated 06.04.2010 delivered by the High Court Division is set aside and the judgment and order passed by the courts below is restored. ...Ali Miah =VS= Peyara Begum, (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 31] ....View Full Judgment |
Ali Miah =VS= Peyara Begum | 11 LM (AD) 31 |
Section 96 |
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
|
Alamgir(Md.) =VS= Mosammat Abeda Begum | 11 LM (AD) 592 |
Section 97 |
The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972
|
Wagachara Tea Estate Ltd =VS= Muhammad Abu Taher | 3 LM (AD) 478 |
Section 107 |
The High Court Division discharged the Rule holding that the appellate Court has duly found that the plaintiff Bigraha is in possession of the suit land and further, the claim of alleged pattan by the defendants in the city of Barisal is hit by the provision under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and so the contesting defendant acquired no pattani right in the suit land on the basis of unregistered docu-ment. Moreover, the Exhibits showing payment of rent do not show that those were paid in respect of the suit land. Morium Begum vs State 13 BLC (AD) 131. |
Morium Begum vs State | 13 BLC (AD) 131 |
Sections 116 and 117 (1)(a) |
Amalgamation and consolidation of holdings—Revenue Officer competent to pass such order suo motu—Payment of rent at the old rate even after amalgamation and consolidation cannot set at naught the process which was duly made and acted upon—Wheli order of amalgamation has been passed by the competent authority and in accordance with law its validity cannot be challenged in the preemption proceeding—Prima facie the order was a valid one, its validity cannot be chalenged- for a collateral purpose—The civil Court while dealing with an altogether different matter cannot ignore the order passed by a competent Revenue Officer. Md. Khairuilah Bhuivan Vs. Haji Nurul Alam Chowdhury, 3BLD (AD)179 |
Md. Khairuilah Bhuivan Vs. Haji Nurul Alam Chowdhury | 3 BLD (AD) 179 |
Section 117 |
When a valid order under section 117 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is given, the court is not competent to ignore the said order when disposing of a case under section 96 of the said Act. M Bank vs Nitya Ranjan 39 DLR (AD) 75. |
M Bank vs Nitya Ranjan | 39 DLR (AD) 75 |
Section 117(i)(c) |
Upon partition of the non-agricultural land by metes and bounds by a decree in a partition suit there occurs ceasing of co—sharership among the separate specific saham holders. Alfazuddin Ahmed vs Abdur Rahman and others 55 DLR (AD) 108. |
Alfazuddin Ahmed vs Abdur Rahman and others | 55 DLR (AD) 108 |
Section 117 |
Lis pendens— The expression ‘otherwise dealt with in section 52 of T.P. Act covers sub-division of holding—Mutation of holding during the pendency of pre-emption proceeding comes within the mischief of doctrine of us pendens—Such mutation will not bar the right of pre-emption—Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882), S. 52: Non Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (XXIII of 1949), S.24. Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others, 1BLD (AD)269 |
Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others | 1 BLD (AD) 269 |
Section 117(i) |
Mutation without notice to cosharers—Statutory requirement of notice upon co-sharers before effecting mutation of holding is mandatory and mutation of holding without notice to a co-sharer is not binding on the co-sharer. Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others, 1BLD (AD)269 |
Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others | 1 BLD (AD) 269 |
Section 117 |
The last Court of fact has found that the plaintiff has title in the land in suit and he is in possession of the land in suit as the record of right was prepared in favour of the plaintiff, who has been paying rent for the same when the Advocate Commissioner's report shows that there is no structure of Dagonbhuiyan Charitable Hospital and the Thana Health Complex in the land in suit. There is no infirmity in the finding of the High Court Division regarding the right, title and possession of the plaintiff in the land in suit and that claim of the defendants has not been substantiated by oral or documentary evidence. Bangladesh vs Sultan Ahmed 14 BLC (AD) 47. |
Bangladesh vs Sultan Ahmed | 14 BLC (AD) 47 |
Section 117(1)(c) |
The pre-emptor and the vendor being full brothers, the pre-emptor is
entitled to prevent any stranger from entering into what was their joint
family property–
|
Harunur Rashid =VS= Afruza Khanam | 4 LM (AD) 221 |
Section 123 |
The High Court Division has rightly found that the petitioner's basis of title is a registered deed from her vendor who claims the suit property by oral gift. Being a member of the Hindu Community by the alleged gift petitioner's vendor acquired no title in the suit property. So her vendor Guru Dasi Dey had nothing to transfer to the petitioner. Shahanaz Begum vs Md Kutubuddin 13 BLC (AD) 15. |
Shahanaz Begum vs Md Kutubuddin | 13 BLC (AD) 15 |
Section 143A |
Section 143A is only concerned with the question of possession of the land—Question of title to the land is beyond the scope of this section. Reazuddin vs Jatindra Kishore 37 DLR (AD) 202. |
Reazuddin vs Jatindra Kishore | 37 DLR (AD) 202 |
Section 143A |
Record of rights prepared on the basis of possession—High Court Division cannot interfere with lower court's decisions on grounds which cannot be considered in a case under section 143A. Reajuddin vs Jatindra Kishore 37 DLR (AD) 202. |
Reajuddin vs Jatindra Kishore | 37 DLR (AD) 202 |
Section 143 A |
Record of rights —rectification of—Material question in deciding such a case—An application under section 143A is not a suit for declaration of title but is a proceeding for rectification of mistakes in the record of rights prepared on the basis of possession in the land in question—The scheme of the section shows that possession is the material question. The Assistant Custodian, Enemy Property (L & B) Tangail, Vs. Bholanath Guha and others, 4BLD (AD) 159 |
The Assistant Custodian, Enemy Property (L & B) Tangail, Vs. Bholanath Guha and others | 4 BLD (AD) 159 |
Section 143 and 144 |
These two sections operate in different perspectives so far whether revenue
officer is a court or not-
|
Sahera Khatun (Most.) Vs. Abdur Rahim Sk and another | 12 MLR (AD) 377 |
Section 143A |
The learned Additional Attorney-General argued that the material consideration in a case under section 143A of the Act is the question of possession and since in the instant case the appellate Court which is the final Court of fact on consideration of the evidence clearly recorded a finding that the Government has been in possession of the disputed land and the said finding has not been reversed in revision, the learned Single Judge of the High Court Division has fallen into an error of law in interfering with the order of the appellate Court refusing correction of the record of right. Bangladesh vs Ramiz Mia 12 BLC (AD) 201. |
Bangladesh vs Ramiz Mia | 12 BLC (AD) 201 |
Section 143A |
It is apparent that the defendant did not take settlement of any land relating to the Taluk named as Abdul Taluk, rather he may have taken settlement of land relating to other Taluk which is adjacent to the land of Abdul Taluk. Therefore, the claim of the defendant has not been established and the Courts below without properly appreciating of that exhibit illegally decided the fate of the suit. It appears that the so-called record of right in the name of Abdul Monaf and subsequently corrected in the name of the contesting defendant by filing a suit under section 143 A of the state Acquisition and Tenancy Act is not at all relevant to the suit land and the plaintiff is not bound by the decree of the suit, Famim Khatun us Fazlul Karim 15 BLC (AD) 236. |
Famim Khatun us Fazlul Karim | 15 BLC (AD) 236 |
Section 143(a) |
Writ Petitioners having not enclosed any order of the Revenue Officer pursuant to the filing of their application for mutation and only stated that they prayed to the Assistant Commissioner for mutation of their names who expressed his inability to mutate their names. The High Court Division in no way is sitting on appeal from the order of the Revenue Officer. Since no action or order contrary to law has yet been taken by the Revenue Officer, the writ petition in the nature of mandamus is a premature one. Government of Bangladesh vs M Anwar Hossain 16 BLC (AD) 155. |
Government of Bangladesh vs M Anwar Hossain | 16 BLC (AD) 155 |
Section 143A |
The Specific Relief Act, 1877
|
Hena Begum(Most.) =VS= Abdul Kader | 3 LM (AD) 229 |
Section 143A |
The Specific Relief Act, 1877
|
Hena Begum(Most.) =VS= Abdul Kader | 3 LM (AD) 229 |
Section 143A |
The Appellate Division observed that in a proceeding under section 143A of
the E.B. SAT Act title is not decided and the decree passed in a suit for
title shall always prevail upon the order passed in such a proceeding, so
the High Court Division committed no illegality in relying upon the decree
passed in Title Suit in preference to the order passed in Miscellaneous
Case in interfering with the order passed by the Full Board. Accordingly,
petition is dismissed.
|
Md. Mintu Chowdhury -Vs.- Khurshid Nayeem and others | 6 ALR (AD) 184 |
Section 143A |
It is by now a well settled legal principle that the finding in a suit for permanent injunction cannot be binding in a suit for title– As the ex parte decree passed in Title Suit No.204 of 1946 of the Court of Munsif, third Court is concerned that suit was filed for correction of the record, the trial Court and the Appellate Court rightly refused to rely upon it as the plaintiffs failed to prove their title to the suit land on the basis of their oral settlement as decided in the instant suit. Therefore, Appellate Division does not find any substance on the point of non-consideration of the judgment and decree passed in the said two suits (Title Suit Nos.204 of 1976 and 506 of 1976) on which leave was granted. Since the plaintiffs failed to prove their title in the suit land by virtue of their oral settlement, the Courts below as well as the High Court Division did not commit any error of law in passing the impugned judgment and order calling for interference by this Court. ...Mizanur Rahman Molla(Md.) =VS= Rustom Molla, (Civil), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 23] ....View Full Judgment |
Mizanur Rahman Molla(Md.) =VS= Rustom Molla | 11 LM (AD) 23 |
Sections 144 and 144A |
The presumption as regards the entries in the RS Khatian so attached under section 144A of the Act is rebuttable by leading evidence from the side of the person questioning correctness of the entry made therein. Government of Bangladesh, represented by the ADC vs AKM Abdul Hye and ors 56 DLR (AD) 53. |
Government of Bangladesh, represented by the ADC vs AKM Abdul Hye and ors | 56 DLR (AD) 53 |
Section 144 |
State Acquisition and Tenancy Rules 1955
|
Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation =VS= Nasrin Sultana | 15 LM (AD) 408 |
Section 144 |
The trial Court arrived at its wrong decision because of non-consideration of the material evidence on record namely, the rent receipts granted by the Government and the deed a 90 years old registered deed as well as the SA Khatian and RS Khatian standing in the names of the predecessor-in-interest and in the name of the plaintiffs respectively and the Judgment of the High Court Division is in accordance with law and hence no interference is called for. Abdul Jabbar vs Akter Hossain Bhuiyan 17 BLC (AD) 174. |
Abdul Jabbar vs Akter Hossain Bhuiyan | 17 BLC (AD) 174 |
Section 144 |
Without correcting the SA Khatian and RS Khatian as prepared in respect of
the case lands in accordance with law earlier, the leave petitioner cannot
get its name entered in the recent record of right prepared during
Mohanagar Survey allegedly only on the basis of CS Khatian.
|
Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate vs Rasheda Begum | 15 BLC (AD) 115 |
Section 144A |
The burden of proof, in civil litigations initially is upon the plaintiff,
but depending on the circumstances, it also shifts upon the defendant’.
|
Divisional Estate Officer, Bangladesh Railway, Rail Bhaban, Kamlapur, Dhaka & others | 13 ALR (AD) 11 |
Section 144(A) |
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act
|
Government of Bangladesh =VS= Tenu Miah Tofadar | 14 LM (AD) 30 |
Section 144A r/w |
Bengal Tenancy Act
|
Md. Abdul Hanif @ Abu Hanif =VS= Bhupen Nath | 16 LM (AD) 617 |
Section 146 |
Board of Land Administration—Section 146(1) shows that the general power of superintendence and control over all Revenue Officers is vested in the Board of Land Administration and not in the Government. Moreover, section 146(1) vests the Board of Land Administration with Administrative control over the Revenue Officers and by no means empowers it to revise the order passed by the Revenue Officers under the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. Saifur Rahman Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh and others, 10 BLD (AD) 286. |
Saifur Rahman Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh and others | 10 BLD (AD) 286 |
Section 148 |
State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
|
A.T.M. Nasiruddin =VS= Shirin Ahmed Chy | 3 LM (AD) 45 |
Section 150(1) |
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
|
Abdul Gafur =VS= Md Muklesur Rahman | 12 LM (AD) 200 |
Declaration of title–– |
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act
|
DC, Gopalgonj =VS= Saleha Begum | 15 LM (AD) 387 |
State Acquisition of Tenancy Act- |
The High Court Division as well as this Division inaccurately decided that after the enforcement of the State Acquisition of Tenancy Act, 1950, there established a land lord and tenant relationship between the Government and the plaintiffs. For the establishment of a land lord and tenant nexus linking the Government and the ancestor of the plaintiffs there should exists a lawful affiliation between them prior to the enactment. In Appellate Division’s opinion the plaintiffs’ side was not able to set up such a tie. .....Deputy Commissioner, Ctg. =VS= Abdul Salam Chowdhury, (Civil), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 469] ....View Full Judgment |
Deputy Commissioner, Ctg. =VS= Abdul Salam Chowdhury | 14 LM (AD) 469 |