Act/Law wise: Judgment of Supreme Court of Bangladesh

ALL A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z



State Acquisition and Tenancy Act [XXVIII of 1950]
Section/Order/Article/Rule/Regulation Head Note
Section 2A

Interest of any 'local authority' is exempt from acquisition under the SAT Act. The Municipality is a local authority. Narendar Nath vs Municipal Committee 39 DLR (AD) 16. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 2(12) & 20(2a)

"Hat" or "Bazar" definition of—A hat or bazar sitting once in a week is not uncommon in this country. If a hat sits once a week regularly then it will come under mischief of the SAT Act. The expression "particular days" in the definition of 'hat or bazar' if read together with necessary emphasis that the word 'particular' deserves, then it will be clear that the word 'days' will also include a day as well in view of the provision of the General Clauses Act and the history of relevant legislation. Bangladesh vs Shakhipur lslamia High School 45 DLR (AD) 23. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 2(12) and 20

Non-retainable khas—hat and bazar— Building with shop standing on land within the periphery of a hat or bazar—The land not being physically attached to the hat or bazar, nor shown in the settlement record as such shown in the settlement record as such cannot be treated as part of hat or bazar. Mohammad Doser Ali Vs. Bangladesh and others, .1BLD (AD) 423 ....View Full Judgment

Sections 2(16) and 96

Whether “Tilla Ban” or elevated homestead is non-agricultural land— Whether a holder of a contiguous land can pre-empt the same? —Whether particular land is non-agricultural land is to be determined with reference to the use thereof and if it is held on lease with reference to the purpose of the said lease—It is to be determined upon evidence and there is no material on record to hold the same as non-agricultural land—There seems to be no reason at all for holding that the case land is non-agricultural land—The wide definition of land is capable of taking in even a ‘Tilla Ban’ (elevated homestead land) unless it can be shown that it is nonagricultural land—Non-Agricultural Tenancy Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949(XXIII of 1949), S. 2(4). Sayeda Khatun and another Vs. Rahman and others, 6BLD (AD) 330 ....View Full Judgment

Section 2A

Lease under the Municipality— Whether after the acquisition of rent receiving interest a lease under the Municipality has become a tenant under the Government — Whether he can be evicted from the land by the Municipality — Whether Municipality is a local authority — Whether the land belonging to the Municipality is exempt from acquisition — Local authority is understood to mean an authority entrusted with the administration of a local fund —The Municipality is a local authority — The property had vested in the Municipality which is not a rent receiver and therefore exempt from acquisition of the property — The defendant did not acquire tenancy right under the Government — Defendant also did not acquire tenancy right under the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act since land belonging to the Municipality is exempt from its provisions—General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of l97), S. 3(38) — Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, l949(XXVIII of 1949), S. 85. Narendra Basu Roy and another Vs. Municipal Committee, Mymensingh, 6BLD (AD) 297 ....View Full Judgment

Section 2(13), 117(1)(c)

The Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949
Section 24(11)(a)
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 2(13), 117(1)(c)
Pre-emption– Only separation of Jama/Khatian by a party will cause him to cease to be a co-sharer in the jama but co-sharership will also be ceased by a final decree in a partition suit or by a registered deed of partition– 55 DLR (AD) 108 (Alfazuddin Ahmed Vs. Abdur Rahman), 1 ADC (Abdul Munim alias Tanu Miah Vs. Mahfuzur Rahman and others (1 ADC 515), 54 DLR (AD)126 (Hiran Chandra Dey and others Vs. Md. Abdul Quyum and another) and 62 DLR(AD)250 cases, it appears that this Division held that not only separation of Jama/Khatian by a party will cause him to cease to be a co-sharer in the jama but co-sharership will also be ceased by a final decree in a partition suit or by a registered deed of partition. That means either of the two will cause a person to cease his co-sharership in the case jote. Thus, the 62 DLR case has not overruled the contention that ‘only by a partition suit or partition deed the co-sharership is extinguished’. So in this case by separating the Jama the pre-emptor and/or his predecessor having already lost her/his character of co-sharership in the case jote so the pre-emptor is no more a co-sharer and as such his right to pre-empt as a co-sharer does not exist anymore.
Thus the finding and decision arrived at by the High Court Division being based on proper appreciation of fact and law the same does not call for any interference by this Division. This civil appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. ...Abul Kasem Md. Kaiser =VS= Md. Ramjan Ali, (Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 284] ....View Full Judgment

Section 3

If there is no service for acquisition under section 3 the presumption is, there has been no acquisition under the State Acquisition & Tenancy Act. Narendar Nath vs Municipal Committee 39 DLR (AD) 16. ....View Full Judgment

Section 3(4)(e)

After the abolition of all rent receiving interests in the country there is only one class of tenancy under the Government whose rights and liabilities are governed by a uniform law. Government of Bangladesh vs Abani Kanta Chakrobory 38 DLR (AD) 93. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 3(1), 43(2), 46C and 46E(3)

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions of the learned Advocates of the respective parties and on perusal of the Rule 42A of the State Acquisi­tion Rules, 1955 as well as the application filed by the leave petitioner Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate dated 14-7-2002 and the gazette notifications dated 24-3-1952 and 29-2-1956 as well as ground rent payment receipts issued by the Government revenue office and earlier by the Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate and also the transfer made through registered deed of gift and having regard to the fact that the SA record of right and RS record of right were correctly prepared in the names of the writ petitioners and or their predecessors-in-interest in respect of their respective lands arid also the fact of admission, as to the possession of the writ petitioners in their respective case lands in the draft Mahanagar record of right, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division. The learned Advocate appearing for the leave petitioner, when confronted with the aforesaid gazette notifications dated 24-3-1952 and 29-2-1956, as to acquisition of rent receiving interest and the vesting of lands of the leave petitioners, including the case lands, found it difficult to substantiate the locus standi of the leave petitioner in challen­ging the draft records of right prepared in the names of the respective writ petitioners in respect of their respective case lands prepared during the Mohanagar Survey. Further, with the publication of the gazette notifications dated 24-3-1952 and 29-2-1956 the leave petitioner ceased to have any right, title and interest and possession in the case lands, because of acquisition, and vesting of said lands in the Government. Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate vs Rasheda Begum 15 BLC (AD) 115 ....View Full Judgment

Section 9

Fourth Amendment of the section in 1951 provided that the amendment made shall have retrospective effect with effect from the very beginning. Shafiqur Rahman vs Idris Ali 37 DLR (AD) 71. ....View Full Judgment

Section 9

The appellants need not have joined the pre—emptor respondent because to join in the application for pre-emption filed by contiguous land—holder is unnecessary—Section 26F of Bengal Tenancy Act limited pre-emption to co—sharers only, either by purchase or by inheritance; it did not extend the right of pre­emption to a tenant having land contiguous to the land transferred. Shafiqur Rahman vs Idris Ali 37 DLR (AD) 71. ....View Full Judgment

Section 9

Transfer of land by rent receiver— Transfer of land up to ten bighas by the rent receiver after the publication of notice for acquisition whether valid—after the Amendment in 1961 no permission for such trnasfer was necessary—The amendment had retrospective effect. Mvi Haifzuddin Ahmed Vs. Mahabubul Huq and others, 4BLD (AD) 77. ....View Full Judgment

Section 19(1)

High Court Division's failure to appreciate the approach and findings of the lower appellate Court. A large part of the judgment is devoted to defendant's weakness in the case including rejection of objection under section 19(1) of State Acquisition and Tenancy Act which was wholly unnecessary as it did not prove or strengthen the plaintiffs case.
The learned Judge found fault with the subordinate judge for not considering the weakness of the defendant's case and particularly the rent—receipts produced by him and thus considered himself justified to interfere in second appeal. It must be said that the learned Judge made a fundamental mistake in ignoring altogether that the defendant's case was disbelieved by the lower appellate Court but even then the plaintiff was held not to be entitled to a decree as he could not establish his own case.
Naim-uddin Sardar vs Md Abdul Kalam 39 DLR (AD)237. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 19(1), 22

Leave was granted to consider whether, in view of the provision of section 22 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 the learned judges of the High Court Division were wrong in holding that the lands in question were not liable to assessment of rent. In view of the provisions of section 22 of the Act all lands are subject to assessment and payment of rent. Bangladesh vs Zeenat Taxile Mills 40 DLR (AD) 189. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 19, 22, 23, 26 and 50

Rent of land — Whether an understanding that rent was not payable on an entry in the khatian showing lands to be rent-free can make it escape from payment of rent — The Government direction to pay rent in respect of the lands acquired for and delivered to the requiring body is in accordance with law — No declaration by the Court that the suit land is not liable to be assessed under the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act can be given — Government has no power to grant exemption from payment of rent in respect of lands mentiohed in the Act and if such exemption is granted it will be beyond its power. Bangladesh Vs. MIS. Zennath Textile Mills Limited and others, 8BLD(AD)189 ....View Full Judgment

Sections 19 (2) and 53

Whether the High Court Division committed error of law in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below in the absence of any legal infirmity in such findings ?
The Appellate Division observed that according to the facts of the case Appellate Division finds that the High Court Division has reversed the concurrent finding of facts of the Courts below without specifically identifying any evidence which was misread or not considered by the trial Court or the appellate Court. The decision of the High Court Division is not in accordance with the law and accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgement and order of the High Court Division is set aside. Md. Younus Mia being dead his heirs:
Sohel Ahmed and others -Vs.- Illias Ali Chowdhury being dead his heirs: Mubin Chowdhury. (Civil) 9 ALR (AD) 44-49 ....View Full Judgment

Section 20(2a)

Hat and Bazar—If a hat sits once a week regularly, then whether it will come under the mischief of the Act? If we read the “expression” particular days” in the definition of ‘hat or bazar together and give the necessary emphasis the word particular’ deserves, then it will be clear that ‘days’ will also include a day as well in view of sub-section (2) of section 13 of the General Clauses Act and in view of the history of the legislation of the acquisition of inte’est in hats and bazars by the Government. Government of Bangladesh Vs. Shakhipur Islamia High School, 12BLD(AD)170 ....View Full Judgment

Section 20

Fishery non—retainable—Fishery’ is a non-retainable khas land under section 20 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act and it vested absolutely in the Government. Sharping Matsh&ibi Samabaya Samity Ltd. Vs. Bangladesh and others, 7BLD(AD) 106 ....View Full Judgment

Section 20(2a)

Land or building in hat or Bazar are non-retainable which vest in Government—
Assessment of compensation prior to acquisition are formalities which cannot be decided by invoking writ jurisdiction. Under article 102 of the Constitution writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to decide contentious matter or where title is disputed. Bangladesh and another Vs. Money' Kumar Roy Chowdhury 1. MLR (1996) (AD) 165 ....View Full Judgment

Section 20

The High Court Division took correct view that the plaintiff could not prove that the ex-landlord auction purchased he suit land and made the same khas and thereafter, the same vested in the Govern­ment as excess non-retainable khas land of the ex-landlord. But no paper has been produced by the plaintiff in that respect to show that the Provisions of section 20 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 were duly complied with in the matter of acquisition of khas lands in excess of the limit imposed by law. Bangladesh vs Md Ali Khondker 12 BLC (AD) 160. ....View Full Judgment

Section 20(2a)

The submission of the learned Counsel is of no merit since prepa ration of the compensation assessment roll and the publication thereof has the legal presumption that the land claimed by the plaintiffs is of non-retainable class of land and that as on the publication of the compen­sation assessment roll in the gazette, the land has vested in the Government the plaintiffs are not entitled to raise any claim in the land and, as such, relief sought in the suit was not available to them. Gopal Das Soni vs Bangladeshi BLC (AD) 69. ....View Full Judgment

Section 20, 90 & 86

Appellate Division sum up as under:
(i) Land of a holding or a portion thereof is lost by diluvion prior to 4th November, 1972, the rent of the holding shall on application by the tenant would abate by such amount as would be considered by the Revenue Officer to be fair and equitable.
(ii) The right, title and interest of the tenant shall be extinguished if such land were lost by diluvion or the process of diluvion takes place before or after the date of coming into force of section 86 substituted by P.O.135 of 1972.
(iii) If the diluvited land or a portion thereof re-appeared after the commencement of P.O.135 of 1972 but in respect of which the right of the original tenant or his successor-in-interest whose land was so lost, to re-possession was not recognized or declared by the competent authority or the court, all land so lost, which may reappear on or after 4th November, 1972, shall vest absolutely in the Government.
(iv) In making settlement of the said land, notwithstanding anything provided in paragraphs (ii) and (iii) above, the preference shall be given to the tenant or his successor-in-interest whose interest was lost by diluvion subject to the condition that such land or a portion thereof re-appeared within twenty years of such loss subject to the condition that the total area of land possessed by the tenant or his family does not exceed the ceiling prescribed by sections 20 or 90 of the Act of 1950. v (v) The rights which had already accrued to the tenant or his successor-in-interest on the day of coming into force of section 86 by P.O.135 of 1972 had not been affected but such rights were affected only prospectively.
(vi) If the land or a portion thereof is diluviated after 13th July, 1994, the rent or the land development tax of the holding of the tenant or his successor-in-interest be abated on his application, such amount as may be considered by the Revenue Officer and the act of such loss by diluvion shall be recorded by such Revenue Officer.
(vii) The right, title and interest of the tenant or his successor-in-interest shall subsist of a holding or a portion thereof during the period of loss by diluvion from 15th July, 1994, if such land re-appear in situ within thirty years of loss.
(viii) The Collector, either on his own motion or on the basis of application of the tenant or his successor-in-interest shall exercise the right of immediate possession of the land so re-appeared and shall give public notice of the said fact, prepare a map, make survey of the land and after forty five days of completion of survey, allot the land to the tenant or his successor-in-interest such quantity of land which together with the land already held by him shall not exceed sixty standard bighas.
(ix) Section 86 substituted by the State Acquisition and Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act XV of 1994) shall have prospective operation. .....Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 74] ....View Full Judgment

Sections 20(4A), and 20(5)

Tarapur Tea Estate– The transfer of the tea estate was made by resorting forgery, inasmuch as, the writ petitioners procured a forged permission. Secondly, it is reported that after taking possession, the writ petitioners set up a medical college and established a housing estate and a market. Naturally they demolished the tea plantations and used the land for commercial purpose which is not permissible under any law of the land.
The High Court Division was totally unmindful to the laws applicable in this case or in the alternative, it was totally confused as to the application of law in the matter and delivered a judgment which has no sanction of law. The judgment of the High Court Division is, therefore, liable to be interfered with and accordingly it is done. Accordingly, we sum up our opinion as under:
(a) a religious and charitable trust by way of debutter is created only when a property is dedicated for the worship or service of the idol;
(b) a Hindu idol is founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus;
(c) a Shebait, cannot delegate his duties to another, no matter whether such other is a stranger or a co-trustee on the principle of the maxim ‘Delegatus non potest delegare’;
(d) an idol is a juristic person in whom the title of the property of the endowment vests; but it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner;
(e) the office of the Shebait being used for religious purposes under the Hindu Law, apostasy is a disqualification in the heir and execution of his inheritance as well as for holding the office of Shebaitship;
(f) when a pious Hindu establishes a Deity cannot conceive of its ‘seba’ and ‘puja’ being carried on under the supervision of a non-Hindu religion believer;
(g) the founder of an endowment can confer upon a Shebait appointed by him the right of nominating his successor subject to the limitation that the nominee cannot be a believer of any religion other than a Hindu religion;
(h) the deed of endowment does not permit the alienation of the debuttor property i.e. Tarapur Tea Estate by the Shebait or his nominee;
(i) the transfer of the Tarapur Tea Estate for 99 years by the alleged Shebait is void ab initio.
(j) the writ petitioners are directed to Shift Ragib Ali Medical College and Hospital at a suitable place within six months from the date of the judgment so that the academic education of the students is not hampered;
(k) The conversion of a portion of the tea estate into a medical college, a housing estate and use of the same for other purposes is totally illegal, and therefore, Tarapur Tea Estate should be restored to its original position;
(l) the Deity installed by the founder should be installed at its original place, if it is removed from its original site in the meantime;
(m) the withdrawal of Tk.30,76,189.20 as compensation money from the government by Ragib Ali was illegal and without jurisdiction. Ragib Ali is directed to refund the said amount within 7(seven) days from the date of receipt of the judgment to the legal Shebait of the Deity and in the absence of the legal Shebait, in the account of the Deity;
(n) the writ petitioners Abdul Hai and Ragib Ali are directed to hand over vacant possession of Tarapur Tea Estate in favour of the Shebait of the Deity within 1(one) month from the date receipt of the judgment;
(o) the constructions made on a portion of the Tarapur Tea Estate should be dismantled within six months and the writ petitioners are directed to transplant tea plantations thereon. If they fail to dismantle them, the Shebait shall dismantle them with the help of police and the city corporation, and the costs be recovered from the writ petitioners by the Deputy Commissioner;
(p) In the absence of a legal Shebait of the Deity, the Deputy Commissioner is directed to appoint a Shebait of the Deity in consultation with the ten leading Shebaits or priests of the temples of Sylhet town;
(q) The writ petitioners are directed to refund Tk.5,00,00,000/- (five crore) which they admittedly earned by exporting tea to the Shebait (Para 10 of the writ petition).
The Deputy Commissioner, Sylhet shall monitor the implementation of the directions given above. If the writ petitioners fail to comply with the direction, he shall take legal action against them and shift the medical college to a suitable place by freezing the bank accounts of the writ petitioners and withdrawing money from those accounts for the purpose of taking temporary lease of a house suitable for the medical college.
If the writ petitioners fail to make tea plantations, the Deputy Commissioner shall make plantations by constituting a committee at the cost of the writ petitioners and the amount be realized from their moveable and immovable properties. The Kotwali P.S. Case Nos.117 dated 27.9.2005 and 12 dated 2.11.2005 shall proceed forthwith. The Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, is directed to proceed with the cases expeditiously. The appeal is allowed with cost of Tk.5,00,000/- in the above terms. ...Ministry of land, Bangladesh =VS= Abdul Hye, (Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 230] ....View Full Judgment

Section 22

In view of the express provisions of section 22 even the Government cannot, by an order or agreement, exempt any land from assessment of rent, for the words used in the section are mandatory, namely, "all lands shall be subject to the payment of fair and equitable rents. Bangladesh vs Zeenat Taxtitle Mills 40 DLR (AD) 189. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 42,43 & 44

Provisions made in the sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Act point to inevitable conclusions that every interest which is liable to be acquired under the Act has to be paid for and that except in the cases of acquisition under Chapter-II of the Act the Interests which are acquirable vest in the Government only if assessment of compen­sation in regard to the same has been made and published as provided in the Act. Government of Bangladesh vs Abdul MotalebU BLC (AD) 50. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 43(2) & 44(3)

Publication of a notification in the official Gazette declaring that a compensation assessment-roll has been finally published for a village specifying in such notification the date of the final publication of the compensation assessment-roll is a conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof. After the said notification all interests of tenants in respect of their non-retainable property would vest in the Government with effect from the first day of the agricultural year next following the date of publication. Even if there be any defect in the preparation and publication of the compensation assessment-roll that by itself shall not stand in the way of the vesting. Ali Akbar (Md) vs Government of Bangladesh 50 DLR (AD) 143. ....View Full Judgment

Section 43 (2) Read with Section-44 (3)

Publication of a notification in the official gazette declaring .that a compensation assessment-roll has been finally published for a village or group of villages or local area as the case may be, speci1ring in such notification the date of the final publication of the compensation assessment-roll, as required under section 43 (2) is a conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof. After the said notification all interests of tenants in respect of their non-returnable property would vest in the Government under section 44 (3) of the said Act with effect from the first day of the agricultural year next following the date of publication of such notification in the official gazette. Even if there be any defect in the preparation and publication of the compensation assessment-roll that by itself shall not stand in the way of the vesting. [Para-9] Md. Ali Akbar Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh & Ors. 5 BLT (AD)-145 ....View Full Judgment

Sections 43(2) and 72

Once notification under sub-section (2) of section 43 of the Act is published in the official gazette, such notification is conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof and section 72 of the Act bars a civil Court from entertaining any suit in respect of the preparation, signing and publication of a Compensation Assessment Roll or any Part thereof under Chapter V or Chapter VA of the Act. Bangladesh represented by the Secretary Ministry of L.A. and LR Vs Chowdhury Tanbir Ahmed Siddiky, 17 BLD (AD) 131. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 48(4) 51 & 55

Since the Special Judge is a 'Court' such Court is sub­ordinate to the High Court Division. Any order passed by a Special Judge is amenable to the High Court Division under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Government of Bangladesh vs Abdul MotalebU BLC (AD) 50. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 51 and 81A

Pre-emption—Non-agricultural land— Omission of sub-section (2) and (3) in section 81 and insertion of section 81A in State Acquisition and Tenancy Act have not rendered section 24 of Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act ineffective or impliedly repealed—Section 24 of Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and not section 96 of State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is applicable for pre-emption of land falling within Municipal area. Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others, 1BLD(AD)269 ....View Full Judgment

Section 75A

No estoppel against Statute—Whether this rule of law can be invoked by one to take advantage of his own fraud?—The rule is attracted only when its invocation will defeat the public policy behind statute—If, in disregard of the obligation imposed by section 75A upon the landlord he has alienated his land he cannot subsequently raise an objection to nullify his own auction—The plaintiff—appellant has filed the suit certainly not for the benefit of the Government. nor can there be any reason to suppose that the statutory provisions would be nullified if the declaration sought for is not granted—If he is allowed to succeed it will allow him to take advantage of his own fraud—Evidence Act, 1 872 (I of 1872), S. 115. Sree Sudir Chandra Saha and another Vs Matuan Bewa, being dead her heirs Nazmul Rahman Sarker and others, 6BLD (AD)182 ....View Full Judgment

Section 76

In respect of fisheries which are governed by section 76 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, in the absence of rules framed thereof the Government must follow some standards or guidelines, and must not act arbitrarily. SMS Samity vs Bangladesh 39 DLR (AD) 85. ....View Full Judgment

Section 76

Family— What it means— The expression ‘family’ is to be understood in the height of the given enactment—In so far as settlement of khas land is concerned the expression ‘family’ has not been used in definite sense—The emphasis is only that the land should be cultivable by himself or by members of the family— Evidence was led by the plaintiff to prove that his nephew ploughed the land who resided with him—This evidence was not rebutted—So it cannot be said that the plaintiff did not answer the description of the persons to whom settlement could be made. Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Syeduddin Ahmed, 4 BLD (AD) 61. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 76 and 148

Settlement of Government khas land— Whether can be made to Government servants. their children of female members of the family of a Government servant—Whether such settlement is valid by lapse of time—No settlement of Government khas land can be made in favoui of Government servants, their children or female members of their family— the plaintiff respondents being sons of a Government servant were not entitled to take settlement of Government khas land—Any settlement granted in violation of express provisions of law and Government Circular cannot become valid by any lapse of time—There is no provision of law to cure such illegality—In view of the fraud subsequently revealed vitiating the transaction, delay is no bar to the cancellation. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Maymensingh and others Vs. Satyendra Kishore Roy; 6BLD(AD)169 ....View Full Judgment

Section 76

Government’s right to deal with its properties by granting lease or license--- Lease or license granted by the Government— Whether Government is entitled to deal with its property in any manner it likes or award a contract to any person it chooses without any constitutional limit upon it—Lease or licence to use Government property is regulated by the state for the welfare of its people—Lease of fishery exclusively owned by the Government is a new kind of wealth which the Government distributes by way of settlement amongst the class of people who deserves it— In doing so Government was to enter into agreement but such lease agreement can by no stretch of imagination be termed as ordinary contract entered into by two individuals as trading ventures—On the other hand, when the Government deals with this new kind of wealth for the welfare of the citizens and regulates distribution of such wealth by way of settlement or lease, the Government acts in its sovereign capacity—When authority over- steps or commits breach of rule or even commits breach of principle of natural justice the same can be challenged by filing writ petition—Government Estate Manual, 1958, Rules 205 and 206.
Fishery is non-retainable khas land under section 20 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act and it vested absolutely in the Government. Under section 76 of this Act it lies at the disposal of the Government who may either manage it as khas or make settlement thereof in accordance with rules to be made by them. Sharping Matshajibi Shamabaya Sainity Ltd. Vs. Bangladesh and others, 7BLD(AD, 106 ....View Full Judgment

Section 81A(2)

Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, Sections—85(2) and 24
The object of section 85(2) of the Non Agricultural Tenancy Act was to retain control over non-agricultural land held by a tenant under the Government unencumbered by the provisions of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. Section 8 1A(2) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act determines the rights and liabilities of non-agricultural tenants other than those who have become tenants under the Government by virtue of compulsory acquisition of land . The Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act has not been mentioned to be a governing law in respect of such tenants of nonagricultural land under the Government. Hence, on both accounts, under section 85(2) of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and section 81A(2) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, the ouster of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act from the categories mentioned therein is complete. Section 24 of the Nonagricultural and Tenancy Act has no manner of application to lands of Dhanmondi Residential Area. Md. Mosaddeque Hossain Vs. Dr. Esmat Mirza and others, 18 BLD (AD) 57. ....View Full Judgment

Section 81

Section 81 of the Tenancy Act authorised the Government to lease out khas land to a leasee for any particular period and the rights and liabilities of the lease shall be governed by the terms and conditions as may be set forth in the lease
The Appellate Division observed that the High Court Division found that by Ext. 4 the Government earlier settled the suit land to Jasahimuddin but subsequently it was cancelled and the possession of the land was restored to the Tahasilder, Godagari and further no registered instrument having been executed in support of settlement in favour of Jashimuddin, because of the cancellation of the above settlement the subsequent transfers by Jashimuddin did not confer any title to the defendants and further after execution and registration of the lease deed (kabuliyat) on 4.3.1982 in favour of the plaintiffs 15 years having already elapsed and in the meantime no allegation of violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed having been brought by the Government the lease (kabuliyat) became permanent lease and so the plaintiff-respondents the heirs of Sujauddin, having acquired lease hold right in the suit land are entitled to get a decree for a declaration of their lease hold right in the suit land.
Most. Sharbanu Khatun -Vs.- Md. Nahurul Islam and others. (Civil) 8 ALR (AD) 197-199 ....View Full Judgment

Section 86(1)(2)(3)

Section 86(1)(2)(3) as amended by State Acquisition and Tenancy (Fourth Amendment) Order, 1972. (President's Order No. 135 of 1972) dated 4-11-1972.
Second diluvion of the suit land took place in 1362-63 BS and re-appeared in 1374 BS ­Clauses (2) and (3) attracted because diluvion took place before 'the commencement of PO No. 135 of 1972—Plaintiffs tight was never recognised under clause (3) of section 86—The view taken by the lower court and upheld by High Court Division is correct.
It appears from the footnote under section 79 of the Act (published by the Government) that Notification in respect of entire areas under the Police Stations of Muladi, Mehendiganj was published in the Gazette on 13 May 1958, that is long before 1967. Syed Nizamuddin Mohsin vs Bangladesh 41 DLR (AD) 141. ....View Full Judgment

Section 86

Diluvion and extinguishment of tenant’s right—When diluvion had taken place before commencement of P.O. No. 135 of 1972 and the lands reappeared before the commencement of the Order, the right, title and interest of the tenant got extinguished with the diluvion—The lands having reappeared before the commencement of the Order, it vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances to be at its disposal until the tenant’s right to re-possession was finally recognised by a competent authority—Presidents Order No. 135 of 1972, Article. 2. Syed Nizamuddin Mohsin being dead his heirs Vs. People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others, 9BLD(AD)116 ....View Full Judgment

Section 86

Section 86 by Act XV of 1994 would be prospective in operation and that the new provision would not be applicable in respect of those land which were diluviated and alluviated prior to that date, that is to say, the said land would be treated as khas land of the Government in accordance with the old provision. .....Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 74] ....View Full Judgment

Section 86

The amendment is prospective in operation and the High Court Division is not correct in giving retrospective operation of the substituted provision of sub-section (2) of section 86 of the Act of 1950. .....Bangladesh =VS= Md. Kazemuddin Miah, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 74] ....View Full Judgment

Section 87

Accretion of land to the holding of a tenant—If such accretion is by artificial or mechanical process due to development work—Whether such increment will form part of the holding of the tenant—As the suit was filed in 1963 and Ordinance No. VIII of 1967 was not retrospective in nature the accretion of the land to the holding due to development work would not deprive the plaintiff from the same—Plaintiffs suit is not also hit by abatement clause nor his right is disturbed by the operation of sub-section (2) because the provision is also not retrospective but prospective. Makku Mian and others Vs. Ali Hossain Buiyan and others, 4BLD (AD) 209 ....View Full Judgment

Section 87

The High Court Division correctly concurred with the findings of the appellate Court that the land in question was accreted land and the plaintiffs took lease from the Government in the year 1970 under Section 87 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act and they have been in posses­sion for long 32 years and correctly decreed the suit. Zahur Ali Sk vs Jogendra Nath Samaddar 16 BLC (AD) 35. ....View Full Judgment

Section 89

Distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land in making a gift by a Muslim—There is not indication in section 129 of T.P. Act restricting its application to any particular class of land—After the enactment of S.A.T. Act very little distinction is maintained between incidents of agricultural land and non-agricultural land.
There is no such Clause in section 89 of the S.A.T. Act or section 26C of the B.T..Act as to exclude the operation of section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act in case of transfer of agricultural land. If lands as provided in section 129 of T.P. Act has exempted the owner of urban property, which are generally more valuable than agricultural lands from transferring the same by a registered instrument, why should greater hardship be imposed on the holder of agricultural lands by the requirement of a registered instrument for transferring his interest therein by way of gift judged from different view points. The effectiveness of an oral gift of immoveable, property when properly made has not been curtailed by the language of section 26C of the Bengal Tenancy Act or section 89 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act in so far as it has been preserved by section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act. Jobed Ali Vs. Abu Sheikh being dead his heirs Md. Naimuddin and others, 3 BLD (AD) 1. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 89 and 96

read with
Evidence Act (1 of 1872)
Sections 101, 102, 103, and 104.
It is the settled principle of law that the testimony of a witness cannot be disbelieved only on the ground of relationship if his evidence is otherwise found to be true and withstands the test of cross-examination. The pre-empees shall be entitled to get development cost till getting notice of the pre-emption application.
Md. Habibur Rahman Bhuiyan and others -Vs- Mosammat Galman Begum and others 1 ALR (AD) 133 ....View Full Judgment

Sections 90 and 96

Pre-emption under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885)—Whether the same can be allowed in favour of the pre-emptor applicant who admitedly owns more than 100 bighas of land exceeding the land ceiling prescribed by PO No. 98 of 1972— The question of land holding limitation upto 100 bighas of land does not arise as the Munsifs order was passed in 1967 when there was no law limiting and holding to 100 bighas. Appeal dismissed. Azizur Rahman vs Bhayetullah 40 DLR (AD) 224. ....View Full Judgment

Section 90

The suit land compromises 99 acres which is located in the coastal area. There is no doubt that the suit land is the government khas land. Therefore, the lease was made in violation of section 90 of the State Acquisition of Tenancy Act. We would like to observe here that the government cannot lease out any khas land to any person in violation of law. If the government wants to lease out the suit land such lease should be granted in due process of law keeping in mind the prevailing law of the land. .....Government of Bangladesh =VS= Messers Friends Industries Corporation, (Civil), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 202] ....View Full Judgment

Section 92(4)

Limitation —Question of limitation in a suit seeking declaration that the proceedings u/s. 92 S.A.T. Act was void—Since no notice was issued by the Revenue Officer under sub- Usufructuary mortgage—Limitation for section (3) of Section 92 of the S.A.T. Act inviting any objection against the taking over of the holding as “aboadnoned “ holding the period of limitation prescribed in that section will not be applicable—The suit attracts the general provisions of Limitation Act under Article 120 of the Limitation Act—Limitation Act, 1908(IX of 1908), Art. 120. Province of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Vs. Sailesh Chandra Bhattacharya, 4BLD (AD) 295 ....View Full Judgment

Section 92

Escheat —Question of onus — When the claim is founded on escheat the onus lies on the claimant to show that the owner of the estate died without. Heir—A child of a prostitute mother under the Hindu Law did not escheat to the Government as the Government failed to prove that the owner died intestate without leaving any heir. (Per B.H. Chowdhury, J).
There is no legal presumption as to maternity. Section 112 of the Evidence Act has no manner of application when the maternity of a person is questioned—The question of maternity is purely a question of fact. Plaintiff claimed that Gouri Dasi though a prostitute at the earlier part of her life, later on married one Kalipada Das and that she was born of that wedlock. But the trial Court and the lower appellate Court raised the question whether this marriage is valid. These Courts proceeded on the erroneous view of law that to prove her maternity, the plaintiff is also required to prove her paternity on the basis of a valid marriage. -
[Per S. Ahmed (agreeing) I]
Geeta Rani Dasi alias Shamina Khatun Vs. Bangladesh, 5 BLD (AD) 13. ....View Full Judgment

Section 95 & 95A

The legislative intent of section 95A is that cases of sale attended with agreement for recoveyance whether or not registered would be within the ambit of complete usufructuary mortgage for a period of 7 years and provisions of section 95(4)(5) would apply to such transfers. A contrary view would make the provision of section 95A nugatory and frustrate its purpose. Abdus Salam Sheikh and others vs Puspa Rani Shil and others 49 DLR (AD) 71. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 95 & 95A

President's Order No. 88 of 1972 created special forum for restoration of mortgaged property. But it did not take away right of redemption available to a mortgagor by filing a mortgage suit. Asmat Ali vs Abdur Rafique Mridha and others 52 DLR (AD) 132. ....View Full Judgment

Section 95A

Redemption suit–
Legal aspect of the case, the plaintiffs also failed to prove their case factually. In the plaint, it was asserted that their predecessor-in-interest, Momtaz Miah, paid back the kabala money to the defendants' predecessor-in-interest, Moniruddin as per terms of the agreement and then he got back possession of the suit land and thereafter, he was dispossessed. The trial Court gave clear finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that their predecessor-in-interest paid back the kabala money to Moniruddin and that he got back possession of the suit land.
The trial Court also held that as per the own case of the plaintiffs, the mortgage was redeemed with the return of the kabala money followed by delivery of possession of the suit land, but subsequently, Moniruddin did not execute and register the deed of reconveyance, if that be so, the plaintiffs could not have any cause of action to main the suit for redemption of the suit land and that they ought to have filed a suit for specific performance of contract. We have considered the evidence. The trial Court was perfectly correct in taking the said factual and legal view. But neither the Appellate Court nor the High Court Division adverted the above findings of the trial Court in decreeing the suit.
We find merit in the appeal and the same is allowed. The impugned judgment and order affirming those of the Appellate Court is set aside and those of the trial Court are restored. …Belayeth Hossain =VS= Nasrin Akhter, (Civil), 2019 (2) [7 LM (AD) 40] ....View Full Judgment

Section 95A

The appellant sold the land to respondent No. 1 by Kabala dated 24.6.1967 and the agreement for reconveyance of the said land executed on the same day stipulated a period of 4 (four) years from the said date. The time for reconveyance expired on 23.6.1971 — so the transaction cannot be said to be alive and subsisting on the date of promulgation of P.O. No. 88 of 1972, i.e. on 3.8.1972, section 95A will have no application to the transaction which was past and closed — appeal dismissed with cost. [Paras-7 & 10] Abdul Kaleque Samarnath Vs Abdul Kaleque Samarnath & Ors. 3BLT (AD)-140. ....View Full Judgment

Section 95A

Cases of sale attended with agreement for reconveyance whether or not registered would be Within the ambit of complete usufructuary mortgage for a period of 7 years and provisions of Section 95 (4) (5) would apply to such transfers. A contrary view would clearly make the provision of Section 95A nugatory and frustrate its purpose. [Para-6] Abdus Salam Sheikh & Ors Vs. Pusspa Rani Shil & Ors. 5 BLT (AD)-58 ....View Full Judgment

Section 95A Read with Section-95(4) and (5)

Respondent No. 4 sold .87 acres of land to the appellant by a registered kabala dated 11.1.1965 corresponding to 27th Poush 1371 B.S and handed over the possession of the said land to the appellant. On the same date a contemporaneous agreement was made between the appellant and respondent No. 4 to the effect that the appellant would enjoy the usufruct of the land for 5 years with effect from first Ashar 1371 B.S. toAgrahayan 1376 B.S. and if the respondent could return the entire consideration money to the appellant within the next 2 years starting from the month of Poush 1376 B.S. then the respondent would get back the land and in case of failure of the respondent to repay the consideration money within the stipulated period he would have no right to claim the land or anything from the appellant — In order to recover the disputed land under the agreement which expired on 10.1.72 long before the promulgation of P.O. No. 88 of 1972 on 3,8.72, respondent No. 4 filed R.P. Case No. 67 of 1973 on 25.6.1973 against the appellant for redemption of the land which was allowed — Held : It was a case of an out and out sale with a contemporaneous agreement for reconveyance — relied on 32 DLR (AD) 233 — the appeal is allowed. [Para- 15] Anwaruddin Bepari Vs. The Asst. Comm. (Land) & Ors. 4 BLT (AD)-52 ....View Full Judgment

Section 95

Usufructury motagage- Limitation for redemption—Period for which mortgage can Inviting any objection against the taking over be entered into not to be confused with the of the holding as abandoned’ holding, the period of limitation for redemption—Limitation period of limitation prescribed in that section Act 1908 (IX of 1908) Article—148. Moulvi Abu Bakkar Vs. Nazir Ahmed, 2 BLD (AD) 151. ....View Full Judgment

Section 95A

Section 95A of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act as amended by P.O. 88 of 1972, P.O. 136 of 1972 and P.0.24 of 1973 is not discriminatory and does not violate fundamental right relating to property.
By P.ONo. 88 of 1972, P.O. No. 136 of 1972 and P.0.No. 24 of 197 the provisions of section 95 of State Acquisition and Tenancy Act have been amended and section 95A has been inserted and amended whereby them period of complete usufructuary mortgage has been reduced to 7 years, a summary procedure for redemption and restoration of possession by and to mortgagor has been provided and it has been provided that an out and out sale with agreement for reconveyance shall be deemed to be a complete usufructuary mortgage for a period not exceeding 7 years. It was contended that S.95A as amended is violative of Articles 27 and 42 of the Constitution.
S. 95A is not a discriminatory legislation inasmuch as indebted agricultural tenants who constitute poorer section of the people may be regarded as a class apart for which there appears to be a rational basis having a just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. The removal of factual, social and economic discrimination by legislation is not only sanctioned by the Constitution, it is supported by well established canon of interpretation, viz, the beneficial rule.
Complete usufructuary mortgage presupposes the restoration of land to the transferor either by redemption or by efflux of time.
Bangladesh Vs. HajiAbdul Gani Biswas and others, 1BLD(AD)8 ....View Full Judgment

Section 95A

Usufructuary mortgage—A transfer of a holding by way of an out and out sale with an agreement to recovery or whether the transferor receives from the transferee any consideration and the transferee acquires the right to possess and enjoy the usufruct of such holding etc. for a specified period in lieu of such consideration, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the documents relating to the transfer, be deemed to be a complete usufructuary mortgage for a period not exceeding 7 years. Asmatunnessa and others Vs. Tenu Khan and another, 12BLD(AD)216 ....View Full Judgment

Section 95A

The kabala under pre-emption was not an out and out sale deed but a kot kabala and as such, the same was not pre-emptable–
The Appellate Division observed that the High Court Division held that in a case with 'an agreement for re-conveyance with a deed of out sale as contemplated under section 95A of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is not required to be compulsorily registered as is required under section 95(2) of the Act. .....Dadan Biswas =VS= Abdul Barek Bepari, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 203] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Consideration of the documents as to the devolution of the vendor's interest on the pre—emptor did not materially affect the decision. Bhupati Ranjan Shame & others vs Afizuddin Sheikh 40 DLR (AD) 264. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption—Co-sharer in one of the plots of the holding is a co-sharer in the holding—Impleading of a co-sharer, whether by inheritance or by purchase, in an application for pre-emption under section 96 of the Act is mandatory—Omission to implead a co-sharer in the application renders the pre-emption application liable to be dismissed for defect of party. Sultan Ahmed vs Akhtaruzzaman 42 DLR (AD) 1. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

The omission to implead a co-­sharer was pointed out at the earlier point of time, but the same was not rectified—In the circumstances, the order of the trial Court which was restored by the High Court was not sustainable. Sultan Ahmed vs Akhtaruzzaman 42 DLR (AD) 1. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Long line of decisions of the erstwhile Dhaka High Court has followed the principle that the date of accrual of the right of pre-emption is not the date of execution of the same deed· but the date of registration under section 60 of the Registration Act. Abdul Motalib vs Iman Ali Mollah 42 DLR (AD) 123. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

As a rule no amendment is allowed where its effect will take away any legal right, which might have accrued by lapse of time. Here the transferee has failed to show what legal right had accrued to him which will be washed away by allowing the amendment—Then again as a rule the Court refused an amendment if the amendment introduces a totally new and inconsistent case which may require further evidence to be adduced by the opponent—In this case no legal right accrued to the respondent except the right of rateable pre-emption—The amendment is allowed and it will relate back to the date of the institution of the pre-emption case.
Amendment of pleadings under Order VI, rule 17 CPC—Special limitation prescribed under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act—The question of limitation may arise in two cases (i) whether the claim to be included was barred on the date of the institution of the suit, (ii) whether the claim is barred on the date of the prayer for amendment—In this case the amendment will relate back to the date of the institution of the case. Shushil Ranjan Dutta vs Al­-Haj Moulvi Idris Mia 42 DLR (AD) 110. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Right of pre-emption—Waiver and acquiescence in pre-emption: Facts proved in a particular case may give rise to waiver and acquiescence and a pre-emptor may be held to be estopped from enforcing his right of pre-emption. It will be a question of proper inference from the facts provided in each particular case as to whether the plea of waiver and acquiescence exists or not. Akhlasur Rahman vs Safarullah 42 DLR (AD) 189. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Right of pre-emption—Nature of the right—The foundation of the right is avoidance of inconvenience and disturbance which would arise from the introduction of a stranger into the land. Law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disability upon ownership of a property to the extent that it restricts the owner's unfettered right of sale and compels him to sell the property to his co­sharer or neighbour. The benefit and the burden of the right of pre-emption run with the land and can be enforced by and against the owner of the land for the time being. The right can be waived or relinquished at an earlier date than on the date of actual completion of sale under the law or thereafter. Akhlasur Rahman vs Safarullah 42 DLR (AD) 189. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

When a valid order under section 117 of State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is given, the court is not competent to ignore the said order when disposing of a case under section 96 of the said Act. M Banik vs Nitya Ranjan 39 DLR (AD) 75. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption—Cause of action —Cause of action for pre-emption accrues on the date of registration of a sale deed when registration is compulsory, because the right to pre-emption arises on completion of a transfer. If a pre-emption application is filed before registration of the sale deed, it is not to be dismissed on the ground of pre—maturity if the same is registered during the pendency of pre­emption proceeding. Ayesha Khatun vs Jahanara Begum 43 DLR (AD) 9. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption–
Since the pre-emptees are still co-sharers of holding by inheritance, we are of the view that the High Court Division committed error of law in allowing the prayer for pre-emption against them upon setting aside the concurrent findings of facts inasmuch as such application was barred against the co-shares. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court Division is hereby set aside. …Anwar Hossain @ Babul Miah (Md) =VS= Hakimuddin, (Civil), 2019 (2) [7 LM (AD) 45] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Muktipatra—Its real import­ The pre-emptee failed to prove his motive for acquisition of the case land in the benami of Swapan Kumar—the question of deed of release by him in favour of pre-emptor Momtaz Ali does not arise and so the impugned deed is a transfer deed. The judgment of the High Court Division is liable to be set aside and the pre-emptor is entitled to the pre-emption. Abdur Rashid vs Momtaz Ali Karikar 44 DLR (AD) 270. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Right of pre-emption— Waiver and acquiescence—Statutory right of pre-emption cannot be taken away by mere verbal assurance of the person having such right, unless other facts and circumstances clearly make out a case of acquiescence or waiver. Fazaruddin vs Maijuddin 44 DLR (AD) 62. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

The right of pre-emption accrued to the pre-emptor is not affected by the subsequent acquisition of co-shareship by the pre-­emptee. Abdul Baten vs Abdul Latif Sheikh 45 DLR (AD) 26. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Right of pre-emption is a heritable right—In a pending proceeding the heirs are entitled to be substituted in the place of the deceased pre-emptor so as to proceed with the case. Inu Mia and others vs Mokhlesur Rahman & others 45 DLR (AD) 171. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Principle of contiguity— Pre­emption in respect of two plots transferred when cannot be allowed—Admittedly the pre-emptor 's land, plot No. 2575, is contiguous to plot No. 2574, but it is not contiguous to plot No. 2573. If both these plots were closely contiguous to each other and formed a compact block of land, then only the principle could be applied. Jahiruddin Mollah vs Hosne Ara Begum 45 DLR (AD) 118. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Since the Khatians are different the pre-emptor cannot be held to be a co-sharer in the case holding and as such she is not entitled to pre-emption. Fatema Bibi vs Sree Manik Lal Somaddar & others 50 DLR (AD) 97. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Subsequent becoming of co­-sharers by inheritance during pendency of the case cannot alter the character and status of the original pre-emptor. Momtazuddin Sarker and others vs Abdur Rob and others 53 DLR (AD) 67. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(1)

There being no evidence of record by the pre-emptee challenging the date of knowledge of the pre-emptor about the transfer of the land, the contention that the application for pre-emption is barred by limitation is untenable in law. Jafar Ali vs Hushiar Ali 46 DLR (AD) 187. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(1)(4) clause (b) of sec. 96 (6)—

Court's direction to make deposit in case of rateable pre-emption.
Where the transferee is also an applicant for rateable pre-emption despite the fact that he is entitled to receive back the money he has paid he must make the deposit proportional to the ratable pre-emption, but the court may grant an exemption regarding his deposit in his case. Abdul Hadi Bepari vs Safaruddin Mondal 38 DLR (AD) 265. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(3)(b)

The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants canvassed that it was statutory obligation on the part of the pre-emptor to deposit the balance consideration within the period and since he failed to do so the prayer was illegally granted. This point has no substance.
By opposing respondent's prayer for deposit of the balance consideration the appellants were trying to achieve something indirectly namely, frustrating the very pre-emption proceeding—The payer was rightly granted—High Court Division was correct in taking the view. Serina Begum vs Mafizul Islam 42 DLR (AD) 77. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96( 4)

Transferee—co-sharer—His right to purchase when lost— The pre-emptee tried to resist the claim of the pre-emptor but did not join in the application for pre-emption. Such pre-emptee cannot be granted relief in the name of even—handed justice on the ground that the parties being co—sharers by purchase stood on equal footing. Golchera Khatun vs Sayera Khatoon 45 DLR (AD) 133. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(10)(c)

A cousin sister's son is within three degrees of consanguinity from the donor. Shamsul Islam and others vs Badiar Zaman alias Bablu and another 48 DLR (AD) 88. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Defect of parties—As a matter of fact, some of the S.A. recorded tenants as appeared from the khatian filed in this case have been omitted. In view of the legal position the application for pre-emption was not legally maintainable for non-impleading necessary parties in the pre-emption proceeding. [Para- 12] Indrojit Kundu & Ors Vs. Biswajit Kundu & Ors 7 BLT (AD)-386 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

The land in question was transferred by a kabala dated 18-1-78 and registered on 22-1-81 the respondents knew of the transfer long before the date of registration and as such limitation will start from the date of this knowledge as contended by the petitioners Advocate.
Held : The right to pre-emption accrues on the date the kabala is registered and from this date, the application for pre-emption in this case was filed within the prescribed time. [Para-3] Md. Moslem Uddin & Anr Vs Md. Abdul Hakim & Ors. 3 BLT (AD)-134 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

In the present case admittedly the application for pre-emption was filed after 7 years of transfer and a heavy burden lies on the pre-emptor to discharge the onus of proof that he filed the case within four months from the date of his knowledge. The pre-emptor having failed to discharge the initial onus by adducing cogent and reliable evidence the learned Single Judge ought to have held that the application for pre-emption is barred by limitation. [Para- 13] Abdul Mazid Howlader & Anr Vs. Lahajuddin Howlader & Ors. 4 BLT (AD)-275 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96 (10) (c)

Read with Section-23 of Succession Act, 1925
The learned Judge of the High Court Division erred in law in holding that cousin sisters son is a relation by consanguinity within three degrees from the donor and the transaction in question is covered by Sub-Section 10(c) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 as contended by the petitioners Counsel.
Held In the instant case the parties are Muslims and the Principle of Succession Act, 1925 is not applicable — The learned Judge of the High Court Division applied the principle enunciated in the case reported in 20 DLR 376 and rightly held that a cousin sister’s son is within three degrees of consanguinity from the donor. [Para-5] Shamsul Islam & Ors. Vs. Badiar Zarnan & Anr 4 BLT (AD)-12 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption--Provisions of section 96(2) regarding joinder of necessary parties is mandatory and not merely directory—Consequence of non-joinder Of necessary parties in spite of objection taken is the same in pre-emption proceeding as in suits. Abdus Samad and others Vs. Md. Soharab Au and others, 1BLD(AD) 77 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(2)

Pre-emption—Necessary Parties —Cosharers and contiguous landholders—lmpleading of such persons not necessary if they have not subsisting right of pre-emption or have waived their right of pre-emption. Md. Abdul Jalil Vs. Durjan All alias Siddique Hossain and others, 1BLD (AD) 241 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(2)

Burden of Proof—Onus of proof that the left-out co-sharer has no subsisting right of pre-emption is upon the pre-emptor. Md. Abdul Jalil Vs. Durjan All alias Siddique Hossain and others, 1BLD (AD)241 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption—Application for preemption by contiguous landholder—Preemptor’s land contiguous to some of the plots transferred, but the plots transferred are coii tiguous to each other and in a compact block— Pre-emptor entitled to pre-empt all the plots transferred—Pre-emption is allowed to help consolidation and amalgamation of holdings. Haji Tajamal All Vs. Abdus Sattar and others, 3BLD (AD) 6 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption—Application for pre-emption filed before the registration of the kabala in question was complete—Application premature—Prematurity can be cured if at the time of the trial the kabala was registered, otherwise prematurity would remain—When the question of prematurity was raised only at the appellate stage and registration was complete during the pendency of the appeal, prematurity held cured at the appellate stage. Lebu Miah Vs. Ganesh Chandra Nath and others, 3 BLD (AD)57 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96 (10)(a)

Transfer to co-sharer by inheritance— not pre-emptible—Transfer to a co-sharer whose interest in the tenancy accrued by inheritance cannot be pre-empted—Even if the father of such cosharer acquired interest in the tenancy by purchase he is a cosharer by inheritance—Transfer to such a cosharer by inheritance is immune from pre-emption. Abdul Haque Miah and another Vs. Abdur Rashid and others, 3BLD(AD)103 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(2)

Pre-emption case —Omission of a necessary party is fatal to pre-emption case—Respondent No. I being a co-sharer was a necessary party in the pre-emption proceeding— Failure to make her a party in the proceeding has vitiated it—The mere fact that her name was not disclosed did not absolve the preemptors of their mandatory duty to impleaci her by ascertaining necessary particulars. Jalaluddin Fakir Vs. Shahjahan All Molla and others, 4BLD(AD)27 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(2)

Waiver of right of preemption
Question of waiver of right to preemption—The appellant was impleaded both as an opposite party and as a petitioner and though these two parties were the same persons, they were impleadèd separately—On his death exemption from substitution was sought and granted in respect of the opposite party, but no exemption was sought for and granted in respect of the petitioner—In this circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that the heirs of the appellant would not have claimed rateable pre-emption if substituted— The provision of making parties being mandatory, waiver of right to pre-emption cannot be presumed on a hypothetical ground that heirs of the appellant would not have claimed preen-lption. Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan and others Vs. Dengua Mia, 4BLD(AD)32 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(4)

Functus officio—Whether the Court is functus officio and cannot extend time to deposit money for rateable pre-emption—The trial Court while allowing rateable preemption directed that in case the appellant failed to deposit money within two months his application for rateable pre-emption ‘shall stand dismissed—The order being capable of automatic operation it became final when the default occurred—The trial Court rightly refused extension of time on the ground that it became functus officio. Abdul Hadi Bepari Vs. Safaruddin Mondal and others, 6BLD(AD)332 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(6)(b)

Rateable pre-emptionad justment of deposite—Whether the Court can direct to adjust the amount to be deposited for rateable pre-emption in favour of the transferee from the amount deposited by the pre-emptor in his favour—Deposit’ for rateable pre-emption by a subsequent claimant being a transferee, the Court may in its discretion exempt a transferee—pre-emptee from making the deposit and to adjust the amount due from him against pre-emption money already deposited, if a prayer is made to the Court in appropriate time.’ Abdul Hadi Bepari Vs. Safaruddin Mondal and others, 6BLD(AD)332 ....View Full Judgment

Section 96 (10)(b)

Transfer by way of exchange not Preemptable—
Transfer by way of exchange is not pre-emptable under section 96(10)(b) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act. But when it is established by consistent evidence that although a transfer is shown in the deed as exchange the same is out and out a sale, such transfer is pre-emptable. Idris Mia (Ma) Vs. Haji Abdul Mannan Sarker and others 4, MLR (1999) (AD) 18. ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

The trial Court after hearing the parties allowed the pre-emption finding that the pre-emptor was a co-sharer by inheritance and that the pre-emptee failed to prove that he was also co-sharer which was affirmed upto to the High Court Division. Any ground not canvassed before the Courts below cannot be raised before the Appellate Division. Abdul Kashem vs Amirun Nahar 11 BLC (AD) 147. ....View Full Judgment

Section-96

State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
Section-96 read with
The Civil Procedure Code
Section-115(2), 115(4)
Pre-emption–
Preemptor filed an application under Section 96 of the State Acquisition and tenancy Act in the Court of Assistant Judge, 9th Court Dhaka giving rise to preemption Miscellaneous Case being No.69 of 2006. The case is being contested by the pre-emptee-petitioners by filing written objection. the pre-emptees filed an application for rejection of the pre—emption application on grounds (1) all necessary parties were not impleaded in the preemption application and (ii) in filing the pre-emption application, the preemptor did not comply with the provisions of Section 96 (3) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy - Act as amended in 2006. .....Alhaj Md. Maruf Hasan Swapan & another =VS= Kohinur Aziz & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 273] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption–
It is true that the High Court Division in its revisional jurisdiction cannot reassess the evidence on record and should not readily reverse the concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and the appellate Court which are both Courts of fact. However, it is within the jurisdiction of the High Court Division in its revisional jurisdiction to see whether the trial Court and the appellate Court have misread or left out of consideration any evidence on record. The High Court Division rightly held that the pre-emptor was not able to prove that the transaction was a sale. Hence, we are inclined to agree with the High Court Division that the deed in question is a deed of exchange and, therefore, the application for pre-emption was rightly rejected by reversing the decisions of the trial Court and appellate Court. .....Abdul Mobin (Md.) =VS= Abdur Rab, (Civil), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 6] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

The prayers for preemption of the original preemptor and the co-preemptor of the case land are allowed in equal share. The original preemptor shall be entitled to withdraw the money deposited by him in excess of his proportion. .....Masum Ali (Md) =VS= Laynur Begum, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 266] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 96 read with
The Non-Agricultural & Tenancy Act, 1949
Section 24
Pre-emption–
The preemptor-petitioner while deposing before court, though denied this alleged fact that he obtained the certified copy of the case kabala in the year 1982 for the opposite party No.2, but he did not deny the fact that he was the engaged lawyer of the opposite party No.2. The opposite party No.2 filed Other Suit No.70 of 1982 challenging the genuineness of the impugned kabala. In the circumstances it is not believable at all that the preemptor-petitioner could not know about the case kabala before his alleged date of knowledge. From the facts and circumstances stated above it is rather proved beyond any doubt that the preemptor-petitioner knew about the case transfer in the year 1982. .....Shantipada Shil =VS= Sunil Kumar Sarker, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 459] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption–
We state the law that no application for pre-emption under section 96 of the Act, 1950 can be rejected on the ground of long lapse of time, if the same is found to have been filed within the statutory period of limitation, making the statutory deposit and impleading all the necessary parties and of course subject to the fulfillment of other requirements of law as regards the right of pre-emption of the pre-emptors. So, the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained and that must be interfered with. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court Division is set aside and those of the Courts below are restored. .....Syed Emdad Hussain =VS= Muzahar Ali Mallick, (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 466] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

We must state the law that the pre-emptors were not at all required to file a separate suit for the declaration that the deed in question was not an ewaj deed, but it was an out and out sale deed, as the question could very well be raised and decided in the miscellaneous case itself filed for pre-emption of the land transferred by the deed in question. And it appears to us that the suit was filed on misconception of law by the Bar at the woe of pre-emptors. .....Ruhul Amin (Md) =VS= Md Forkan Ullah, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 65] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Whether the pre-emptors had no locus-standi to file the case as the case khatian had already been separated–
It appears that the High Court Division considered the case of the respective party as made out in the respective pleading and the evidence on record and came to the clear finding that the order of separation of the khatian vide Mutation Case No. 683 of 1995-1996 was set aside in miscellaneous Appeal No. 03 of 1997 and that from the order in the miscellaneous appeal, it appeared that notice was served upon the dead persons named Yakub Mollah and Ramizuddin. The High Court Division also noticed that against the order passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 03 of 1997 cancelling the mutation of the pre-emptee, Miscellaneous Appeal No.301 of 2012 was filed before the Commissioner and the appeal was dismissed upholding the order dated 14.11.2012 in Miscellaneous appeal No.03 of 1997 and came to the conclusion that the pre-emptors were the sharers by inheritance in the case holding. On behalf of the pre-emptor-respondents, an additional paper book has been filed incorporating the orders passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 03 of 1997 and Appeal No.301 of 2012; from perusal of those orders, we found that the High Court Division took the correct view as to the separation of the khatian and the co-sharers ship of the pre-emptors in the case holding. .....Akhtaruzzaman Mollah(Md.) =VS= Jahirul Alam, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 166] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption of the case–
The High Court Division as the revisonal Court upheld the judgment and order of the appellate Court for the reason that the trial Court did not consider the whole aspect of the case, whilst the appellate Court considered the deposition of the witnesses, evidence on record, the impugned deed and location of the suit land.
The appellate Court also rightly refused to accept the solenama, the contents of which tend to show that pre-emptee No.2 was in collusion with the pre-emptors having received money outside the Court. Clearly this was not the money which the pre-emptor had deposited with the pre-emption application.
In the light of the facts and circumstances discussed above, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgement, which in our view does not call for any interference. .....Tafazzal Haq(Md.) =VS= Nazrul Islam(Md.), (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 284] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption of the case–
Both the Courts below also found that the pre-emptees could not prove that the pre-emption case was barred by the principles of waiver and acquiescence. These findings of the Courts below having been based on proper appreciation of evidence on record should not be interfered with by the High Court Division as there is no mis-reading or non-reading of evidence on record.
We are of the view that High Court Division was not justified in setting aside the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below.
This civil appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court Division is set aside. The judgment and order passed by the appellate Court affirming the judgment and order of the trial Court is hereby restored. .....Ramoni Golder =VS= Gopal Chandra Chowdhury, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 288] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96 (3)

Pre-emption application fail for non deposit of the value of the deed under Section 96 (3) of the Act, 1950–
A deed of sale and not a deed of exchange, that the pre-emptors were co-shares in the case holding, the miscellaneous case was filed within time, there was no defect of party were ball based on proper sifting of the evidence and the High Court Division was totally wrong in holding that the deed in question was a deed of ewaz nama and not a deed of sale, the pre-emption application must fail for non deposit of the value of the deed under pre-emption and the statutory compensation thereon as discussed above and accordingly, we find on merit in the appeal and in the same is dismissed. .....Ruhul Amin (Md) =VS= Md Forkan Ullah, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 65] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(10)(c)

The Appellate Division finds that the two registered deeds were executed on 31.07.2001 by opposite party No. 2 Saiful Islam who is the 2nd party in the divorce agreement. The total quantum of land is 66 decimals which is the quantum of land mentioned in the divorce agreement executed and signed by the parties on 31.07.2001. Thus the nexus between the registered land deeds and the divorce agreement is obvious on the face of the record. The claim of respondent No. 1 that the transfer of land was in lieu of dower is clearly established. .....Md. Shahidul Islam =VS= Sobejan Khatun & others, (Civil), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 75] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96(10)

State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 96(10) read with
The Evidence, Act,1972
Section 92
The High Court Division did not at all take into consideration the full purport of section 96(10) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 and that a pre-emption case under Section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act depends on the very nature of transaction i.e. whether a sale or a exchange and further the High Court Division failed to consider that the appellate Court, after thorough discussion of the evidence on record both oral and documentary, correctly came to the finding the transaction was not an out and out sale but an exchange which is not pre-emptible under Section 96(10) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950.
It further appears that the High Court Division failed to grasp the legal aspect to the effect that under section 92 of the Evidence, Act,1972 no evidence is admissible to vary the contents of the documents by any oral evidence and oral or extraneous evidence to contradict the terms of the contents of document is inadmissible. In view of section 92 of the Evidence Act a deed of exchange which is not pre-emptible under section 96 of the E.B. State Acquisition and Tenancy Act cannot be treated as a deed or sale and intention to treat a deed of exchange as a deed of sale is not permitted. The judgment of the High Court Division cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside. .....Nur Mohammad Mondal =VS= Mohammad Golam Rabbani, (Civil), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 390] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption– On the basis of the comments of the Tahsilder, Dandkandi Tahsil Office, the Circle Officer (Revenue), Dandkandi, allowed the prayer of the pre-emptor and eventually, the pre-emptor’s name was mutated. And accordingly, the pre-emptor started paying rents separately. So factually and legally, there was no separation or sub-division of the case holding but separation of jama only to pay the rent. But both the learned Senior Assistant Judge and the learned Additional District Judge without considering the relevant provisions of law and the mutation proceedings initiated by the concerned Tahsilder and the order of the Circle Officer (Revenue), Dandkandi treated the separation of jama as separation of the case holding and held erroneously that there was separation or sub-division of the case holding and thus the pre-emptor ceased to be a co-sharer in the case holding and therefore, it was not entitled to pray for pre-emption of the case land as a co-sharer in the case holding. However, both the Courts below found that the pre-emptor was a contiguous land owner to the case land.
We find no error committed by the High Court Division in allowing the pre-emption applications of the pre-emptor-respondent setting aside those of the Courts below. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. …Atiqur Rahman Chowdhury(Md.) =VS= M/S. Marshu Ltd., (Civil), 2020 (1) [8 LM (AD) 244] ....View Full Judgment

Section 96

Pre-emption– Settled clearly that any land within rural area, whether agricultural or homestead is pre-emptable under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act– The pre-emptor was a contiguous land holder while he instituted the case for pre-emption. In the meantime, the original pre-emptor has died and his heirs have been substituted in this case. The documents filed by the appellant before this Court though show that the substituted pre-emptors have sold out some of their lands but on examination of these deeds it is apparent that the pre-emptors still have some lands contiguous to the case land. We find no merit in this appeal. The High Court Division rightly allowed the case for pre-emption after setting aside the judgment and order of the appellate Court below and the trial Court. ...Aftabuddin(Md.) =VS= Abdul Musabbir, (Civil), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 24] ....View Full Judgment

Section 107

The High Court Division discharged the Rule holding that the appel­late Court has duly found that the plaintiff Bigraha is in possession of the suit land and further, the claim of alleged pattan by the defendants in the city of Barisal is hit by the provision under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and so the contesting defendant acquired no pattani right in the suit land on the basis of unregistered docu-ment. Moreover, the Exhibits showing payment of rent do not show that those were paid in respect of the suit land. Morium Begum vs State 13 BLC (AD) 131. ....View Full Judgment

Sections 116 and 117 (1)(a)

Amalgamation and consolidation of holdings—Revenue Officer competent to pass such order suo motu—Payment of rent at the old rate even after amalgamation and consolidation cannot set at naught the process which was duly made and acted upon—Wheli order of amalgamation has been passed by the competent authority and in accordance with law its validity cannot be challenged in the preemption proceeding—Prima facie the order was a valid one, its validity cannot be chalenged- for a collateral purpose—The civil Court while dealing with an altogether different matter cannot ignore the order passed by a competent Revenue Officer. Md. Khairuilah Bhuivan Vs. Haji Nurul Alam Chowdhury, 3BLD (AD)179 ....View Full Judgment

Section 117

When a valid order under section 117 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is given, the court is not competent to ignore the said order when disposing of a case under section 96 of the said Act. M Bank vs Nitya Ranjan 39 DLR (AD) 75. ....View Full Judgment

Section 117(i)(c)

Upon partition of the non-agricultural land by metes and bounds by a decree in a partition suit there occurs ceasing of co—sharership among the separate specific saham holders. Alfazuddin Ahmed vs Abdur Rahman and others 55 DLR (AD) 108. ....View Full Judgment

Section 117

Lis pendens— The expression ‘otherwise dealt with in section 52 of T.P. Act covers sub-division of holding—Mutation of holding during the pendency of pre-emption proceeding comes within the mischief of doctrine of us pendens—Such mutation will not bar the right of pre-emption—Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882), S. 52: Non Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (XXIII of 1949), S.24. Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others, 1BLD (AD)269 ....View Full Judgment

Section 117(i)

Mutation without notice to cosharers—Statutory requirement of notice upon co-sharers before effecting mutation of holding is mandatory and mutation of holding without notice to a co-sharer isnot binding on the co-sharer. Md. Abdur Rouf and others Vs. Ahmuda Khatun and others, 1BLD (AD)269 ....View Full Judgment

Section 117

The last Court of fact has found that the plaintiff has title in the land in suit and he is in possession of the land in suit as the record of right was prepared in favour of the plaintiff, who has been paying rent for the same when the Advocate Commis­sioner's report shows that there is no structure of Dagonbhuiyan Charitable Hospi­tal and the Thana Health Complex in the land in suit. There is no infirmity in the finding of the High Court Division regarding the right, title and possession of the plaintiff in the land in suit and that claim of the defendants has not been substantiated by oral or documen­tary evidence. Bangladesh vs Sultan Ahmed 14 BLC (AD) 47. ....View Full Judgment

Section 117(1)(c)

The pre-emptor and the vendor being full brothers, the pre-emptor is entitled to prevent any stranger from entering into what was their joint family property–
The evidence on record that the pre-emptor is the full brother of the vendor of the case land. One should not lose sight of the intention of the legislature behind the provisions of law for pre-emption. Essentially the provision exists to prevent any stranger from buying land which form a part and parcel of jointly owned property. The aim of the legislature is to give opportunity to the co-sharers to buy the case land thereby excluding incursion by strangers. In the facts of the instant case, clearly the pre-emptor and the vendor being full brothers, the pre-emptor is entitled to prevent any stranger from entering into what was their joint family property. It has been rightly held that separation of the Jama is not effective since the provisions of section 117(1)(c) of the Act have not been complied with; simply having a separate Municipal holding does not sever the joint ownership of the property unless the mutation takes place in accordance with the provisions of the Act. .....Harunur Rashid =VS= Afruza Khanam, (Civil), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 221] ....View Full Judgment

Section 123

The High Court Division has rightly found that the petitioner's basis of title is a registered deed from her vendor who claims the suit property by oral gift. Being a member of the Hindu Community by the alleged gift petitioner's vendor acquired no title in the suit property. So her vendor Guru Dasi Dey had nothing to transfer to the petitioner. Shahanaz Begum vs Md Kutubuddin 13 BLC (AD) 15. ....View Full Judgment

Section 143A

Section 143A is only concerned with the question of possession of the land—Question of title to the land is beyond the scope of this section. Reazuddin vs Jatindra Kishore 37 DLR (AD) 202. ....View Full Judgment

Section 143A

Record of rights prepared on the basis of possession—High Court Division cannot interfere with lower court's decisions on grounds which cannot be considered in a case under section 143A. Reajuddin vs Jatindra Kishore 37 DLR (AD) 202. ....View Full Judgment

Section 143 A

Record of rights —rectification of—Material question in deciding such a case—An application under section 143A is not a suit for declaration of title but is a proceeding for rectification of mistakes in the record of rights prepared on the basis of possession in the land in question—The scheme of the section shows that possession is the material question. The Assistant Custodian, Enemy Property (L & B) Tangail, Vs. Bholanath Guha and others, 4BLD (AD) 159 ....View Full Judgment

Section 143 and 144

These two sections operate in different perspectives so far whether revenue officer is a court or not-
Revenue officer while acting as Settlement officer in preparing the record of rights under section 144 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 is held to be a revenue court. But the apex court held the revenue officer while effecting mutation under section 143 of the Act 1950, not a revenue court and as such private complaint regarding forged document and its use in the mutation proceeding is not barred under section 476 and 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sahera Khatun (Most.) Vs. Abdur Rahim Sk and another 12 MLR (2007) (AD) 377. ....View Full Judgment

Section 143A

The learned Additional Attorney-General argued that the material consideration in a case under section 143A of the Act is the question of possession and since in the instant case the appellate Court which is the final Court of fact on consi­deration of the evidence clearly recorded a finding that the Government has been in possession of the disputed land and the said finding has not been reversed in revision, the learned Single Judge of the High Court Division has fallen into an error of law in interfering with the order of the appellate Court refusing correction of the record of right. Bangladesh vs Ramiz Mia 12 BLC (AD) 201. ....View Full Judgment

Section 143A

It is apparent that the defendant did not take settlement of any land relating to the Taluk named as Abdul Taluk, rather he may have taken settlement of land relating to other Taluk which is adjacent to the land of Abdul Taluk. Therefore, the claim of the defendant has not been established and the Courts below without properly appre­ciating of that exhibit illegally decided the fate of the suit. It appears that the so-called record of right in the name of Abdul Monaf and subsequently corrected in the name of the contesting defendant by filing a suit under section 143 A of the state Acquisition and Tenancy Act is not at all relevant to the suit land and the plaintiff is not bound by the decree of the suit, Famim Khatun us Fazlul Karim 15 BLC (AD) 236. ....View Full Judgment

Section 143(a)

Writ Petitioners having not enclosed any order of the Revenue Officer pursuant to the filing of their application for mutation and only stated that they prayed to the Assistant Commissioner for mutation of their names who expressed his inability to mutate their names. The High Court Division in no way is sitting on appeal from the order of the Revenue Officer. Since no action or order contrary to law has yet been taken by the Revenue Officer, the writ petition in the nature of mandamus is a premature one. Government of Bangladesh vs M Anwar Hossain 16 BLC (AD) 155. ....View Full Judgment

Section 143A

The Appellate Division observed that in a proceeding under section 143A of the E.B. SAT Act title is not decided and the decree passed in a suit for title shall always prevail upon the order passed in such a proceeding, so the High Court Division committed no illegality in relying upon the decree passed in Title Suit in preference to the order passed in Miscellaneous Case in interfering with the order passed by the Full Board. Accordingly, petition is dismissed.
Md. Mintu Chowdhury -Vs.- Khurshid Nayeem and others(Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah J) 6 ALR (AD) 2015 (2)184 ....View Full Judgment

Sections 144 and 144A

The presumption as regards the entries in the RS Khatian so attached under section 144A of the Act is rebuttable by leading evidence from the side of the person questioning correctness of the entry made therein. Government of Bangladesh, represented by the ADC vs AKM Abdul Hye and ors 56 DLR (AD) 53. ....View Full Judgment

Section 144

The trial Court arrived at its wrong decision because of non-consideration of the material evidence on record namely, the rent receipts granted by the Government and the deed a 90 years old registered deed as well as the SA Khatian and RS Khatian standing in the names of the predecessor-in-interest and in the name of the plaintiffs respectively and the Judgment of the High Court Division is in accordance with law and hence no interference is called for. Abdul Jabbar vs Akter Hossain Bhuiyan 17 BLC (AD) 174. ....View Full Judgment

Section 144

Without correcting the SA Khatian and RS Khatian as prepared in respect of the case lands in accordance with law earlier, the leave petitioner cannot get its name entered in the recent record of right prepared during Mohanagar Survey allegedly only on the basis of CS Khatian.
The petitioner had no locus standi to chal­lenge the draft Mahanagar Survey Khatian as prepared in the names of the respective writ petitioners, at least after publication of the gazette notifications dated 24-3-1952 and 29-2-1956. Bhawal Raj Court of Wards Estate vs Rasheda Begum 15 BLC (AD) 115 ....View Full Judgment

Section 144A

The burden of proof, in civil litigations initially is upon the plaintiff, but depending on the circumstances, it also shifts upon the defendant’.
The Appellate Division considered that since the defendants did not deny the title of the plaintiffs, specifically, in their pleadings or in their evidences and since the defendants totally failed to prove acquisition of the suit land by LA Declaration of 1882 by adducing sufficient evidence, the burden of proof is thus shifted upon the defendants to prove their foundation of recording their names in the R.S. record. Having failed to do so the High Court Division, relying on the case of Cinmoy Chowdhury and another Vs. Sree Mridul Chowdhury and others (23 BLD (AD) 83) and Ali Mondal and others Vs. Md. Anowar Hossain and others (24 BLD 243), rightly came to the conclusion that the RS record has been prepared wrongly in the name of the defendants. Moreover, the defendants neither in their pleading nor in their depositions specifically denied publi-cation of C.S. and S.A. record in the name of Yasin Hazi and his subsequent transferees through his daughter Duburunnessa. Apart from the above all the subsequent transferees got their names recorded and mutated in the government record and accordingly they had been paying rents to the government in respect of the suit land.
Divisional Estate Officer, Bangladesh Railway, Rail Bhaban, Kamlapur, Dhaka & others. -Vs.- Jashimuddin and others. (Civil) 13 ALR (AD) 11-17 ....View Full Judgment

Section 146

Board of Land Administration—Section 146(1) shows that the general power of superintendence and control over all Revenue Officers is vested in the Board of Land Administration and not in the Government. Moreover, section 146(1) vests the Board of Land Administration with Administrative control over the Revenue Officers and by no means empowers it to revise the order passed by the Revenue Officers under the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. Saifur Rahman Vs. Govt. of Bangladesh and others, 10 BLD (AD) 286. ....View Full Judgment

Section 148

State Acquisition & Tenancy Act, 1950
Section 148 read with
The Limitation Act, 1908
Section 29
The main ground on which the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Dhaka was challenged was that the limitation for filing an appeal under section 147 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950(the Act, 1950), as provided in section 148 thereof was 30 days, but the appeal was filed beyond 30 days with an application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the order passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) admitting the appeal condoning the delay was without jurisdiction. From the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court Division accepted the said contention of the writ-petitioner and made the Rule Nisi absolute. We find nothing wrong with the view taken by the High Court Division inasmuch as limitation provided in the Act, 1950 was a special limitation. .....A.T.M. Nasiruddin =VS= Shirin Ahmed Chy., (Civil), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 45] ....View Full Judgment

STATE ACQUISITION AND TENANCY (4TH AMENDMENT) ORDER, 1972
Section—86(2) (3)
If a diluviated land re-appeared prior to the date of coming into force of Part V of the S.A.T. Act, such land would not vest in the Government but if the land re-appeared thereafter, it would vest absolutely in the Government and the right, title and interest of the tenant shall be extinguished. Ganaprajatantri Bangladesh Sarker Vs. Joinal Abedin Dewan and others, 15 BLD (AD)234 ....View Full Judgment